Environmental ethics

Environmental ethics, a field of applied ethics concerned with the natural environment, including its instrumental value for human beings and other animals and its possible intrinsic value.

(Read Peter Singer’s Britannica entry on ethics.)

Environmental issues raise a host of difficult ethical questions, including the ancient question of the nature of intrinsic value. Whereas many philosophers in the past have agreed that human experiences have intrinsic value—and utilitarians at least have always accepted that the pleasures and pains of nonhuman animals are of some intrinsic significance—this does not show why it is so bad if, for example, dodoes become extinct or a rainforest is cut down. Are these things to be regretted only because of the experiences that would be lost to humans or other sentient beings? Or is there more to it than that? From the late 20th century, some philosophers defended the view that trees, rivers, species (considered apart from the individual organisms of which they consist), and perhaps even ecosystems as a whole have a value independent of the instrumental value they may have for humans or nonhuman animals. There is, however, no agreement on what the basis for this value should be.

Discover how ordinary objects work, and expand your understanding of the familiar.

SIGN UP

" height="20" alt="HEW Logo">

Thank you for signing up!"

Back to homepage

By clicking "Sign Up", you consent to the Britannica Privacy Policy and Terms of Use.

Concern for the environment also raises the question of obligations to future generations. How much do human beings living now owe to those not yet born? For those who hold an ethics based on social contract theory (i.e., an ethics that grounds moral rights and duties in a hypothetical agreement with other members of society) or for ethical egoists (i.e., those who hold that morally correct actions are those that advance or protect one’s self-interest), the answer would seem to be: nothing. Although humans existing in the present can act in ways that benefit humans existing in the future, the latter are unable to reciprocate. Most other ethical theories, however, do give some weight to the interests of future generations. Utilitarians, for example, would not think that the fact that members of future generations do not yet exist is any reason for giving less consideration to their interests than to the interests of present generations—provided that one can be certain that future generations will exist and will have interests that will be affected by what one does. In the case of, say, the storage of radioactive waste or the emission of gases that contribute to climate change, it seems clear that what present generations do will indeed affect the interests of generations to come. Most philosophers agree that these are important moral issues. Climate change in particular has been conceived of as a question of global equity: how much of a scarce resource (the capacity of the atmosphere to safely absorb waste gases produced by human activity) may each country use? Are industrialized countries justified in using far more of this resource, on a per capita basis, than developing countries, considering that the human costs of climate change will fall more heavily on developing countries because they cannot afford the measures needed to mitigate them?

These questions become even more complex when one considers that the size of future generations can be affected by government population policies and by other less-formal attitudes toward population growth and family size. The notion of overpopulation conceals a philosophical issue that was ingeniously explored in Reasons and Persons (1984), by the British philosopher Derek Parfit. What is optimum population? Is it the population size at which the average level of welfare will be as high as possible? Or is it the size at which the total amount of welfare is as great as possible? There were decisive objections to the average view, but the total view also had counterintuitive consequences. The total view entails that a vastly overpopulated world, one in which the average level of welfare is so low as to make life barely worth living, is morally preferable to a less-populated world in which the average level of welfare is high, provided that the number of people in the overpopulated world is so great as to make the total amount of welfare in that world greater than in the less-populated world. Parfit referred to this implication as the “Repugnant Conclusion.” Much thought was given to finding alternatives that did not carry the counterintuitive consequences of the average and total views. But the alternatives suggested had their own difficulties, and the question remained one of the most baffling conundrums in applied ethics. (See also environmentalism.)