A very important distinction must be drawn between the short-term capital that flows in the normal course of industrial and commercial development and that which flows because of exchange-rate movements. The first class of short-term capital may be thought of as going in the train of direct long-term investment. A parent company may desire from time to time to supply its branch or affiliate with working capital. There may also be repayments from time to time. The second type of short-term capital flow occurs because of expectations of changes in exchange rates. For example, if people expect that the price of the dollar will fall in terms of the Japanese yen, they have an incentive to sell dollars and buy yen.

An international capital market developed in the 1960s dealing in what are known as Eurocurrencies, of which much the most important was the Eurodollar. The prefix Euro is used because initially the market largely centred on the countries of Europe, but it has by no means been confined to them. Japan and the Middle Eastern oil states have been important dealers. While these short-term lendings normally move across national frontiers, they do not directly involve foreign exchange transactions. They may, however, indirectly cause such transactions to take place.

The nature of the market is as follows: In the ordinary course of affairs, an Italian, for example, acquiring dollars—say from exports or from a legacy—would sell these dollars for his own currency. But he may decide to deposit the dollars at his bank instead, with an instruction not to sell them for cash but to repay him in dollars at a later date. Thus the bank has dollars in hand and a commitment to pay them out in, say, three months. It may then proceed to lend these dollars to another bank, anywhere in the world. Since the lending and borrowing is done in dollars, no foreign exchange transaction is directly involved. The sum total of all operations of this sort is the Eurodollar market. It is not centred on any particular place and has no formal rules of procedure or constitution. It consists of a network of deals conducted by telephone and telex around the world. U.S. residents themselves lend to and borrow from this market.

One may ask why lenders and borrowers use this market in preference to more conventional methods of lending and borrowing. Ordinarily the answer is because they can get more favourable terms, since the market works on very narrow margins between lending and borrowing rates. This involves expertise; London has played the most important part in the creation of the market. The lender hopes to get a better rate of interest than he would on a time deposit in the United States (restrictions limiting interest payable on U.S. time deposits are said to have been a contributing cause of the growth of the market during the 1960s). At the same time, normally, the borrower will find that he has to pay a lower rate than he would on a loan from a commercial bank in the United States.

This has not always been the case. In 1969 Eurodollar interest rates went to very high levels. One reason for this was the set of restrictions imposed by the United States on its commercial banks lending abroad. The second was that although the prime lending rates of the principal U.S. banks might be below Eurodollar rates, many individuals, including U.S. citizens, found that they could not get loans from their banks because of the “credit squeeze.”

Because this form of international lending does not involve the sale of one currency for another, it does not enter into balance-of-payments accounts. Nonetheless it may have a causal effect on the course of the exchanges. For instance, the Italian cited above might have chosen to sell his dollars had he not been tempted by the more attractive Eurodollar rate of interest. In this case, the market causes dollars not to be sold that otherwise would have been. Others who have liquid cash at their disposal for a time may even buy dollars in order to invest them in the market at short term. That would be helpful to the dollar. There are countercases. An individual who has to make a payment in dollars but lacks cash may borrow the dollars in the Eurodollar market, when otherwise he would have got credit in his own country and used that to buy dollars; in this case the market is damaging to the dollar because its existence prevents someone from buying dollars in the regular way.

To summarize, the overall balance of payments comprises the current account (merchandise and services), unilateral transfers (gifts, grants, remittances, and so on), and the capital account (long-term and short-term capital movements). If payments due in exceed those due out, a country is said to be in overall surplus; and when payments due out exceed payments due in, it is in overall deficit. The surplus or deficit must be balanced by a monetary movement in the opposite direction, and consequently the overall balance including monetary movements must always be equal.

In practice, great difficulties have been found in assessing whether a country is in deficit or in surplus. It is often important to establish this with a view to possible corrective measures. The United Kingdom stresses the combined balance of current and long-term capital account—i.e., excluding short-term capital. Such a balance, however, omits short-term movements that occur in the ordinary course of business, which may be called “normal” and which ought in principle to be included. On the other hand it is not desirable to include equilibrating or disequilibrating capital movements. These occur in consequence of a deficit (or surplus), actual or anticipated. But there may be great statistical difficulty in distinguishing between the normal short-term capital flows and those that are consequential on a surplus or deficit.

It has been noted that the overall balance, including monetary movements, must be equal, but it usually happens that the figures do not in fact balance. U.S. statisticians call the residual figure that has to be inserted to square the account “errors and omissions.” If the average value of this figure over a substantial period, such as 10 years—an even longer period may have to be taken if a country is in persistent surplus or deficit—has a positive or negative value of substantial amount, then it may be taken to constitute genuine items that have escaped the statistical net. These may legitimately be included in assessing whether a country is in genuine surplus or deficit and whether corrective measures are needed.

The “errors and omissions” item is extremely volatile from year to year and often very large. Such movements up and down are probably caused by precautionary short-term capital movements. There have been periods when a minus item in the U.S. account was rather strikingly associated with a plus item in the U.K. account, and conversely. Accordingly, in the short term, the “errors and omissions” item should not be included in assessing whether a country is in surplus or deficit.

It has been noted that the United Kingdom stresses the balance of current and long-term capital accounts (which include unilateral transfers). The U.S. position is less clear. It traditionally published two overall balance-of-payments measures: the “Liquidity Balance” and the “Official Settlements Balance.”

In distinguishing between monetary and nonmonetary items, the Liquidity Balance included any increase in the holding of short-term dollar securities abroad as part of the U.S. deficit during the period; but it did not include as counterweight any increase in short-term foreign claims held by U.S. resident banks or others (apart from official holdings). Thus, in this respect the treatment was asymmetrical. The rationale for this was precautionary. The argument was that short-term dollar assets held abroad outside the central banks might at any time be sold in the market or turned in to the central banks of the respective countries and thus constitute a drain, or the threat of a drain, on U.S. reserves. On the other hand the corresponding foreign short-term assets held by U.S. resident banks or others were not readily mobilizable by U.S. authorities for making payments. Thus by this reckoning, if during a period non-central-bank foreign holdings of short-term dollar securities and resident non-central-bank U.S. holdings of short-term foreign securities went up by an equal amount, the situation would be shown as having deteriorated, since the former class (liabilities) were a threat to U.S. reserves, while the latter class (assets) could not be mobilized by U.S. authorities to meet such a threat. Thus, though the motive for this asymmetrical treatment may have been understandable, it was statistically unsatisfactory and also unsatisfactory as a guide to corrective action. This balance is thus mainly of historical interest, and it has not been commonly used since 1971.

The U.S. Official Settlements Balance reckoned an increase in non-central-bank foreign holdings of short-term dollar assets as an inflow of short-term capital into the United States; similarly an increase in U.S. resident holdings of short-term foreign assets was an outflow of short-term capital. This was a logical treatment. But the balance thus defined proved in the 1960s to be extremely volatile. This was due to large movements of funds between foreign central banks and non-central-bank foreign holders, associated with the rise of the Eurodollar market. Oscillations of this kind do not represent changes in the fundamental balance that are needed in order to determine whether corrective measures are required. It may well be that the British method of omitting short-term capital movements altogether in the assessment of surplus or deficit is, although imperfect, the most practical available. Since exchange rates began to float in the early 1970s, the major industrial countries have paid much less attention to overall balance-of-payments measures. The current account and the trade account are the two measures that are now most commonly used in developing countries.