The simplest form of management is the partnership. In Anglo-American common-law and European civil-law countries, every partner (other than a limited partner) is entitled to take part in the management of the firm’s business; however, a partnership agreement may provide that ordinary partners shall not participate in management, in which case they are dormant partners but are still personally liable for the debts and obligations incurred by the other managing partners.

The management structure of companies or corporations is more complex. The simplest is that envisaged by English, Belgian, Italian, and Scandinavian law, by which the shareholders of the company periodically elect a board of directors who collectively manage the company’s affairs and reach decisions by a majority vote but also have the right to delegate any of their powers, or even the whole management of the company’s business, to one or more of their number. Under this regime it is common for a managing director (directeur général, direttore generale) to be appointed, often with one or more assistant managing directors, and for the board of directors to authorize them to enter into all transactions needed for carrying on the company’s business, subject only to the general supervision of the board and to its approval of particularly important measures, such as issuing shares or bonds or borrowing. The U.S. system is a development of this basic pattern. By the laws of most states it is obligatory for the board of directors elected periodically by the shareholders to appoint certain executive officers, such as the president, vice president, treasurer, and secretary. The latter two have no management powers and fulfill the administrative functions that in an English company are the concern of its secretary, but the president and in his absence the vice president have by law or by delegation from the board of directors the same full powers of day-to-day management as are exercised in practice by an English managing director.

The most complex management structures are those provided for public companies under German and French law. The management of private companies under these systems is confided to one or more managers (gérants, Geschäftsführer) who have the same powers as managing directors. In the case of public companies, however, German law imposes a two-tier structure, the lower tier consisting of a supervisory committee (Aufsichtsrat) whose members are elected periodically by the shareholders and the employees of the company in the proportion of two-thirds shareholder representatives and one-third employee representatives (except in the case of mining and steel companies where shareholders and employees are equally represented) and the upper tier consisting of a management board (Vorstand) comprising one or more persons appointed by the supervisory committee but not from its own number. The affairs of the company are managed by the management board, subject to the supervision of the supervisory committee, to which it must report periodically and which can at any time require information or explanations. The supervisory committee is forbidden to undertake the management of the company itself, but the company’s constitution may require its approval for particular transactions, such as borrowing or the establishment of branches overseas, and by law it is the supervisory committee that fixes the remuneration of the managers and has power to dismiss them.

The French management structure for public companies offers two alternatives. Unless the company’s constitution otherwise provides, the shareholders periodically elect a board of directors (conseil d’administration), which “is vested with the widest powers to act on behalf of the company” but which is also required to elect a president from its members who “undertakes on his own responsibility the general management of the company,” so that in fact the board of directors’ functions are reduced to supervising the president. The similarity to the German pattern is obvious, and French legislation carries this further by openly permitting public companies to establish a supervisory committee (conseil de surveillance) and a management board (directoire) like the German equivalents as an alternative to the board of directors–president structure.

Dutch and Italian public companies tend to follow the German pattern of management, although it is not expressly sanctioned by the law of those countries. The Dutch commissarissen and the Italian sindaci, appointed by the shareholders, have taken over the task of supervising the directors and reporting on the wisdom and efficiency of their management to the shareholders.

The investing public is a major source of funds for new or expanding operations. As companies have grown, their need for funds has grown, with the consequence that legal ownership of companies has become widely dispersed. For example, in large American corporations, shareholders may run into the hundreds of thousands and even more. Although large blocks of shares may be held by wealthy individuals or institutions, the total amount of stock in these companies is so large that even a very wealthy person is not likely to own more than a small fraction of it.

The chief effect of this stock dispersion has been to give effective control of the companies to their salaried managers. Although each company holds an annual meeting open to all stockholders, who may vote on company policy, these gatherings, in fact, tend to ratify ongoing policy. Even if sharp questions are asked, the presiding officers almost invariably hold enough proxies to override outside proposals. The only real recourse for dissatisfied shareholders is to sell their stock and invest in firms whose policies are more to their liking. (If enough shareholders do this, of course, the price of the stock will fall quite markedly, perhaps impelling changes in management personnel or company policy.) Occasionally, there are “proxy battles,” when attempts are made to persuade a majority of shareholders to vote against a firm’s managers (or to secure representation of a minority bloc on the board), but such struggles seldom involve the largest companies. It is in the managers’ interest to keep the stockholders happy, for, if the company’s shares are regarded as a good buy, then it is easy to raise capital through a new stock issue.

Thus, if a company is performing well in terms of sales and earnings, its executives will have a relatively free hand. If a company gets into trouble, its usual course is to agree to be merged into another incorporated company or to borrow money. In the latter case, the lending institution may insist on a new chief executive of its own choosing. If a company undergoes bankruptcy and receivership, the court may appoint someone to head the operation. But managerial autonomy is the rule. The salaried executives typically have the discretion and authority to decide what products and services they will put on the market, where they will locate plants and offices, how they will deal with employees, and whether and in what directions they will expand their spheres of operation.