Mojtaba Khamenei

Mojtaba Khamenei (born September 8, 1969, Mashhad, Iran) is Iran’s third supreme leader (rahbar), appointed to the position at the start of the 2026 Iran war following the death of his father Ali Khamenei, Iran’s second supreme leader. During his father’s rule the largely shadowy figure played a commanding role in the Office of the Supreme Leader and loomed over both the clerical and military establishments, yet he was almost never in the public view. His appointment to the position represented institutional continuity and signaled the Islamic Republic’s commitment to Ali Khamenei’s hawkish and repressive policies. Unlike his father, however, he remained elusive while Iran’s other senior officials served as the face of public policy.

A child of the revolution

Mojtaba Khamenei was born to a clerical family in Mashhad, Iran, an important religious center for the Twelver Shiʿah, at a time of pronounced socioeconomic upheaval among the city’s clerical elite. The reform programs of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, most notably the land reforms of the 1960s and the subsequent White Revolution, disenfranchised many clerical families, especially those around the shrine complex of the eighth Twelver imam, ʿAlī al-Riḍā. Mojtaba Khamenei’s father, Ali Khamenei, was among the young activists who supported efforts to overthrow the shah in the 1970s (see Iranian Revolution) and became an influential figure in the Islamic Republic when it was established in 1979.

As a member of the transitional Revolutionary Council, Ali Khamenei was immediately thrown into the throes of defending the new republic. He was closely tied to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a nascent amalgamation of pro-revolution paramilitary forces intended as a counterweight to the regular army, which had formerly been loyal to the shah. After Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, unity—and therefore the suppression of domestic challenges to the regime—became a top priority. The IRGC proved formidable in addressing threats both at home and abroad and was granted extensive resources after 1981, when Ali Khamenei became president, a position he held until 1989.

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After Mojtaba Khamenei finished secondary school in 1987, he joined the IRGC and served at the close of the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88). By that point, the war had devastated Iran. The regime hoped that a continued war effort could pry more concessions from Iraq, but Iraqi advances in 1988 led Iran to accept a UN-brokered cease-fire in July of that year. At the end of the war his father was the established patron of a powerful military complex and in 1989 managed to attain the position of leader, a post whose authority and oversight of government was strengthened through changes to the constitution made that same year.

Rise through the ranks of the clerical establishment

Mojtaba Khamenei pursued a religious education, and in the late 1990s he studied under some of Shiʿi Islam’s most prominent conservative clerics at the seminary in Qom. He eventually began teaching courses at the seminary. Meanwhile, according to passing references in the published diaries of Hashemi Rafsanjani (a senior figure in the Islamic Republic throughout the 1980s and 1990s), Mojtaba Khamenei was already involved in his father’s Office of the Supreme Leader in the 1990s. His involvement in the office both enhanced his personal network of powerful figures and placed him as a power broker on behalf of his father. At the beginning of the 21st century, he enjoyed strong connections not only within the IRGC but also with Iran’s top clerics.

Public attention first turned to Mojtaba Khamenei after the 2005 presidential election. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a relatively unknown conservative running against political heavyweights, emerged as a dark horse in the final days of the campaign. Reformist candidate Mehdi Karroubi alleged that Mojtaba Khamenei had leveraged his connections to influence the outcome in Ahmadinejad’s favor.

Election interference in 2009 was more glaring. Ahmadinejad, who in his first term had been unable to tackle economic issues and had taken provocative stances that harmed Iran’s international standing, won a much greater share of the vote than expected. When demonstrations broke out, the Council of Guardians found discrepancies affecting millions of votes but claimed that those discrepancies were not significant enough to have affected the outcome. Nevertheless, the opposition accused Mojtaba Khamenei of involvement in the interference. He was believed to have orchestrated the subsequent brutal crackdown on the largely peaceful protesters. The IRGC’s intelligence wing, under the purview of the Office of the Supreme Leader, was greatly expanded at this juncture and came to rival the Ministry of Intelligence and Security.

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Meanwhile, Mojtaba Khamenei began teaching advanced courses in Qom that were usually reserved for Shiʿism’s most reputable clerics. Although he was hardly known for his theological acumen, he otherwise enjoyed prestige as the son of the Islamic Republic’s spiritual guide. In August 2022 a media outlet associated with Qom’s seminary began referring to Mojtaba Khamenei as an ayatollah, a title typically awarded only to the Twelver Shiʿi clerics whose teachings garner a wide following and command high respect. The adoption of the title to refer to such a private and unaccomplished cleric fueled speculation that he was being positioned to succeed his father as the country’s leader. Weeks later, when security forces clashed with demonstrators who were outraged by the death of Jina Mahsa Amini, some of the protesters recalled Mojtaba Khamenei’s involvement in the crackdown in 2009 and chanted: “Mojtaba, may you die and not become the leader.” As the protests grew to a level unprecedented since the 1979 revolution, Mojtaba Khamenei was believed to have coordinated the brutal response by the security forces, just as he had done in 2009.

Succession as Iran’s third supreme leader

Mojtaba Khamenei’s likelihood of succeeding his father ebbed and flowed over the years that followed the protests against Amini’s death. On the one hand, popular dissatisfaction with the Iranian government demonstrated a need for a shift in policy and a fresh face to lead reform. Mojtaba Khamenei’s lack of a popular base and close association with his father—and especially to the repressive elements of his father’s rule—made him a poor choice to address popular dissent by reform. On the other hand, few clerics were well-positioned to command the trust of both the IRGC and the clerical establishment and prevent fracture within the regime. One of the only other clerics to bridge these institutions was Ebrahim Raisi—a career prosecutor and president of Iran—but he died suddenly in a helicopter crash in 2024. When Ali Khamenei was killed at the start of the 2026 Iran war—during a wave of attacks in which Mojtaba Khamenei was also injured—Mojtaba Khamenei was selected as his successor. The move showed that the Iranian state, under fire and immediate existential threat, preferred a leader who could quickly consolidate control of a fragmented state over one who could win back legitimacy from the Iranian people.

Throughout the war and the start of his rule, Mojtaba Khamenei refrained from making public appearances and communicated with the public only through written statements. His absence, though a continuation of his decades-long tendency to operate behind the scenes, led to speculation about the extent of his injuries. Pres. Masoud Pezeshkian, who met with Mojtaba Khamenei in May and July, was among the only public officials to have direct contact with the new supreme leader, while Pezeshkian, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and other political figures appeared to have greater sway in public policy than they had under Ali Khamenei. In June Mojtaba Khamenei accepted a memorandum of understanding with the United States that he had previously opposed and Ghalibaf had supported, indicating either a pragmatic change of position or a willingness to defer to other senior officials. In early August he made several appointments that appeared to streamline wartime decision-making, concentrating command among trusted veterans of the IRGC and reducing the need for his active involvement.