Floating exchange rates

In the early 1970s, when the IMF system of adjustable pegs broke down, the currencies of the western European countries began to float, as did most other currencies.

However, the members of the European Economic Community wanted an exchange-rate agreement to complement their customs union. An early step was taken in this direction when the nations instituted the so-called “snake in a tunnel.” Exchange-rate fluctuations between EEC members were limited, and the currencies moved in a narrow, undulating, snakelike pattern against the U.S. dollar and other outside currencies.

In 1979 most of the members of the EEC (with the important exception of the United Kingdom) entered a more formal agreement, the European Monetary System (EMS), which had some characteristics of the old IMF system. Exchange rates were to be pegged to a European Currency Unit (ECU), made up of a basket of European currencies. However, there were three important differences from the old IMF system: (1) the flexibility around the official rate was as much as 6 percent, substantially wider than the 1 percent under the IMF system; (2) official rates were to be adjusted more quickly and frequently than the IMF par rates; and (3) the U.S. dollar was not included in the EMS system; thus, the EMS currencies fluctuated as a group against the U.S. dollar.

Developing nations have traditionally borrowed from the developed nations to support their economies. In the 1970s such borrowing became quite heavy among certain developing countries, and their external debt expanded at a very rapid, unsustainable rate. The result was an international financial crisis. Countries such as Mexico and Brazil declared that they could not keep up with the schedule of interest and principal payments, causing severe reactions in the financial world. Cooperating with creditor nations and the IMF, these countries were able to reschedule their debts—that is, delay payments to remove financial pressure. But the underlying problem remained—developing countries were saddled with staggering debts that totaled more than $800,000,000,000 by the mid-1980s. For the less-developed countries as a whole (excluding the major oil exporters), debt service payments were claiming more than 20 percent of their total export earnings.

The large debts created huge problems for the developing countries and for the banks that faced the risk of substantial losses on their loan portfolios. Such debts increased the difficulty of finding funds to finance development. In addition, the need to acquire foreign currencies to service the debt contributed to a rapid depreciation of the currencies and to rapid inflation in Mexico, Brazil, and a number of other developing nations.

The wide fluctuations in the price of oil were one of the factors contributing to the debt problem. When the price of oil rose rapidly in the 1970s, most countries felt unable to reduce their oil consumption quickly. In order to pay for expensive oil imports, many went deeply into debt. They borrowed to finance current consumption—something that could not go on indefinitely. As a major oil importer, Brazil was one of the nations adversely affected by rising oil prices.

Paradoxically, however, the oil-importing countries were not the only ones to borrow more when the price of oil rose rapidly. Some of the oil exporters—such as Mexico—also contracted large new debts. They thought that the price of oil would move continually upward, at least for the foreseeable future. They therefore felt safe in borrowing large amounts, expecting that rapidly increasing oil revenues would provide the funds to service their debts. The price of oil drifted downward, however, making payments much more difficult.

The debt reschedulings, and the accompanying policies of demand restraint, were built on the premise that a few years of tough adjustment would be sufficient to get out of such crises and to provide the basis for renewed, vigorous growth. To the contrary, however, some authorities believed that huge foreign debts would act as a continuing drag on growth and could have catastrophic results.

Benjamin J. Cohen, Organizing the World’s Money: The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations (1977); Richard N. Cooper et al. (eds.), The International Monetary System Under Flexible Exchange Rates: Global, Regional, and National (1982); Richard N. Cooper, Macroeconomic Policy Adjustment in Interdependent Economies (1969); Paul Einzig and Brian Scott Quinn, The Euro-Dollar System: Practice and Theory of International Interest Rates, 6th ed. (1977); J. Marcus Fleming, Guidelines for Balance-of-Payments Adjustment Under the Par-Value System (1968); Anne O. Krueger, Exchange-Rate Determination (1983); Gerald M. Meier, Problems of Trade Policy (1973), Problems of a World Monetary Order, 2nd ed. (1982), and Problems of Cooperation for Development (1974); Robert A. Mundell, International Economics (1968); Robert Solomon, The International Monetary System, 1945–1981, new ed. (1982); and Robert Triffin, Gold and the Dollar Crisis: The Future of Convertibility (1960, reprinted 1983), in which the author points out the contradictions in the IMF system. A suggestion for target zones for exchange rates is presented in John Williamson, The Exchange Rate System, 2nd ed. (1985). International debt is specifically discussed in Bela Balassa et al., Toward Renewed Economic Growth in Latin America (1986); William R. Cline, International Debt: Systemic Risk and Policy Response, new ed. (1984); Thomas O. Enders and Richard P. Mattione, Latin America: The Crisis of Debt and Growth (1984); and Carol Lancaster and John Williamson (eds.), African Debt and Financing (1986).