Being and Time

Being and Time, work by the German existentialist philosopher Martin Heidegger, first published in German (as Sein und Zeit) in 1927, that permanently altered the course of philosophy in continental Europe. Widely regarded as Heidegger’s masterpiece, Being and Time generated a level of excitement that few other works of philosophy have matched. Despite its nearly impenetrable obscurity, the work earned Heidegger recognition as one the world’s leading philosophers. The extreme density of the text was due in part to Heidegger’s avoidance of traditional philosophical terminology in favour of neologisms derived from colloquial German, most notably Dasein (literally, “being-there”). Heidegger used that technique to further his goal of dismantling traditional philosophical theories and perspectives.

Being and Time begins with a traditional question of ontology (the philosophical study of being), which Heidegger formulated as the Seinsfrage, or the “question of Being.” In an essay first published in 1963, “My Way to Phenomenology,” Heidegger put the Seinsfrage as follows: “If Being is predicated in manifold meanings, then what is its leading fundamental meaning? What does Being mean?” If, in other words, there are many kinds of Being, or many senses in which existence may be predicated of a thing, what is the most-fundamental kind of Being, the kind that may be predicated of all things? In order to address that question properly, Heidegger found it necessary to undertake a preliminary phenomenological investigation of the Being of the human individual, which he called Dasein. In that endeavour he ventured onto philosophical ground that was entirely untrodden.

Since at least the time of the French mathematician and philosopher René Descartes (1596–1650), one of the basic problems of Western philosophy had been to establish a secure foundation for individual humans’ presumed knowledge of the world around them on the basis of phenomena or experiences about which they could be certain (see epistemology). That approach presupposed a conception of individuals as mere thinking subjects (or “thinking substances”) who are radically distinct from the world and therefore cognitively isolated from it. Heidegger stood that approach on its head. For Heidegger, the very Being of the individual involves engagement with the world. The fundamental character of Dasein is a condition of already “Being-in-the-world”—of already being caught up in, involved with, or committed to other individuals and things. Dasein’s practical involvements and commitments, therefore, are ontologically more basic than the thinking subject and all other Cartesian abstractions. Accordingly, Being and Time gives pride of place to ontological concepts such as “world,” “everydayness,” and “Being-with-others.”

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Martin Heidegger: Being and Time

Yet the framework of Being and Time is suffused by a sensibility—derived from secularized Protestantism—that stresses the paramountcy of original sin. Emotionally laden concepts such as “angst,” “guilt,” and “falling” suggest that worldliness and the human condition in general are essentially a curse. Heidegger, it seems, had implicitly adopted the critique of “mass society” set forth by earlier thinkers such as the Danish philosopher and theologian Søren Kierkegaard (1813–55) and the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), a perspective that was well established within Germany’s largely illiberal professoriate in the early 20th century. That theme is illustrated in Being and Time’s treatment of “authenticity,” one of the central concepts of the work. Heidegger’s view seems to be that the majority of human beings lead an existence that is inauthentic. Rather than facing up to their own finitude—represented above all by the inevitability of death—they seek distraction and escape in inauthentic modalities such as curiosity, ambiguity, and idle talk. Heidegger characterizes such conformity in terms of the notion of the anonymous das Man—“the They.” Conversely, the possibility of authentic Being-in-the-world seems to portend the emergence of a new spiritual aristocracy. Such individuals would be capable of heeding the “call of conscience” to fulfill their potential for Being-a-self.

Another distinguishing feature of Being and Time is its treatment of temporality (Zeitlichkeit). Heidegger believed that traditional Western ontology, from the ancient Greek philosopher Plato (428/427–348/347 bce) to the German Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), had adopted a static and inadequate understanding of what it means to be human. For the most part, previous thinkers had conceived of the Being of humans in terms of the properties and modalities of “thinghood,” of that which is “present-at-hand.” In Being and Time, Heidegger conversely stresses Being-in-the-world as Existenz—a form of being that is “ecstatically,” rather than passively, oriented toward its own possibilities. From that standpoint one of the distinctive features of inauthentic Dasein is that it fails to actualize its Being. Its existential passivity becomes indistinguishable from the nonecstatic, inert being of things.

The problem of historicity, as discussed in Division II of Being and Time, is one of the most poorly understood sections of the work. Being and Time is usually interpreted as favouring the standpoint of an individual Dasein: social and historical concerns are intrinsically foreign to the basic approach of the work. Nevertheless, with the concept of historicity Heidegger indicates that historical questions and themes are legitimate topics of ontological inquiry. The concept of historicity suggests that Dasein always “temporalizes,” or acts in time, as part of a larger social and historical collectivity—as part of a people or Volk. As such, Dasein possesses a heritage on which it must act. Historicity thus means making a decision about how to actualize (or act upon) salient elements of a collective past. Heidegger stresses that Dasein is future-oriented: it responds to the past, in the context of the present, for the sake of the future. His treatment of historicity thus constitutes a polemical response to the traditional approach of the German historians Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886) and Johann Gustav Droysen (1808–84) and the German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), which viewed human life as “historical” in a sense that was passive and devoid of intentionality (the quality of being about or directed toward something else). That kind of historicism failed to understand history as a project that humans consciously undertake in order to respond to their collective past for the sake of their future.

Shortly after finishing Being and Time, Heidegger became dissatisfied with its basic approach. Indeed, the projected second part of the book, to be called Zeit und Sein (“Time and Being”), was never written. His doubts centred on the notion of Dasein, one of the chief innovations of Being and Time. In retrospect, Heidegger found it too redolent of the subjective and anthropological preconceptions he had been trying to surmount. Ironically, although Heidegger’s treatise had begun by posing the Seinsfrage, the question of Being, the ensuing train of argumentation never managed to return to that theme.

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