How did Plato explain human knowledge of mathematical objects?

In the context of the philosophy of mathematics, Plato argued that human knowledge of mathematical objects cannot be derived from sense experience, as physical objects are imperfect and fail to embody the precise, abstract nature of mathematical concepts like equality or perfect geometric forms.1

Instead, Plato proposed that humans possess immaterial souls that acquired knowledge of these abstract forms in an existence prior to birth. Consequently, what we perceive as mathematical learning is actually a process of recollection, where the soul retrieves this pre-existing knowledge.12

This perspective is a cornerstone of Mathematical Platonism, which posits that mathematical objects are real, objective, and abstract—existing independently of the physical world and human thought. By rejecting the idea that the human mind is entirely physical, Plato maintained that the soul is capable of forging contact with these nonspatiotemporal realities.342