History

On December 10, 1963, Zanzibar achieved independence as a member of the Commonwealth. In January 1964 the Zanzibar government was overthrown by an internal revolution, Sayyid Jamshid ibn Abdullah (who had succeeded to the sultanate in July 1963 on his father’s death) was deposed, and a republic was proclaimed.

Although the revolution was carried out by only about 600 armed men under the leadership of the communist-trained “field marshal” John Okello, it won considerable support from the African population. Thousands of Arabs were massacred in riots, and thousands more fled the island. Sheikh Abeid Amani Karume, leader of the ASP, was installed as president of the People’s Republic of Zanzibar and Pemba. Sheikh Abdulla Kassim Hanga was appointed prime minister, and Abdul Raḥman Mohammed (“Babu”), leader of the new left-wing Umma (The Masses) Party (formed by defectors from the ZNP), became minister for defense and external affairs. Pending the establishment of a new constitution, the cabinet and all government departments were placed under the control of a Revolutionary Council of 30 members, which was also vested with temporary legislative powers. Zanzibar was proclaimed a one-party state. Measures taken by the new government included the nationalization of all land, with further powers to confiscate any immovable property without compensation except in cases of undue hardship.

Tanzania under Nyerere

Nyerere’s chief external task was to convince the international community, particularly the Western powers, that Tanzania’s foreign policy was to be one of nonalignment; but the overt involvement of the Eastern bloc in Zanzibar, as well as Nyerere’s own insistence that, to rectify the imbalance created in the colonial era, Tanzania had to turn more to the East for aid, did little to make the task easier. The high moral tone taken by the president over Britain’s role in Rhodesia and over the supply of British arms to South Africa also strained the bonds of friendship between the two countries, with Tanzania severing diplomatic relations with Britain from 1965 to 1968. The consequent loss of aid from Britain was more than compensated for by help from Eastern countries, notably from China, whose aid culminated in 1970 in the offer of an interest-free Chinese loan to finance the construction of a railway line linking Dar es Salaam with Zambia.

Though Nyerere fully appreciated the generous assistance his country was receiving, he was eager to impress upon his countrymen the need for maximum self-reliance. Political freedom, he insisted, was useless if the country was to be enslaved by foreign investors. His views were formulated in the Arusha Declaration of February 5, 1967, which put forth the policy of ujamaa (familyhood) and called for socialism and self-reliance. The resources of the country, Nyerere said, were owned by the whole people and were held in trust for their descendants. The leaders had to set an example by rejecting the perquisites of a capitalist system and should draw only one salary. Banks had to be nationalized, though compensation would be given to shareholders; the same would apply to the more important commercial companies. Agriculture, however, was the key to development, and only greater productivity could hold at bay the spectre of poverty. To give a fillip to his argument, people were to be moved into cooperative villages where they could work together for their mutual benefit.

Nyerere’s exhortations did not arouse the enthusiasm for which he had hoped. Individuals resisted his plans for collectivization, and not even the majority of his supporters wholeheartedly adopted his moral stand. The cooperative village scheme failed, bringing additional pressure to bear upon an already desperately weak economy. The sisal industry, one of those nationalized, was badly run down by the mid-1970s because of inefficient management.

Nyerere’s criticisms were not reserved for his own people—or yet for the wealthy countries of the world. In 1968 he challenged the rules of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) by recognizing the secession of Biafra from Nigeria, and in 1975 he attacked the OAU for planning to hold its summit meeting in Uganda, where Pres. Idi Amin was acting with extreme cruelty. Deteriorating relations with both Uganda and Kenya contributed to the collapse of the East African Community in 1977, which had been established 10 years earlier to foster economic development between the three countries.

Tense relations between Tanzania and Uganda in the early 1970s—caused primarily by Nyerere’s continued support of Milton Obote, the former Ugandan president deposed by Amin in 1971—led to occasional border clashes between the two countries. Despite an agreement to cease their hostilities, a new round of conflict was initiated in 1978 when Amin’s forces entered northwestern Tanzania and occupied territory north of the Kagera River; Tanzanian forces counterattacked and regained the region. The clashes continued in the months that followed, and in April 1979, Tanzanian-led forces proceeded to capture the Ugandan capital of Kampala; Amin’s rule ended when he fled the country just before the city was captured. The retention of Tanzanian troops in Uganda for several years after Amin’s overthrow also contributed to strained relations with some of Uganda’s leaders as well as arousing suspicions in Kenya. Elsewhere in Africa, however, Nyerere was able to play an authoritative role, notably in the negotiations leading to the independence of Zimbabwe and in the formation of an organization of African states to try to resist economic domination by South Africa.

Events in Zanzibar caused continuing concern for the mainland leadership. The arbitrary arrest and punishment of anyone believed to oppose the state gave rise to regret that the constitution of the joint republic prevented the mainland authorities from intervening in the island’s affairs where questions of law and justice were involved. The failure to hold elections in Zanzibar also contrasted unfavorably with developments on the mainland. In April 1972 Karume was assassinated by members of the military. His successor, Aboud Jumbe, had been a leading member of Karume’s government, and, while his policies did not differ markedly from those of Karume, they appeared to be moving gradually closer into line with mainland practices. The amalgamation of TANU and the ASP under the title of Revolutionary Party (Chama cha Mapinduzi; CCM) early in 1977 was a hopeful sign but was followed by demands for greater autonomy for Zanzibar. This trend was checked for a short while when Ali Hassan Mwinyi succeeded Jumbe in 1984 and became president of the joint republic after Nyerere resigned in November 1985.

Political and economic change

Mwinyi inherited an economy suffering from the country’s lack of resources, the fall in world prices for Tanzanian produce, the rise in petroleum prices, and inefficient management. An acute shortage of food added still further to his problems. Though he promised to follow Nyerere’s policy of self-reliance, Mwinyi soon concluded that his predecessor’s resistance to foreign aid could no longer be sustained. In accepting an offer of assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1986, Mwinyi adopted some structural reforms and furthered the devaluation of the currency begun in 1984 by Nyerere, who also had denationalized the state-run sector of the sisal industry in 1985. Moreover, private enterprise had been allowed to take over other areas of business.

In the late 1980s dissent again resurfaced in Zanzibar, culminating in the revelation in January 1993 that Zanzibar had joined the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Criticism on the mainland forced its withdrawal later that year.

In May 1992 the country’s constitution was amended to provide for a multiparty political system, and in 1995 the first national elections under this system were held; Benjamin Mkapa of the CCM was elected president. Mkapa continued the economic reforms pursued by his predecessors.

Mkapa’s presidency (1995–2005)

Beginning in the mid-1990s and continuing into the 2000s, Tanzania’s already-tenuous economy and food supply were strained by the number of refugees arriving from the neighboring countries of Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo); the country eventually requested international aid to assist with the care of the refugees. Meanwhile, Tanzania was the site of a terrorist act in 1998 when the U.S. embassy in Dar es Salaam was bombed; 11 people were killed, and many more were injured.

Mkapa was reelected in late 2000 amid allegations of electoral fraud in Zanzibar. Several violent demonstrations followed, including one in January 2001 in which police intervention resulted in at least 40 people dead and 100 people injured. Zanzibar also experienced an escalation in Islamic militancy. Several demonstrations, violent attacks, and bombings in the 2000s were attributed to a few radical organizations protesting the government’s refusal to comply with their extremist views. In late 2004, 10 people were killed in Dar es Salaam by the Indian Ocean tsunami; the government was criticized for not doing enough to warn the public about the impending threat.

After more than a decade of preparation, Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya launched the East African Community Customs Union in 2005 in an effort to stimulate economic activity in the region. In 2009 Tanzania signed an agreement providing for the free movement of people and goods across the East African Community, which by this time also included Burundi and Rwanda.

Tanzania under Kikwete (2005–15)

Meanwhile, Tanzania’s concurrent presidential and legislative elections were held on December 14, 2005. Former foreign minister Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, the CCM candidate, was elected president; the CCM itself won a strong majority in the National Assembly. In the 2010 presidential and legislative elections, held on October 31, Kikwete won a second term as president, with 61 percent of the vote. The CCM, though losing some seats to the opposition, maintained a majority in the National Assembly. The elections were marred by allegations from several opposition groups claiming that votes were tampered with, and some domestic and international observers noted issues with the transparency of the vote-tabulation process.

Earlier that year, Zanzibar had held a referendum to decide on whether to form a government of national unity after the October elections; some 66 percent of voters opted in favor of the measure. In the following years, however, there were demands for greater independence as well as some calls for secession from Tanzania.

Corruption, long an issue in Tanzania, remained a troubling problem under Kikwete’s administration, despite his pledges and efforts to curb the malfeasance. Of particular note was Edward Lowassa, a prominent CCM member and an ally of Kikwete’s, who had been prime minister but resigned in 2008 after being implicated in a corruption-related case; Lowassa denied the allegations. Two other ministers also resigned over the same scandal that year, and shortly thereafter Kikwete dismissed his entire cabinet. Another corruption-related cabinet purge came in 2012 when Kikwete fired six ministers for alleged widespread misuse of government funds. Although some members of government had been put on trial for corruption-related charges, convictions were rare. An exception occurred in July 2015 when former ministers Basil Mramba and Daniel Yona were each sentenced to three years in prison for corruption-related charges.

Kikwete saw the drafting of a new constitution during his second term. He first suggested a constitutional review in 2011, and the following year a commission was established to proceed. After gathering much input from Tanzanians across the country as well as constitutional law experts, the commission made several recommendations, including a move to a decentralized three-tier system of government. A constituent assembly—consisting of the members of the Tanzanian National Assembly and the Zanzibar House of Representatives as well as more than 200 delegates from civil society organizations—reviewed the recommendations and were charged with approving a draft that would be put to a national referendum; a two-thirds majority vote by the body was needed for approval. Many CCM members participating in the constituent assembly did not support the recommendation of changing to a decentralized government, fearing that the outcome of such a change would favor the opposition, while much of the opposition strongly supported the recommendation; this led to an impasse. Unhappy with the way the draft discussions were proceeding, in 2014 the leading opposition party, Chadema, and other opposition groups formed a coalition, Ukawa, and boycotted the constituent assembly in an attempt to have their grievances over the proceedings heard. That act, along with a hastily called and questionable vote on the draft by the rest of the assembly, led to a draft version’s being approved for referendum that did not include the three-tier government structure. Although the goal had been for the constitutional referendum to be held before the October 2015 presidential and legislative elections, in April the electoral commission announced that the referendum would need to be delayed.

2015 elections and rerun of Zanzibar elections in 2016

With Kikwete due to step down after two terms as president, the CCM began the process of choosing a candidate for the 2015 presidential election. In July 2015 it selected government minister John Magufuli, who had a reputation for being ethical and tough on corruption. Longtime CCM stalwart and former prime minister Lowassa left the party after Magufuli’s selection, angered at being passed over for the spot; he soon joined Chadema. Chadema, meanwhile, had worked to increase its appeal and gain supporters; by 2014 it had become increasingly popular with younger voters. The party and its allies in the Ukawa coalition—its very existence noteworthy for being the first time in Tanzania’s history that the usually fractured opposition had united—agreed to field one candidate for the presidential election. Soon after Lowassa joined Chadema, he was named the presidential candidate of the coalition.

The presidential and parliamentary elections on October 25, 2015, were the country’s most closely contested polls, partly because of anger over corruption and the united front provided by the opposition. As results began to trickle in, it was clear that several CCM cabinet members had lost their legislative seats to Ukawa candidates. On October 28 the Zanzibar Electoral Commission chair annulled the elections there, claiming that electoral laws had been violated; international observers were concerned with the annulment, feeling that it was unwarranted. Also that day, Lowassa called for a recount of the presidential vote, claiming that there were irregularities. Regardless, presidential results were released the next day, with Magufuli declared the winner with about 58 percent of the vote; Lowassa took almost 40 percent. Despite the loss of some seats, the CCM managed to maintain a majority in the National Assembly.

Zanzibar’s local presidential and parliamentary elections were rerun on March 20, 2016. The leading opposition party, the Civic United Front (CUF), maintaining that its candidate, Seif Sharif Hamad, had fairly won the October 2015 Zanzibar presidential election, boycotted the rerun. As such, the incumbent, Pres. Ali Mohamed Shein of the CCM, won more than 90 percent of the votes. Several diplomats reiterated their earlier position that the October election should not have been annulled and rerun. A leadership dispute in the CUF in the following years culminated in 2019, with Hamad and his supporters leaving the party to join ACT-Wazalendo, another opposition group.

Magufuli’s presidency (2015–21)

Magufuli began his term as president winning accolades for his frugal tendencies, for a crackdown on corruption, and, later, for his focus on infrastructure projects. However, he and his administration also took on an increasingly authoritarian tone, as evidenced by such actions as exhibiting intolerance for and discrimination against individuals on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity and placing restrictions on the media and the opposition, especially as the 2020 elections grew closer. Magufuli was also criticized for his handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, implementing few of the recommended safety precautions and then prematurely declaring Tanzania free of the virus while it was spreading unchecked within the country.

The presidential and parliamentary elections were held on October 28, 2020. Magufuli faced 14 challengers, foremost of whom was Tundu Lissu, representing Chadema. Magufuli was declared the winner, with about 84 percent of the vote, and his CCM took more than 95 percent of the directly elected legislative seats. The presidency of Zanzibar was contested by more than a dozen candidates, including Hamad as the ACT-Wazalendo candidate and Hussein Mwinyi for the CCM. Mwinyi was declared the winner with about 76 percent of the vote. However, Chadema and ACT-Wazalendo called the elections in both locations fraudulent, and some Western countries cast doubt on the veracity of the results, citing reports of widespread voting irregularities and violence being committed by security forces against civilians. Nonetheless, Magufuli was sworn in for his second term on November 5. In Zanzibar, Mwinyi was sworn in on November 2. In accordance with Zanzibar’s constitutional provision for a government of national unity, Mwinyi named Hamad as first vice president; Hamad accepted the position and was sworn in on December 8. Hamad’s involvement in Mwinyi’s administration was short-lived, however, as he soon contracted COVID-19 and died on February 17, 2021. In March rumors swirled that Magufuli himself was battling COVID-19, but officials denied he was ill. However, on March 17 the government announced that Magufuli had died, citing heart-related complications as the cause of his death. Vice president Samia Suluhu Hassan was sworn in on March 19 to complete the remainder of his term; she was the first woman to serve as president in Tanzania.

Tanzania under Hassan

Once in place, Hassan, in contrast with Magufuli, took strong measures to address the COVID pandemic. More broadly, Hassan reversed some of Magufuli’s more repressive policies and attempted to improve relations with other countries in the region. The next year, she characterized her approach to governance as focusing as the “4Rs”—reconciliation, resilience, reforms, and rebuilding. In January 2023, for example, she lifted a ban on political rallies.

Hope that Hassan would continue with a reform-oriented agenda would fade. By 2024 her government had pivoted to cracking down on dissent. Political parties found their activities restricted, with rallies sometimes banned or dispersed. Multiple opposition figures were arrested or abducted, and there were reports of extrajudicial killings. Some media outlets were ordered to remove content that the government disagreed with, and some had their licenses suspended. Social media and other online platforms were also under scrutiny, with some temporarily banned, blocked, or otherwise restricted.