Major Supreme Court Cases from the 2025–26 Term

Summary

The case, argued before the Supreme Court on April 1, 2026, concerns the question of whether Pres. Donald Trump’s executive order 14160, “Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship,” which declared an end to birthright citizenship (jus soli) in the United States, “complies on its face with the Citizenship Clause” of the Fourteenth Amendment (1868) and with the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, in which the citizenship clause was codified.

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See Major Executive Orders Issued by U.S. Pres. Donald Trump During His Second Term of Office.

Trump attended the government’s oral argument—the first sitting president in U.S. history to do so—and left soon afterward.

Oral arguments before the Court

The government’s argument, presented by Solicitor General D. John Sauer, advanced a narrow reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, arguing that it was principally intended to convey citizenship to formerly enslaved Black Americans whose allegiance to the United States was established through generations of domicile in the country. The amendment clarified the inclusion of formerly enslaved people in the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which stated that “all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States.” The government maintained that the constitutional guarantee extends only to children whose parents have a settled, lawful, and enduring connection to the United States—understood as domicile—and that this connection establishes the requisite allegiance. Therefore, the amendment did not, Sauer argued, grant birthright citizenship to the children of “temporary visitors or illegal aliens” without domicile. Further, for the principal framer of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” in the citizenship clause meant “not owing allegiance to anybody else.” On that reasoning, children born to temporary visitors would not qualify for citizenship because their parents (and the children as an extension of their parents) retained primary allegiance to another sovereign. Sauer asserted that, “For aliens, lawful domicile is the status that creates the requisite allegiance, and the text of the clause presupposes domicile.…Temporary visitors are not citizens and illegal aliens lack the legal capacity to establish domicile here.”

The plaintiffs, represented before the Court by Cecillia Wang, the national legal director for the ACLU, advanced a competing interpretation of the right of birthright citizenship as a principle enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment and grounded in traditional common-law principles of citizenship by place of birth (jus soli). She argued that the constitutional text has long been understood—and affirmed by the Court—to confer citizenship on nearly all individuals born in the United States, regardless of their parents’ immigration status, and that Trump’s executive order not only violated the Fourteenth Amendment but also overturned the Court’s affirmation of jus soli in its decision in United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898). Wang argued that,

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“When the government tried to strip Mr. Wong Kim Ark’s citizenship on largely the same grounds they raise today, this Court said no. Thirty years after ratification, this Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment embodies the English common-law rule. Virtually everyone born on U.S. soil is subject to its jurisdiction and is a citizen.”

Questions and comments from the Court

The justices who frequently make up the Court’s ideological center—Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justice Neil Gorsuch, and Justice Amy Coney Barrett—expressed concern about the implication of the government’s position. Their questioning probed the meaning and legal significance of the government’s understanding of the terms domicile and allegiance. In response, Sauer clarified, saying, “The domiciliaries are people who are lawfully present and have an intent to remain permanently. So that’s the kind of black-letter…understanding of domicile.”

Several of the justices, as well as the parties for both cases, invoked the arguments and decision in the case of United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898), which articulated a broad understanding of birthright citizenship. In that ruling, Justice Horace Gray delivered the opinion of the Court, writing that “the Fourteenth Amendment affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory”—a rule known as jus soli, a bedrock principle in English common law—and that,

“the Amendment, in clear words and in manifest intent, includes the children born, within the territory of the United States, of all other persons, of whatever race or color, domiciled within the United States. Every citizen or subject of another country, while domiciled here, is within the allegiance and the protection, and consequently subject to the jurisdiction, of the United States.”

But because of each side’s different interpretation of the meaning of “domicile” in the Wong Kim Ark case, under questioning they each affirmed the Court’s ruling in Wong Kim Ark.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor also questioned whether the government’s argument in support of Trump’s executive order would allow the retroactive removal of birthright citizenship from those who had already acquired it. Sauer told the Court that the order “applies only prospectively” and asked it “to rule only prospectively.”

The Court’s decision

In an opinion written by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., the Court held that Pres. Donald Trump’s executive order denying citizenship to “children born of parents unlawfully or temporarily present in the United States” was in violation of both the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship clause and the codification of the clause in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952. The Court found in particular that the plaintiffs’ contention that children born in the United States are not “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” unless their parents are permanently and lawfully present in the country failed to properly take into account the English common law on which the citizenship clause was based. Citing an authoritative 18th-century treatise on English common law—Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765–69)—Roberts noted that those born within the sovereign’s dominions owed allegiance to the king or queen and in return were protected as citizens, or “natural-born subjects.” Indeed, “the same rule applied to children born in the realm of parents subject to expulsion.” The only children not automatically granted citizenship under English common law were those born in areas not controlled by the sovereign and those born of foreign ministers. The “common law of citizenship” naturally “crossed the Atlantic” with American colonists and was mirrored in the citizenship clause adopted in the Fourteenth Amendment.

Roberts’ majority opinion was joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, Amy Coney Barrett, and Ketanji Brown Jackson. Jackson also filed a concurring opinion joined in part by Sotomayor. Justice Brett Kavanaugh concurred with the majority’s judgment but dissented over its main argument, holding that birthright citizenship is not guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment but is instead granted under existing legislation, which could be amended or replaced to validate Trump’s executive order. Meanwhile, Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch, and Justices Samuel A. Alito, Jr., and Gorsuch filed their own dissenting opinions.

Thomas, for his part, argued that the majority’s reading of the citizenship clause was historically inaccurate, because the clause was actually aimed at securing “equal rights for freed blacks”; Gorsuch also argued that the clause had been misread; and Alito argued that “a careful analysis of the text of the Fourteenth Amendment and the process that led to its adoption shows that it…confers citizenship on only those children who, at birth, owe allegiance solely to this country.”

Background

Trump’s executive order 14160, “Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship,” issued on the first day of his second presidential term (2025– ), prohibits the federal government from granting American citizenship to a person born in the United States whose biological parents were not American citizens or legally permanent residents at the time of the person’s birth. The order thus rejected the traditional interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship clause, which declares that “all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.” Trump’s order claimed that the original purpose of the citizenship clause was only to guarantee American citizenship to formerly enslaved persons and their children; therefore, it should not be read as also granting citizenship to children born to “illegal aliens” or temporary residents. Trump’s order was challenged in several lawsuits and soon blocked in nationwide injunctions issued by three federal district court judges, each of whom found the order to likely be unconstitutional. In response, the Trump administration first asked the Supreme Court to rule on the question of whether district courts were capable of issuing nationwide injunctions prohibiting enforcement of particular federal laws or policies. After the Court found that nationwide injunctions in cases involving small numbers of plaintiffs “exceed the equitable authority that Congress has granted to federal courts,” lower courts issued new nationwide injunctions in suits filed by states, organizations, and plaintiffs representing entire classes of individuals. In September 2025 the Trump administration filed a petition with the Supreme Court asking for review of a New Hampshire district court’s nationwide injunction, this time in consideration of the proper interpretation of the citizenship clause. In December the Court agreed to hear the case in its 2025–26 term.

Summary

The case, argued on November 5, 2025, concerns the question of whether the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) of 1977 “authorizes the President to impose tariffs.” On February 20, 2026, in a majority opinion written by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., the Court held that the IEEPA does not give the president the power “to unilaterally impose unbounded tariffs,” because that power is not clearly identified and delegated to the president in the text of the legislation.

Oral arguments before the Court

Learning Resources v. Trump was argued before the Supreme Court in consolidation with a similar case, Trump v. V.O.S Selections, Inc. The original plaintiffs in the two cases, including several small businesses and 12 states, argued that such tariffs are not justified because: (1) they are nowhere mentioned in the IEEPA, (2) no other president has attempted to impose tariffs under the IEEPA, and (3) in the past 238 years Congress has always delegated such powers “explicitly, always with real limits.” The businesses and states also argued that U.S. Pres. Donald Trump’s imposition of tariffs was in violation of the Supreme Court’s “major questions doctrine,” according to which a president may exercise important powers delegated by Congress only if those powers are specifically identified in relevant legislation.

The solicitor general, representing Trump, argued in part that large U.S. trade deficits and the smuggling of opioids into the country had created economic and national security emergencies, justifying significant tariffs on other countries. He also insisted that the IEEPA’s delegation of the power to “regulate…importation” in response to declared emergencies must encompass tariffs, because tariffs are a standard means of regulating importation.

Questions and comments from the Court

Most justices appeared skeptical of the solicitor general’s arguments, questioning not only whether the IEEPA authorized presidents to invoke tariffs but also whether tariffs were a form of taxation—in which case, under the Constitution, presidents could not invoke them. Skeptical members of the Court also joined Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., in suggesting that Trump’s interpretation of the IEEPA was probably in violation of the major questions doctrine.

Some justices, however, appeared to favor Trump’s position in their questions and comments. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., for example, suggested that it is reasonable to assume that under an “imminent threat of war” the president would have the power to invoke a tariff on “a very powerful enemy whose economy was heavily dependent on U.S. trade.” And Justice Brett Kavanaugh asked whether it made sense to interpret the IEEPA as prohibiting “a 1 percent tariff” while allowing the president to completely suspend trade with another country in the event of a national emergency. Notably, Justice Amy Coney Barrett was critical of both sides of the case.

The Court’s decision

In a 6–3 majority opinion written by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., the Court ruled that the IEEPA does not authorize the president to impose tariffs. Noting that Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution assigns the tariff power to Congress (“the Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises”), Roberts argued that the IEEPA’s reference to the power to “regulate…importation” does not clearly include the control of tariffs—indeed, the term tariff appears nowhere in the text of the law. Roberts also held that under the “major questions doctrine,” a conservative principle of administrative law, the IEEPA cannot be read as granting an unlimited power to impose tariffs, because no Congressional power of such magnitude can be so delegated unless it is clearly identified.

Roberts’ first conclusion was joined by five other justices—Amy Coney Barrett, Neil Gorsuch, Ketanji Brown Jackson, Elena Kagan, and Sonia Sotomayor—and thus became the majority opinion of the Court.

Three other justices dissented from the Court’s majority opinion. Brett Kavanaugh, joined by Clarence Thomas and Samuel A. Alito, Jr., argued that it was clear enough that Congress had intended the delegated powers in the IEEPA to include tariff imposition. He also contended that the IEEPA need not satisfy the major questions doctrine, because courts had never before applied that test to legislation dealing with foreign affairs.

Background

In February and April 2025 President Trump issued a series of executive orders that together imposed tariffs on products imported from nearly all other countries. Related orders by Trump reduced, increased, extended, or lifted tariffs for certain countries and products. In the orders themselves Trump claimed that as president of the United States he possessed the authority to impose tariffs under a set of laws including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) of 1977, which enables presidents to “deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat…to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States,” provided that a corresponding “national emergency” is declared. In the first of two groups of executive orders, Trump imposed what came to be known as trafficking tariffs upon Canada, Mexico, and China for having failed to “stem the tide” of “illicit drugs” and upon Mexico for “unlawful migration” into the United States, both of which “threaten the fabric of our society.” In the second and much larger group of orders, Trump imposed reciprocal tariffs of 10 to 50 percent upon countries throughout the world. In April, two Illinois-based educational child-toy companies, Learning Resources, Inc., and hand2mind, Inc., whose products were manufactured in other countries, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that the IEEPA did not authorize the president to impose tariffs and requesting a preliminary injunction of Trump’s orders. In the same month, the Court of International Trade (CIT) agreed to hear two other suits against Trump’s tariffs, one by a group of five businesses and another by Oregon and 11 other states. In May the district court agreed with the plaintiffs that the IEEPA did not grant Trump the power to impose unlimited tariffs at will and issued a preliminary injunction. The CIT issued a similar ruling (though without an injunction) in the same month, and in August the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CFC) rejected Trump’s appeal of that case. The Supreme Court then granted Trump’s request for an expedited review of the CFC’s decision, scheduling oral arguments for November 5, 2025.

Summary

The case, argued on October 15, 2025, concerns the question of whether Louisiana’s creation of a second majority-minority congressional district “violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.”

Questions and comments from the Court

“What Section 2 does is to say, where…African Americans…are not being given the same voting opportunities as white people are, then a remedy is appropriate. That remedy doesn’t have to be race-based, but sometimes it is race-based in order to correct the racially…discriminatory situation that exists in the state right now.” —Justice Elena Kagan

“It is necessary to bear in mind that redistricting must comply with the overriding demands of the Equal Protection Clause.” —Justice Brett Kavanaugh

The conservative justices appeared skeptical of the plaintiffs’ arguments, questioning their reading of Section 2 and the provision’s ultimate compatibility with the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments. Chief Justice Roberts, who had written the Court’s majority opinion in Allen v. Milligan, seemed to dispute its status as a decisive precedent for the current case, noting that “we were considering Alabama’s particular challenge based on…what turned out to be an improper evidentiary showing.” Justice Kavanaugh then suggested that Section 2 might not have justified the creation of a second Black-majority district, because “this Court’s cases in a variety of contexts have said that race-based remedies are permissible for a long period of time…but that they should not be indefinite and should have an end point.” He also contended that if Louisiana’s opposition to a new majority-minority district was based on politics rather than race, it would not count as a violation of Section 2, as the Trump administration had argued in its brief.

In contrast, the liberal justices seemed to side with the plaintiffs. In response to Roberts comparison of the current case with Allen v. Milligan, for example, Justice Elena Kagan told the Louisiana solicitor general that “when we decided Milligan…the state there made several arguments that we specifically rejected. And in the answers that you just gave to me, it seems to me that you repeated each and every one of those arguments that we rejected.”

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson also countered Kavanaugh’s point regarding the supposed time limit of Section 2 by claiming that the provision “is not a remedy in and of itself” but rather “just the measure by which we determine that a remedy is required,” and for that reason the provision does not need a time limit: “It’s not doing any work other than just pointing us to the direction of where we might need to do something.”

The Court’s decision

In a 6–3 majority opinion written by Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., the Court ruled that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, intended to protect the ability of racial minority voters to elect candidates of their choice, does not necessarily prohibit the creation of electoral districts that collectively limit or reduce minorities’ voting power. This is because Section 2 would apply only to situations in which a state “intentionally drew its districts to afford minority voters less opportunity because of their race,” not to situations in which the state’s redistricting merely results in less voting opportunity for minorities. In other words, Section 2, “properly understood…does not intrude on States’ prerogative to draw districts based on nonracial factors, including to achieve partisan advantage.”

The plaintiffs are also mistaken, according to the majority, in their assumption that Section 2 justifies the cancellation of any act of redistricting that reduces minority voting power. Section 2 so interpreted would allow for the violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying equal rights to non-minority (or white) voters. The section would also violate the Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibits state actions clearly designed to be discriminatory.

In her minority opinion, Justice Elena Kagan argued that the Court’s majority had effectively erased Section 2 by ignoring its obvious meaning and purpose. “Today’s decision,” she declared, “renders Section 2 all but a dead letter.” The majority’s ruling “effectively insulate[s] any practice…said by a State to have any race-neutral justification.” As a result, states could perform racially discriminatory redistricting simply by characterizing their act as a partisan gerrymander. “Assuming the State has left behind no smoking-gun evidence of a race-based motive,” she announced, “Section 2 will play no role.”

Following the Supreme Court’s decision, Louisiana’s Republican governor delayed the state’s May primary election by two months to give the state legislature time to design a new map that would increase the number of electoral districts with Republican majorities. The Court also overturned a lower court’s order preventing Alabama from reinstating a map it had created in 2023, which included only one Black-majority district.

Background

In 2022 a federal district court ordered the Louisiana state legislature to redraw the congressional district map it had created after the national census of 2020, on the ground that the map violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act by effectively limiting the voting power of the state’s Black population. In that map, only one of the state’s six congressional districts contained a Black majority, despite the fact that approximately one-third of the state’s population was Black. Soon afterward the Supreme Court stayed the district court’s order pending its own decision in a similar case originating in Alabama. In 2023, after finding Alabama’s redistricting to have violated Section 2, the Court lifted its stay of the Louisiana order, allowing the state’s legislature in 2024 to create a new map with two Black-majority districts. Later that year, however, another district court in the state ruled that the creation of the second Black district was an act of racial gerrymandering in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it ordered the state legislature not to use the map in the 2024 election. The Supreme Court then stayed that court’s order pending its own hearing of the case during its 2024–25 term, thus ensuring Louisiana’s use of the map. Remarkably, the Court was unable to reach a decision by late June, and it announced that it would reschedule the case for its 2025–26 term. The Court then ordered the parties in the case to file briefs addressing the question, “whether [Louisiana’s] intentional creation of a second majority-minority congressional district violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.”