velāyat-e faqīh

velāyat-e faqīh, concept in Twelver Shiʿi Islamic thought stating, in its most general form, that a Shiʿi faqīh (expert in Islamic jurisprudence) can administer the affairs of the Muslim community in the absence (ghaybah) of an imam, a spiritual leader whom the Twelver Shiʿah believe to be divinely appointed. In the 1970s Ruhollah Khomeini, a prominent religious scholar and a revolutionary activist against Iran’s shah, promulgated an interpretation of velāyat-e faqīh in which a government can serve justice only if it is overseen by a faqīh. That interpretation became the founding principle of the Islamic Republic established after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and Khomeini was appointed the new government’s first rahbar (supreme leader).

Origin of the term

The term velāyat-e faqīh was coined in 16th-century Iran during the rule of the Safavids, the first dynasty to embrace and propagate Twelver Shiʿi Islam since the short-lived Buyid dynasty (945–1055). Because the Twelver Shiʿah were accustomed to living under non-Shiʿi rulers, their religious scholars were used to operating under restrictions, and their role in public life had not yet been clearly defined. On the one hand, the Twelver Shiʿah had already established that worldly spiritual-political leadership (Arabic wilāyah, from which Persian velāyat is derived) had been divinely vested in the Prophet Muhammad and had been passed down successively to each of the Twelve Imams. On the other hand, the Twelfth Imam, who, according to the Twelver Shiʿah, went into occultation (concealment) in the 9th century and is kept alive by God, still carries this authority into the present. Religious scholars in the Safavid period argued that, in the Twelfth Imam’s absence, a respected faqīh could act in his stead and thereby occupy administrative and advisory roles in a Shiʿi political regime. At this juncture, the concept granted religious scholars explicit permission to cooperate with and influence government, but it did not suggest that a faqīh should supervise the Safavid ruler or exert direct rule.

Rising tension between clergy and the government

After tensions emerged between the clerical class and the ruling class under the Qajar dynasty (18th–20th century), some religious scholars developed the concept further. In the 19th century they began articulating the notion that a faqīh cannot cooperate with an unjust ruler. Moreover, some scholars asserted that the ruler should seek guidance from a faqīh in all decision-making. By the end of the century the Qajar rulers had become broadly unpopular, and the opposition within the clerical ranks was emboldened by appeals from Iran’s merchant class to intervene against the rulers. In 1906 the alliance between merchants and clerics forced the Qajar dynasty to concede to a constitution in the Constitutional Revolution. This success led some religious scholars to believe that velāyat-e faqīh was a prerequisite for just government rather than only a guideline for clerical cooperation. The Constitutional Revolution did not prove favorable to the clerical class, however, and tensions continued. After Reza Khan effectively overthrew the Qajars in 1921, the new Pahlavi dynasty worked to sideline clergy.

Discover how ordinary objects work, and expand your understanding of the familiar.

SIGN UP

" height="20" alt="HEW Logo">

Thank you for signing up!"

Back to homepage

By clicking "Sign Up", you consent to the Britannica Privacy Policy and Terms of Use.

More From Britannica

Iran: Velāyat-e faqīh

Ruhollah Khomeini and the Islamic Republic

The idea that the clerical class should rule outright was first articulated in 1970, by Ruhollah Khomeini, a high-ranking and respected Iranian religious scholar who was also an outspoken critic of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi’s rule. He outlined a role reminiscent of the platonic philosopher king, arguing that a widely esteemed faqīh would rule justly rather than according to self-interest, because of the proven moral and intellectual commitment of such a faqīh. Although the clerical class was split on Khomeini’s activist interpretation, the timing was ripe for his idea to gain traction among both clergy and laypersons. The shah was deeply unpopular, especially after several years of implementing the White Revolution, an aggressive modernization program that both disrupted and disenfranchised much of Iranian society and dispossessed the clerical class of its landholdings. After the Iranian Revolution (1978–79), Khomeini gained widespread support, including among secularists and left-wing activists, as guardian of the revolution.

Voters approved by referendum an Islamic republic underpinned by Khomeini’s novel interpretation of velāyat-e faqīh, and the cleric was created rahbar (supreme leader). However, the new government faced existential challenges from the start, prompting it to take a combative stance and consolidate power in the hands of loyalists to Khomeini. After he died in 1989 the faqīh appointed in his stead as rahbar was Ali Khamenei, a loyalist cleric who nonetheless lacked prestige among religious scholars and had been hastily elevated to senior rank. The previous year Hossein Ali Montazeri, one of the most respected religious scholars in the 1980s, was stripped of his status as Khomeini’s designated successor after he criticized the government for human rights abuses. Montazeri and many other scholars believed that Khamenei did not qualify for velāyat-e faqīh as articulated by Khomeini.