Houthi movement

Houthi movement, Islamic fundamentalist movement in northern Yemen, one of the main actors in the Yemeni Civil War (2014– ), and a close regional ally of Iran in the Axis of Resistance. The network grew out of a revivalist movement among Zaydi Muslims, who belong to a small sect of Shiʿi Islam centered in northern Yemen, that opposed foreign influence on the Yemeni government. Crackdowns against the movement in the early 21st century led it to take up arms, and, with aid from Iran during the civil war, it became a powerful military force. By 2020 Houthi fighters appeared to have the upper hand in the conflict and in an increasingly discrete Houthi-Saudi conflict that had taken shape during the civil war. In 2023 the global consequences of the Houthi movement’s ascendance moved to center stage when, in response to the Israel-Hamas War, it launched missiles and drones toward Israel and disrupted global trade by attacking commercial ships in the Red Sea. After a ceasefire with the United States in 2025 led to a pause in Red Sea attacks, Houthi fighters resumed those attacks in 2026, taking specific aim at vessels associated with Saudi Arabia and gaining control of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

Background and origins

The Houthi movement calls itself Anṣār Allāh (“Defenders of God”). The name Anṣār Allāh evokes the anṣār, inhabitants of Medina who provided refuge to Muhammad and his followers after they fled persecution in Mecca, enabling them to establish the first Muslim community and advance Muhammad’s religious mission. The more popular term, Houthi, refers to the Houthi family, whose patriarch Badr al-Din and his sons Hussein, Muhammad, and Abdul-Malik played seminal roles in the movement’s transformation from Zaydi revivalism to political activism and, ultimately, militancy.

The origins of the movement are rooted in Zaydi society, which in 893 ce became established in northern Yemen. The community, which had long been a minority sect within the Shiʿi branch of Islam, thrived in Yemen and became the region’s predominant political force, despite the occasional challenge to Zaydi rule. The most recent such challenge came in 1962 when the imam, the Zaydis’ political-spiritual head, was overthrown and forced into exile. A military regime—the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen)—was set up in place of the imamate, and throughout the remainder of the decade it was met with fierce resistance from Zaydi royalists who wanted to restore the imam-led government. Despite securing an agreement to end the hostilities, the regime remained wary of empowering Zaydi elites, a reluctance that contributed to the broader marginalization of the Zaydi community.

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Israel-Hamas War: Israel and the Houthi movement in Yemen

The most salient area of marginalization was in education. The Yemen Arab Republic received substantial support from neighboring Saudi Arabia to develop education in the country, partly in a bid to boost literacy and economic development and partly to combat ideas promulgated in the educational system of South Yemen, which had embraced Marxism. But the rapid proliferation of schools funded by Saudi Arabia and using Saudi materials promoted a form of Islam peculiar to the Saudi state, known in the West as Wahhabism. The essentials of Wahhabi thought undermined core elements of Zaydi doctrine and challenged the authority of the Zaydi aristocracy. A particular pressure point was the establishment of the Wahhabi-influenced Dar al-Hadith madrasah in Dammaj near Saada—the heart of Zaydi society. That move, and related developments in that decade, touched a nerve for Zaydis, who were then stirred by what many perceived as an existential threat to their community and identity. A Zaydi revivalism took shape and included the concerted embrace of overtly Shiʿi symbols and ideas—particularly those that venerate ʿAlī and his sons, the first imams in Shiʿi tradition—that would clearly set them apart from the Wahhabis’ emphatic rejection of taqlīd (which involves devoted adherence to religious leaders).

In the 1990s this Zaydi revivalism saw a political opening after the unification of Yemen, the resulting democratic shift, and the fallout between Pres. Ali Abdullah Saleh and the Saudi government over the Persian Gulf War (1990–91). The withdrawal of Saudi aid from Yemen led Saleh’s government to encourage the development of a Zaydi educational network parallel to the Saudi-funded network. That effort included the formation of the Believing Youth movement (fostered by the clerical family of Badr al-Din al-Houthi) that rivaled the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood, which had grown out of the Saudi-funded schools. Zaydi aristocrats and religious scholars, including the Houthi family, also formed Al-Ḥaqq (Truth) Party, whose main objectives were to advance the interests of the Zaydi community and resist the infusion of Saudi religious ideas and practices into the country. The small party, in parliament from 1993 to 1997, stood in staunch opposition to the more powerful Islah (Reform) Party, a coalition of Islamist and tribal factions that strongly favored close relations with the Saudi government. In 1997, amid the ongoing tensions with Saudi Arabia, Saleh took the ministerial post for religious endowments (awqāf; singular waqf) from Islah and gave it to Al-Ḥaqq. But as Al-Ḥaqq grew closer to Saleh, the Houthi family parted ways from the party. The party subsequently lost much of its voter base and never again met the voter threshold to enter parliament. Meanwhile, the Believing Youth movement grew more active as Hussein al-Houthi, a former parliament member representing Al-Ḥaqq and Badr al-Din’s eldest son, transformed it into a politically vocal movement.

Houthi rebellion

In the early 2000s tension brewed between the Believing Youth, which was becoming increasingly critical of Saleh, and the Saleh government, which achieved a rapprochement with Saudi Arabia in 2000 and subsequently aligned Yemeni policy with Saudi security objectives. Saleh’s support for the United States’ war on terrorism and 2003 invasion of Iraq prompted anger from the Believing Youth, which viewed that support as prioritizing the same foreign interests that had eroded the Zaydi community’s way of life in the 1970s and 1980s. It was about that time that Hussein al-Houthi, in blaming foreign actors for the woes of his community, adopted a chant reminiscent of the “Death to America” chorus often raised by another foreign actor, Iran: “God is great, death to America, death to Israel, curse the Jews, victory for Islam.” As the movement grew, the Saleh regime began cracking down on its participants in June 2004 and issued an arrest warrant for Hussein al-Houthi. In September, after months of armed resistance, Hussein al-Houthi was killed by Yemeni forces; leadership of the movement passed briefly to his father and later to his brother Abdul-Malik.

In part as a reaction to the regime’s heavy-handed response, the rebellion continued to grow and defied third-party efforts to reach a truce. The movement’s possession of arms grew substantially, with weapons coming primarily from the black market, members of the armed forces who joined their ranks, and overrun military arsenals. (Concerted efforts by Iran to arm the movement came several years later.) The rebellion in the north, coupled later with unrest in the south, raised broader questions of the legitimacy of the Saleh regime, Yemeni unification, and even republicanism as a viable system of governance for Yemen.

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After the Arab Spring protests in Tunisia and Egypt toppled their respective presidents in early 2011, Yemenis called for the end of the Saleh regime. In February 2012 Saleh handed power to Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, his vice president, but Hadi proved no less divisive—especially as he showed favor to the Houthi movement’s rival Islah Party. Saleh, for his part, later sided with the Houthi movement against Hadi’s government.

Yemeni Civil War

In July 2014 protests erupted in Yemen after Hadi’s administration enacted deep cuts in fuel subsidies. In September Yemeni security forces opened fire on protesters in the capital city, Sanaa, killing several. The event set off an escalation of confrontations that culminated later that month in the Houthi takeover of parts of the city. In late January 2015, with the quiet support of Saleh and his backers in the military, Houthi fighters overran the presidential palace, and Hadi was forced to resign.

In February 2015 Hadi emerged in Aden, Yemen’s largest commercial city and the capital of South Yemen before unification, and he retracted his resignation. In an effort to drive the rebels out of Sanaa, he mustered support for military intervention from abroad, and a Saudi-led campaign began in March as Hadi and his government fled to Saudi Arabia for protection. Mohammed bin Salman, then Saudi Arabia’s defense minister, expected the conflict to last mere months. But it dragged on, and in December the United Nations (UN) began efforts to mediate a resolution. The negotiations failed to produce an agreement.

The Houthi takeover of Sanaa was completed in December 2017. That month Houthi fighters ousted Saleh’s forces from the capital and killed Saleh after he expressed his willingness to engage with the Saudi-led coalition. They fortified their hold as a brief conflict broke out among Hadi’s supporters in January.

The Houthi rebellion was sustained in part by its control of the port city Hodeidah, through which it received most of its imports and revenue. In June 2018 the Saudi-led coalition advanced on the city, hoping that the threat of its loss would force Houthi leaders into negotiating a peace agreement favorable to the coalition. But, because the port was also a lifeline for humanitarian aid to Yemen, the UN intervened and mediated a ceasefire that came into effect in December.

Meanwhile, Houthi attacks were becoming increasingly sophisticated, and it was beyond doubt that Iran’s clandestine Quds Force was responsible for supplying both the weapons and the training. Houthi cooperation with Iran was brought into the open in September 2019 when Houthi leaders claimed responsibility for an attack on the oil-processing facilities in Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia, despite indications that more strongly pointed toward Iranian involvement. Attacks on Saudi Arabia and on ships off Yemen’s coast were among those that prompted the United States to designate the Houthi network a terrorist organization in January 2021 in the final days of Donald Trump’s presidency, but the designation raised concerns over the potential disruption to peace efforts and the delivery of humanitarian aid. The following month, after U.S. Pres. Joe Biden took office, that designation was reversed.

By early 2020 the Houthis had gained the upper hand, while economic uncertainty from the emerging COVID-19 pandemic weighed on Saudi Arabia’s willingness to fight. The conflict began to taper in intensity with a formal ceasefire in place throughout much of 2022, after Hadi resigned and handed control to a presidential council. As Saudi Arabia sought to speed up its exit from Yemen, it began engaging with the Houthi rebels directly in 2023, and in September of that year Houthi representatives went to Saudi Arabia for the first time to meet with Saudi officials. Reports suggested that Houthi leaders and Saudi officials were close to a deal, and the allocation of Yemen’s oil revenue remained the main sticking point.

Israel-Hamas War: Houthi attacks on Israel and Red Sea shipping

Progress toward a formal ending to the civil war was disrupted on October 7, 2023, after an event that shocked the broader Middle East region. Hamas, a militant organization based in the Gaza Strip, orchestrated the deadliest attack on Israel since its independence, leading Israel to respond with a devastating assault on the Gaza Strip (see Israel-Hamas War). The Houthi rebels, acting on their posture as anti-Israel and “Defenders of God,” launched missiles and drones toward Israel and began attacking ships passing through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in the Red Sea. The aggression demonstrated that the Houthi rebels are the Yemeni faction best positioned to project power over regional matters and Yemen’s strategic resources—thus showing both their hand and their resolve to end the conflict in Yemen on conditions that they deem favorable. But the attacks also prompted the United States to take action, launching dozens of strikes against the Houthi rebels in January 2024 in coalition with the United Kingdom. That same month the United States restored its designation of the Houthi network as a terrorist organization.

But the Houthi rebels were undeterred and continued its attacks, inviting further confrontation with Israel and the United States. In July 2024 a Houthi drone struck Tel Aviv, killing one person and wounding several others after it traveled undetected for 16 hours from Yemen. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) retaliated the following day with an air strike on Hodeidah, the port city that served as the main supply chain for both Houthi rebel forces and Yemen’s basic needs. In September the Houthi rebels fired a number of missiles toward Israel. They were intercepted, and the IDF again retaliated with air strikes on Hodeidah. The IDF also struck Ras Issa, another Houthi-controlled port to the north of Hodeidah. The timing of the escalations in July and September, which coincided with intensification of regional conflict between Israel and its neighbors, suggested that they came as a matter of solidarity with the other members of the Iran-backed Axis of Resistance.

In March 2025, after a formal ceasefire between Israel and Hamas lapsed and Israel renewed its restrictions on humanitarian aid entering the Gaza Strip, Houthi leaders threatened to attack Israeli ships in the Red Sea. Days later the United States, whose second Trump administration was reportedly seeking to pressure Iran and its allies into a grand bargain that would reshape the Middle East, launched air and naval strikes on Houthi-controlled assets. Trump subsequently took to social media to warn Iran to end its support for the Houthi rebels, and weeks later Iran entered into negotiations with the United States. On May 6, just days after a Houthi missile struck Ben Gurion International Airport in Israel and Israel retaliated in kind with a strike on the airport in Sanaa, Trump announced that the United States and the Houthi rebels had reached a ceasefire through Omani mediation.

The 2026 Iran war, renewed civil war, and the capture of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait

During the 2026 Iran war, which quickly took on regional dimensions, Iran levied pressure on the global economy by attacking vessels in the Strait of Hormuz and bringing one of the most important chokepoints in global shipping to a virtual halt. Iran’s leadership called on its Houthi allies to apply pressure on the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. On July 13, 2026, a commercial flight from Tehran carrying a Houthi delegation, which had traveled to Iran for the funeral of Ali Khamenei, as well as military equipment and senior commanders and military analysts in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) entered Yemeni airspace. An air strike on the airport in Sanaa prevented the plane from landing, and the flight was diverted to Hodeidah. The Yemeni government claimed the attack, but the Houthi rebels blamed Saudi Arabia and launched strikes on the aiport in Abha, Saudi Arabia, in retaliation. They also announced a blockade on ships passing through or originating form Saudi ports in the Red Sea and, on July 23, Houthi forces struck two Saudi tankers.

As the Houthi-Saudi conflict reignited, Houthi fighters launched an offensive in September to take control of government-held territory along the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, including the port town of Mokha and Perim (Mayun) Island. The swift campaign had been made possible by developments in the Yemeni Civil War in December 2025–January 2026 that pushed armed personnel from the United Arab Emirates out of those areas and left the militias there weakened. Meanwhile, the exchange of attacks between Houthi fighters and Saudi Arabia took aim at one another’s oil infrastructure, including a Houthi strike on the headquarters of Saudi Aramco, and the Houthi fighters escalated their attacks on airports in Saudi Arabia, most notably striking the airport in Riyadh several times in October.