Vice Pres. João Café Filho served out most of the remainder of Vargas’s term and carried out preparations for the presidential election of October 1955. The major political parties did not unite behind a single candidate; rather, three strong contenders emerged: former Minas Gerais state governor Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira, popularly regarded as Vargas’s political heir; former São Paulo state governor Ademar de Barros, who had broad backing from financial and commercial groups; and Marshal Juárez Távora, considered to be the representative of conservative military and civilian groups. Kubitschek won the election with slightly more than one-third of the total vote. Brazilians widely interpreted the elections as a popular vindication of the Vargas position. However, civil unrest loomed on the horizon: The conservative press regarded Kubitschek as a dangerous radical, and the illegal but active Communist Party, which had thrown its unsolicited support to Kubitschek, claimed to have provided his margin of victory. In addition, following a heart attack that incapacitated Café Filho, rumors circulated of a coup that would prevent Kubitschek’s inauguration. However, Gen. Henrique Teixeira Lott, the war minister, and Marshal Odílio Denys, who commanded army troops in Rio de Janeiro, staged a “countercoup” on November 11, 1955, in order to guarantee the president-elect’s inauguration, and Kubitschek took office as scheduled on January 31, 1956.
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Kubitschek encouraged a widespread nationalistic spirit by appealing to the popular demand for economic development and to the belief that Brazil was destined to become a great power among the nations of the world. Kubitschek felt that the national government should play a vital role in economic areas that seemed unattractive to private investment; thus, his administration undertook ambitious programs to construct highways and hydroelectric power projects, expand iron, steel, petroleum, and coal production, and assist privately owned industries. His role in planning, initially constructing, and dedicating (April 21, 1960) Brasília, a new federal capital 580 miles (930 km) northwest of Rio de Janeiro, was perhaps his most outstanding and controversial accomplishment. Kubitschek wanted Brasília to focus attention on the interior of the country, hasten settlement of the region, and develop its untapped resources. Residents of Rio de Janeiro denounced the project, but most Brazilians in other regions regarded the nascent city as a symbol of the nation’s future greatness. In inter-American relations, the Kubitschek administration proposed adopting Operation Pan America, an economic development program for Latin America that foreshadowed the Alliance for Progress.
Brazil achieved great material progress during the Kubitschek period but at a high price: The cost of living and the volume of currency in circulation tripled between 1956 and 1961, while Brazil’s large foreign debt nearly doubled. The gross national product rose to unprecedented levels, but living standards mainly remained unchanged or declined. At the same time, evidence emerged of large-scale graft and favoritism among those holding public office.
Quadros administration
In the following presidential campaign, three principal candidates emerged: Kubitschek’s war minister, General Lott; Jânio da Silva Quadros, the unorthodox former governor of São Paulo who was serving as a congressman from the state of Paraná; and Adhemar de Barros, then mayor of the city of São Paulo. The contest soon narrowed to a race between Lott and Quadros. Lott received official backing and campaigned largely on the record of the Kubitschek administration, whereas Quadros—who was not formally aligned with any major party—was supported by the conservative National Democratic Union (União Democrática Nacional; UDN) and a heterogeneous coalition of other groups. Campaigning with a broom as his symbol, Quadros captured the public imagination as a candidate of the common people who promised to “sweep away” corruption. He pledged to lead a scrupulously honest administration, curb inflation, promote economic development, uphold individual rights, and pursue a more independent foreign policy. João Goulart, a political opponent of Quadros, again stood as a candidate for the vice presidency. In the October 3, 1960, election, Quadros won with a plurality of 48 percent of the popular vote, receiving more than 5.6 million votes—the largest total ever cast for a presidential candidate in Brazil at that time. Goulart narrowly won the vice presidential race with just over 4 million votes. Quadros and Goulart were inaugurated on January 31, 1961.
Quadros’s election was widely hailed as a political turning point. For the first time in three decades, anti-Vargas political groups controlled the presidency. He took office amid widespread public expectations for major changes in domestic and foreign policy, but he quickly encountered resistance in Congress, where parties aligned with Vargas-era politics still held a strong majority. Quadros’s often arbitrary and autocratic governing style soon alienated many former supporters and further limited his ability to enact reforms or address Brazil’s growing inflation. In foreign affairs, however, Quadros acted more decisively. His government adopted a more independent foreign policy that sought to distance Brazil somewhat from its traditionally close ties with the United States and to instead align more closely with neutralist countries. He opposed inter-American efforts to censure Fidel Castro’s government in Cuba and moved to establish or restore diplomatic and commercial relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist states.
On August 25, 1961, after less than seven months in office, Quadros unexpectedly resigned, claiming that “terrible forces” had prevented him from leading Brazil toward “political and economic liberation.” Congress promptly accepted his resignation and installed Pascoal Ranieri Mazzilli, speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, as interim president. Vice President Goulart, the constitutional successor, was abroad at the time, returning from a state visit to China.
Goulart’s presidency
Quadros’s resignation pushed Brazil to the brink of civil conflict. Many military commanders and conservative political leaders regarded Goulart as too radical to assume the presidency, whereas most civilian politicians, even some of Goulart’s opponents, defended his constitutional right to succeed Quadros. War Minister Odílio Denys emerged as a leading spokesperson for the anti-Goulart faction, and he urged Congress to declare the vice presidency vacant and call new elections. Congress refused.
In southern Brazil, however, commanders of powerful army and air force units defied orders from the capital and declared their support for Goulart. When Goulart arrived in Porto Alegre, he insisted that he was already the rightful president. Facing the prospect of armed confrontation, Congress and military leaders opposed to Goulart agreed on a compromise: Goulart would assume the presidency but under a new parliamentary system that would sharply limit presidential powers. On September 2, 1961, Congress adopted a constitutional amendment establishing a parliamentary form of government, transferring most executive authority to a newly created office of prime minister. The amendment also provided for a national plebiscite to determine whether the parliamentary system should continue. Goulart accepted the arrangement and was formally confirmed as president on September 7, 1961.
The core problems that Quadros had faced were not resolved with the introduction of the parliamentary system. After the immediate crisis over the presidential succession subsided, political parties resumed debate over pressing national issues but postponed major legislation, pending the October 1962 congressional elections. When those results failed to produce a clear mandate either for or against the government’s proposed reforms, opponents of the parliamentary system, led by Goulart, called for a return to presidential rule. In a national plebiscite held on January 6, 1963, voters overwhelmingly restored full presidential powers to Goulart by a margin of more than five to one. Congress, however, remained deeply divided, and Goulart was unable to secure consistent support for his legislative program. Frequent cabinet changes and successive proposals for economic and social reforms did little to address Brazil’s worsening economic difficulties. Inflation accelerated sharply, the cost of living rose dramatically, and economic growth slowed significantly during Goulart’s presidency. Political polarization deepened as conservative political groups, business leaders, and sectors of the military increasingly opposed Goulart’s reform agenda.
The beginning of military rule and authoritarian consolidation (1964–85)
As Brazil’s political and economic crisis deepened, cooperation between the government and its opponents became increasingly difficult. Supporters and critics of the administration blamed the other for blocking efforts to address inflation, fiscal reform, and social welfare policies, and the political system drifted toward a resolution outside the constitutional order. Goulart also began to align with nationalist and left-leaning groups, whereas many senior military officers sympathized with more conservative political forces. Goulart promoted a program of sweeping “base reforms,” including land reform, expanded labor rights, and greater state involvement in key sectors of the economy. These proposals attracted strong support from labor unions, students, and segments of the political left but alarmed conservative politicians, business leaders, and many military commanders. Political tensions escalated further after Goulart attempted to mobilize popular support through mass rallies and decrees in March 1964 that called for agrarian reform and the nationalization of certain privately owned oil refineries.
By late March civilian and military opponents in several regions had begun coordinating plans to remove the president. Gov. José de Magalhães Pinto of Minas Gerais and Gen. Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco, chief of staff of the army, emerged as leading figures among the conspirators. When the government declined to suppress a strike by naval enlisted personnel in late March, many military leaders concluded that discipline within the armed forces was breaking down. On March 31 military units in Minas Gerais rose against the government, and the movement quickly gained the support of political leaders in São Paulo and Guanabara and of armed forces units throughout much of the country. The coup initiated a military regime that would rule Brazil for the next 21 years and impose significant restrictions on political freedoms and democratic institutions.
Goulart fled Brazil on April 2 and went into exile in Uruguay. Congress subsequently declared the presidency vacant and again installed Pascoal Ranieri Mazzilli, speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, as interim president. Effective authority soon passed to the leaders of the military movement, who initiated sweeping political changes. On April 9 the new government issued the first Institutional Act, which modified the 1946 constitution and granted to the executive broad powers to remove elected officials, dismiss public servants, and suspend political rights. Thousands of individuals were detained or investigated, and many politicians, including former presidents Goulart, Jânio Quadros, and Juscelino Kubitschek, lost their political rights. Congress remained formally in existence but with limited authority. On April 11 it elected General Castelo Branco president, with José Maria Alkmim as vice president. They were inaugurated on April 15, and their term was later extended to March 1967.
Castelo Branco’s extended term was viewed by the new military leadership as a transitional period during which major political and economic reforms could be implemented before power was returned to a popularly elected government. Many leaders of the regime agreed that perceived weaknesses in Brazil’s political system—including the proliferation of small regional parties, opportunistic electoral alliances, and the separate election of president and vice president—required reform, though they differed over how those reforms should be achieved. Castelo Branco initially sought to implement changes through legislation while allowing limited political activity and freedom of expression. More hard-line civilian and military supporters of the regime, however, called for stronger measures, including dissolving Congress and suspending party politics until the new order had consolidated its authority.
Tensions within the regime intensified after gubernatorial elections in October 1965. Although government-backed candidates won in 9 of the 11 states voting, opposition candidates prevailed in the influential states of Minas Gerais and Guanabara. The hard-line supporters interpreted these results as a setback and accused Castelo Branco of failing to advance the revolutionary program vigorously enough. When he refused their demands to annul the elections, some conspirators began discussing the possibility of a coup against his government. At this point Gen. Artur da Costa e Silva, the minister of war, intervened and persuaded dissident leaders to maintain order in exchange for Castelo Branco’s agreement to adopt stronger measures. On October 27, 1965, Castelo Branco issued Institutional Act No. 2, which dissolved all existing political parties and restored broad emergency powers to the presidency, including the authority to suspend political rights for up to 10 years. The act also established October 3, 1966, as the date for new presidential elections.
The government subsequently imposed a two-party system. The pro-government party, the National Renewal Alliance (Aliança Renovadora Nacional; ARENA), supported the regime’s policies, and the Brazilian Democratic Movement (Movimento Democrático Brasileiro; MDB) functioned as the officially permitted opposition. Although additional parties were theoretically allowed, political activity in practice became confined to these two organizations. ARENA attracted a broad coalition of government supporters, whereas the MDB drew many politicians associated with the former Goulart administration and others critical of the regime. On February 5, 1966, Castelo Branco promulgated Institutional Act No. 3, which introduced indirect elections for state governors and for mayors of state capitals and established that the president and vice president would be elected by Congress. Because ARENA held a large majority in the legislature, the opposition declined to nominate candidates. The government’s candidates, Costa e Silva for president and Pedro Aleixo for vice president, were elected and inaugurated on March 15, 1967.
Before leaving office, Castelo Branco called an extraordinary session of Congress in December 1966 to approve a new constitution drafted by a government-appointed commission. Congress approved the document by a two-to-one margin, and it was promulgated on January 24, 1967. The constitution incorporated many of the political changes introduced after the 1964 coup and strengthened executive authority at the expense of the legislature while further centralizing power in the federal government. Among its provisions were the indirect election of the president and vice president on a single ticket, the reduction of the presidential term from five to four years, expanded jurisdiction of military courts over civilians accused of violating national security laws, and broader authority for the president to issue emergency decrees. The Castelo Branco administration also pursued economic stabilization and reform. Seeking to control inflation and restore economic growth, the government imposed credit controls, restructured the tax system, and introduced wage restraints. Although these austerity measures placed heavy burdens on urban workers, they were accompanied by incentives to stimulate industrial and agricultural production and by increased public investment in transportation and electric power. Inflation declined significantly from 86 percent in 1964 to about 41 percent in 1966, and the economy began to recover.
Costa e Silva assumed the presidency in March 1967, promising to “humanize” the revolution and moderate some of the regime’s harsher policies. In practice, however, his administration continued many of the policies of the previous government. It rejected calls for political amnesty, resisted proposals to restore direct elections, and suppressed student protests and other expressions of political dissent. At the same time economic performance improved: Inflation fell to below 25 percent in his first year in office, and economic growth exceeded 5 percent. Political tensions intensified again in 1968 amid growing criticism of the regime, from both Congress and the press. Under pressure from military leaders, Costa e Silva issued Institutional Act No. 5 (AI-5) on December 13, 1968. The measure suspended legislative bodies, allowed the president to rule by decree, and authorized the government to suspend political rights and remove officials from office. AI-5 marked the beginning of the most repressive phase of military rule.
In August 1969 Costa e Silva suffered a cerebral hemorrhage and was removed from office by military leadership. Later that year Gen. Emílio Garrastazú Médici was selected as president. Although he declared that Brazil would eventually return to democratic government, his administration maintained the extraordinary powers established under AI-5. Congressional elections held in November 1970 produced a majority for the government-backed party, ARENA. The events following the 1964 coup confirmed the central role of the armed forces in Brazilian politics. The weakness of the postwar party system and the inability of civilian governments to address mounting economic and social tensions contributed to the military’s continued dominance of the political system during this period.
Return to civilian rule and the legacy of the dictatorship
Beginning in the mid-1970s, the military government gradually relaxed political controls in a process known as abertura (“opening”). Pres. Ernesto Geisel (1974–79) initiated a cautious program of political liberalization, easing censorship and allowing limited political opposition while attempting to manage the transition away from authoritarian rule. His successor, João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo (1979–85), continued this process by restoring political rights to many exiles, reducing restrictions on political activity, and permitting the reorganization of political parties. Despite these changes, Brazil faced mounting economic difficulties during this period, including rising inflation, increasing foreign debt, and slower economic growth. Demands for democratic reform intensified in the early 1980s as opposition parties, labor organizations, church groups, and student movements mobilized public support for political change. The Diretas Já (“Direct Elections Now”) movement, which began in 1983, organized large demonstrations across the country calling for the restoration of direct presidential elections. Although Congress rejected a constitutional amendment that would have allowed direct elections in 1984, the pressure ultimately contributed to the collapse of military political control. In 1985 an electoral college selected opposition leader Tancredo de Almeida Neves as president, signaling the end of military rule. Neves died before taking office, however, and Vice Pres. José Sarney de Araújo Costa assumed the presidency. On March 15, 1985, Sarney was inaugurated as president, ending Brazil’s 21 years of military dictatorship.
The dictatorship remains a subject of political and social controversy in Brazil, particularly regarding human rights abuses and accountability. The military regime was responsible for widespread human rights violations, including torture, arbitrary detention, censorship, and the forced disappearance of political opponents. According to official investigations, some 50,000 people were detained within the first few months of the regime, and about 10,000 Brazilians went into exile during the dictatorship. The report Brasil: Nunca Mais (1985; “Brazil: Never Again”), based on records from the military justice system, documented 1,918 cases of torture between 1964 and 1979, though researchers believe the true number is significantly higher. Brazil’s 1979 Amnesty Law granted immunity for many crimes committed during the period by the regime, and it has limited efforts to prosecute officials responsible for abuses. Although the government has established commissions to investigate political deaths and disappearances and has provided reparations to some victims and their families, questions over accountability for the dictatorship remain ongoing.