Prices may rise even when aggregate demand is not in excess of the supply potential. This may be due to wage increases and other factors. Some hold that this can be dealt with through efforts to discourage excessive wage increases by a direct approach, which may consist of a propaganda campaign on the evil effects of wage-price inflation, together with guidelines governing rates of wage increases. This direct attempt to deal with the problem is generally known as “incomes policy.”

Exchange-rate movements work by making the products of a deficit country more price competitive or those of a surplus country less price competitive. Any program that seeks to rectify an imbalance by changing the level of prices will be effective only if demand is “price elastic.” In other words, if the offer of an article at a lower price does not cause an increase in demand for it more than in proportion to the fall in price, the proceeds from its export will fall rather than increase. Economists believe that price elasticities are sufficiently great for most goods so that price reductions will increase revenues in the long run. The outcome is not quite so certain in the short run.

A fast means of changing relative price levels is devaluation, which is likely to have a quick effect on the prices of imported goods. This will raise the cost of living and may thereby accelerate demands for higher wages. If granted, these will probably cause rises in the prices of domestically produced goods. A “wage–price spiral” may follow. If this spiral moves too quickly it may frustrate the intended effect of the devaluation, namely that of enabling the country to offer its goods at lower prices in terms of foreign currency. This means that if the beneficial effects of a devaluation are not gathered in quickly, there may be no beneficial effect at all.

The authorities of a country that has just devalued must therefore be especially active in preventing or moderating domestic price increases. They will need to use the other policy measures discussed above. Devaluation (or the downward movement of a flexible rate) is thus not a remedy that makes other forms of official policy unnecessary. Some have argued that, if exchange rates were allowed to float, nothing further would have to be done officially to bring the external balance into equilibrium, but this is a minority view.

One further point must be made regarding exchange-rate movements. It has been found in practice that governments resist upward valuation more than they do devaluation. Under the IMF system prior to 1973, devaluations in fact were larger and more frequent than upward valuations. This had an unfortunate consequence. It meant that the aggregate amount of price inflation in deficit countries resorting to devaluation as a remedy was not offset by equivalent price decreases in the surplus countries. Therefore this system had a bias toward worldwide inflation.

Since World War II the major industrial countries have attempted to reduce interferences with international trade. This policy, by extending the international division of labour, should increase world economic welfare. An exception has had to be allowed in favour of the less-developed countries. In the early stages of the development of a country, the effectiveness and feasibility of the three types of adjustment mechanism discussed above, particularly monetary and fiscal policies, may be much less than in the more advanced countries. The less-developed countries may therefore be driven to protection or the control of imports, for lack of any other weapon, if they are to stay solvent. It has already been noted that, even in the case of a more advanced country, the effectiveness and appropriateness of the above-mentioned adjustment mechanisms are not always certain. Thus, there is no certainty that some limitation on foreign trade and on the international division of labour may not be a lesser evil than the consequences that might follow from a vigorous use of the other adjustment mechanisms, such as unemployment.

Interference with capital movements is generally considered a lesser evil than interference with the free flow of trade. The theory of the optimum international movement of capital has not yet been thoroughly developed, but there may be a presumption in favour of absolutely free movement. The matter is not quite certain; for instance, it might be desirable from the point of view of the world optimum to channel the outflow of capital from a high-saving country into the less-developed countries, although the level of profit obtainable in other high-saving countries might be greater. Or it might be expedient to restrain wealthy individuals in less-developed countries, where domestic saving was in notably short supply, from sending their funds to high-saving countries.

While there may be good reasons for interfering with the free international flow of capital in certain cases, it is not obvious that the outflow of capital from, or inflow of capital into, a country should be tailored to surpluses or deficits in current external accounts. It may be that in some cases the sound remedy for a deficit (or surplus) is to adopt adjustment measures such as those discussed above, bearing upon current items, rather than taking the easier way of adjusting capital movements to the de facto balance on current account.