Houthi-Saudi conflict
What is the Houthi-Saudi conflict?
Why was Hodeidah pivotal to the conflict in Yemen?
How did Houthi forces gain control of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in 2026?
Houthi-Saudi conflict, conflict between the Houthi movement in Yemen and the armed forces of Saudi Arabia that began with the Saudi-led intervention in the Yemeni Civil War (2014â ) in 2015. The intervention was intended to be swift and decisive, but the Houthi rebels managed to gain the upper hand, not least because of their early hold on Sanaa and the port of Hodeidah. In 2022 the fighting came to a halt as Saudi Arabia sought an exit from the war and undertook direct negotiations with the Houthi movement.
In late 2025 Saudi forces reentered Yemen to aid the internationally recognized government in defeating a separate secessionist movement. The intervention did not engage Houthi forces, but the defeat of the secessionists left the Houthi rebels room to press their advantage. After the outbreak of the 2026 Iran war, in which Iran sought to pressure the United States by attacking allies such as Saudi Arabia and blockading the Strait of Hormuz choke point, Iran urged its Houthi allies to restrict movement through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. In July, after a confrontation in which Saudi-backed forces prevented an Iranian commercial flight from reaching the airport in Sanaa, Houthi leaders announced a blockade on ships associated with Saudi ports in the Red Sea. In September Houthi fighters advanced on the port of Mokha, Perim (Mayun) Island, and the Hanish Islands, effectively taking control of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Although Houthi fighters took aim at Saudi targets, the far-reaching implications on global oil supply spurred worldwide interest and some level of intervention from powers outside the region.
Saudi intervention in the Yemeni Civil War (2015â22)
The Yemeni Civil War began in late 2014 as Houthi rebels dislodged Yemenâs internationally recognized government from its capital, Sanaa. In February 2015 the government reorganized itself in Aden, the former capital of South Yemen before the unification of the country in 1990. But as the Houthi rebels advanced in southern Yemen, Yemeni Pres. Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi fled Aden, first to Oman and then to Saudi Arabia. Saudi military engagement with the Houthi movement began in March 2015, when Saudi Arabia led a coalition of countries in imposing a naval blockade and launching air strikes to repel a Houthi advance toward Aden. Coalition forces helped drive the Houthi fighters out of most of southern Yemen and maintain a foothold there for the government.
Houthi rebels keep their grip in the north as Yemen falls into humanitarian despair
However, dislodging the Houthi fighters from northern Yemen, including Sanaa, proved far more difficult for the coalition. Saudi-led bombing raids killed thousands of civilians and did massive damage to Yemenâs infrastructure but failed to loosen the Houthi rebelsâ grip on the capital. Yemen descended into a dire humanitarian crisis: In late 2015 more than three-quarters of the population of Yemen lacked access to safe drinking water and sanitation and was in need of emergency humanitarian assistance. The situation prompted the United Nations to mediate in the conflict as early as December 2015, but the efforts were unsuccessful. By late 2016 Yemen faced the worst outbreak of cholera recorded in recent history.
Hodeidah and the Saudisâ last attempt at victory
As the war settled into a stalemate, the Houthi rebellion was sustained in part through its fightersâ firm grip on the port city of Hodeidah. Control of the port allowed the movement to gain supplies, tax imports to northern Yemen, and maintain a strategic presence on the Red Sea. The Saudi-led coalition asserted that the Houthi movement was also importing arms through the port. However, the UN disputed the claim, noting that the Houthi movement more likely smuggled weapons through routes that are less easily monitored. Saudi Arabia blockaded the port in November 2017, but the desperate humanitarian crisis in northern Yemen led the international community to pressure Saudi Arabia into lifting the blockade in December.
Nonetheless, in an attempt to break the stalemate, the Saudi-led coalition advanced on Hodeidah in June 2018 to pressure the Houthi rebels to negotiate a handover of the port. But the UN intervened and implemented a ceasefire in the city in December in order to keep the port open as a lifeline for humanitarian aid. The ceasefire included the withdrawal of forces from both sides, which were then replaced by local authorities, and involved the UN monitoring the cityâs ports and the distribution of aid. The ceasefire remained fragile, as the different parties accused one another of breaching the terms of the agreement. Saudi-led forces obstructed the distribution of international aid, while the Houthi rebels were found to mishandle it.
Saudi Arabia shifts into defense
The prospects of dislodging the Houthi movement from Hodeidah appeared dim. In June 2019 the United Arab Emirates, which had been an important component of the Saudi-led coalition, quietly began disengaging its forces from Yemen as a victory looked increasingly unlikely; a senior official from the United Arab Emirates later claimed that the withdrawal was intended as support for the ceasefire over Hodeidah. In April 2020 Saudi Arabia, facing sudden economic uncertainty from the COVID-19 pandemic, announced a unilateral ceasefire. Its forces continued in a defensive capacity, particularly as the Houthi fighters advanced on the critical government stronghold of MaÊŸrib, but they no longer engaged in major offensives and sought instead to negotiate an end to the war.
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Ceasefire and negotiations
In April 2022 Saudi Arabia, the Houthi rebels, and other participants in the war declared a two-month ceasefire. Days later Hadi, still in exile, announced his resignation and handed over power to a council composed of political and military leaders on the ground. The ceasefire was renewed twice before it formally lapsed in October, although a relative calm remained in practice. In 2023 Saudi Arabia, hoping to speed its exit from the quagmire, began negotiating more directly with the Houthi rebels without the participation of the Aden-based council that had replaced Hadi. In September officials representing the Houthi movement visited Saudi Arabia for direct discussions, with reports suggesting that the allocation of Yemenâs oil revenue remained the main sticking point. The progress of those negotiations was disrupted when the October 7 attack on Israel by Hamas, a militant organization based in the Gaza Strip and allied with the Houthi movement, shifted regional priorities.
Regional conflict (2023â26)
Houthi fighters disrupt Red Sea shipping
Secure in their ceasefire with Saudi Arabia and government forces, Houthi rebels used the Israel-Hamas War to showcase their capability and leverage in regional matters. On October 19, 2023, the rebels launched missiles and drones toward Israel, targeting Israel for the first time despite the movementâs long-held ideological slogan: âGod is great, death to America, death to Israel, curse the Jews, victory for Islam.â On October 31 they became the first militarized organization to launch a ballistic missile toward Israel since 1991.
On November 19 Houthi fighters seized a cargo ship in the Red Sea with a loose connection to an Israeli businessman. It was the first of more than 100 attacks by Houthi fighters on vessels in the Red Sea over the next 18 months. The threat of attack caused Red Sea shipping to collapse to half of its normal level as ships rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope in Africa, adding significant time and distance to their shipping routes. The attacks prompted the United States to take action, launching dozens of strikes against the Houthi rebels in January 2024 in coalition with the United Kingdom.
In May 2025 the United States reached a ceasefire with the Houthi movement. The attacks on ships in the Red Sea largely subsided, but traffic recovered only slightly before the outbreak of the 2026 Iran war brought its own concerns over global shipping.
Saudi Arabia reenters the conflict in Yemen
In December 2025 a secessionist movement in southern Yemen launched a campaign to take control of the Hadhramaut and Al-Mahra regions from the internationally recognized government based in Aden. The campaign prompted Saudi Arabia to reenter the conflict and help push back the secessionists. In January 2026 the secessionists were defeated and their forces were formally disbanded. As part of the defeat, the United Arab Emirates, which had backed the secessionists, agreed to withdraw its remaining forces from bases in Yemen, including in Mokha, on the Red Sea coast near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and on Perim Island, amid the strait.
The fight over the Bab el-Mandeb Strait
The brief campaign in December 2025âJanuary 2026 weakened security in areas along the southwestern coast, which had remained in the hands of the Yemeni government throughout the civil war and took on great significance amid the Iran war that began in late February 2026. Iran defied conventional wisdom during the war when it managed to bring traffic through the Strait of Hormuz to a virtual halt. The blockade proved to be one of Iranâs most important strategies to pressure the United States to end its hostilities and negotiate an agreement favorable to Iran, although an effective agreement remained elusive. It eventually pressed the Houthi movement to do the same with the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
On July 13 a commercial flight from Tehran carrying a Houthi delegation, which had traveled to Iran for the funeral of Ali Khamenei, as well as military equipment and senior commanders and military analysts in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) entered Yemeni airspace. An air strike on the runway of the airport in Sanaa prevented the plane from landing, and the flight was diverted to Hodeidah. Houthi rebels blamed Saudi Arabia for the strike, which was claimed by the Yemeni government. They launched strikes on the airport in Abha, marking the first direct confrontation between Houthi and Saudi forces since April 2022, and announced a blockade on ships passing through or originating from Saudi ports in the Red Sea. On July 23 Houthi forces struck two Saudi tankers, although Houthi leaders, attempting to avoid reigniting conflict with the United States, told the United States and media outlets over the following weeks that their fighters were only targeting ships associated with Saudi Arabia. Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia ultimately extended beyond its ports as the group targeted oil infrastructure and airports. Meanwhile, in early August Saudi Arabia entered into a joint defense agreement (see Mecca Pact) with Turkey (TĂŒrkiye) and Pakistan, as regional threats to all three countries were on the rise.
In September Houthi fighters launched an offensive to take control of Yemeni territory along the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. They swiftly took control of the port town of Mokha and Perim Island, giving the movement direct access to the strait for the first time. The movement then took aim at Taiz (TaÊżizz), Yemenâs cultural capital and third largest city, encircling it on October 4.
Just hours after Houthi forces encircled Taiz, the government announced a major counteroffensive with Saudi involvement. The next day Turkey and Pakistan agreed to activate the Mecca Pact and deploy forces to Saudi Arabia to aid in deterrence; days later France began sending military assets to guard YanbuÊż, the terminus of a vital oil pipeline. The start of the campaign was followed by a concerted escalation in fighting, including several Houthi attacks on the international airport in Riyadh, Saudi attacks on oil storage facilities in Sanaa, and a retaliatory Houthi strike on the headquarters of Saudi Aramco. In late October Egypt also agreed to provide Saudi Arabia with defensive military support, as did Syria in early November.
Background
Tensions between Saudi Arabia and the Houthi movement stem from long-standing grievances within the Zaydi Muslim community toward Saudi influence in Yemen. The Zaydi community became established in northern Yemen in 893 ce and became the predominant political force in the region, which historically included parts of Saudi Arabia that encompass Asir, NajrÄn, and Jizan. In 1962, when military officers in North Yemen overthrew Zaydi royals in a manner reminiscent of Gamal Abdel Nasserâs coup against the Egyptian monarch, Saudi Arabia backed the royalists in a civil war (1962â70). After the end of the civil war in 1970 and Nasserâs death soon afterward, Nasserism ceased to present a threat to Arab monarchies, and Saudi Arabia began offering substantial support for the Yemen Arab Republic that had earlier unseated the Zaydi royals. The republic encouraged the establishment of schools that promoted Islamic teachings peculiar to the Saudi state, known in the West as Wahhabism. The schools undermined the authority of the Zaydi aristocracy, while some of the teachings were fundamentally at odds with Zaydi doctrine, and many Zaydis perceived the rapid encroachment as an existential threat to the community. It spurred a Zaydi revivalist movement in which Zaydi religious scholars launched schools and summer camps in the early 1990s to counter the Wahhabi-influenced institutions. The government, newly unified with South Yemen, encouraged the initiative, having lost support from Saudi Arabia after it sided with Saddam Hussein in the Persian Gulf War (1990â91). The initiative also led to the rise of the Believing Youth movement, a network of Zaydi youths intended as an alternative to the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood that was fostered in the Wahhabi-influenced schools.
A rapprochement between the governments of Yemen and Saudi Arabia took place in the late 1990s, and the restoration of aid began with the conclusion of the Treaty of Jeddah in 2000. That year funding to the Zaydi revivalists was cut. Fierce criticism from the Believing Youth movement toward the governmentâs support of the U.S.-led war on terrorism and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, both of which were firmly backed by Saudi Arabia, led the government to crack down on the movement. When Yemeni forces killed the movementâs leader, Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, in 2004, the movement launched an armed rebellion and reorganized as a militant group that became known to observers as the Houthi movement. In 2009 Houthi rebels took control of a small area across the border in Saudi Arabia, claiming that Saudi Arabia had allowed Yemeni forces to use the area to attack Houthi fighters. Saudi Arabia then pushed the Houthi rebels out in its first direct engagement with the movement.
About that time many observers, particularly in Saudi Arabia, became wary of a developing link between the Houthi movement and Iran. Some of the leaders of the Houthi movement had studied at seminaries in Qom, a major center for ShiÊżi Muslim intellectualism located in Iran, and reportedly trained with Hezbollah in Lebanon, establishing early connections in those locations. Although the Houthi rebellion at the time was armed primarily through the black market, from members of the armed forces who joined their ranks, and by raiding military arsenals, Yemeni forces seized an Iranian ship carrying weapons in 2009 that was believed to be intended for the Houthi rebels. For Saudi Arabia the threat of an Iranian ally along its southern border spurred discussions of a hegemonic competition emerging between Saudi Arabia and Iran in Yemen, with the Yemeni government and the Houthi rebels, respectively, as proxies.
In January 2011 Arab Spring protests broke out in Yemen, and in November Pres. Ali Abdullah Saleh, facing external pressure from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), agreed to step down after an election set for February 2012. When the election was held, his vice president, Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, was the only candidate, and he was sworn in days later. But internal rivalries led Saleh and forces loyal to him to collude with Houthi rebels to overrun the capital, Sanaa, a maneuver that ignited the Yemeni Civil War and, ultimately, the conflict between the Houthi movement and Saudi Arabia.