History

ICC proceedings

Kenyatta and Ruto were occupied with the ICC charges early in their terms. Despite attempts to have the cases against both men dropped, Ruto’s trial began in September 2013. Kenyatta’s trial was repeatedly delayed. Finally, in December 2014 the charges against Kenyatta were withdrawn by the ICC prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, who said that there was not enough evidence to move forward. Kenyatta’s defense team had long claimed that there was not enough evidence, while Bensouda had repeatedly accused the Kenyan government of not cooperating with the ICC in its attempts to gather evidence. Indeed, this was one of the reasons cited for the withdrawal of charges. She also noted the widespread intimidation of the prosecution’s witnesses—leading to recantations and refusals to testify—which also damaged her investigation. In March 2015, ICC judges formally approved the withdrawal of charges and terminated the case proceedings, although they noted that ICC prosecutors could reinstate charges against Kenyatta if future developments supported such a course of action. Ruto’s trial continued until April 2016, when ICC judges terminated it because they found that there had not been sufficient evidence presented that could lead to a conviction. However, they cited “a troubling incidence of witness interference and intolerable political meddling” and noted that ICC prosecutors could retry Ruto at a later date.

Al-Shabaab

Kenyatta inherited security issues that continued to be of concern for his administration. Kenyan troops had entered neighboring Somalia to join in the fight against the Islamic militant group al-Shabaab in 2011. The group promised to retaliate and periodically initiated attacks on Kenyan soil. One of the largest attacks occurred in September 2013, when al-Shabaab gunmen besieged an upscale shopping mall in Nairobi, leaving more than 70 people dead and raising questions about the effectiveness of Kenya’s security forces. Lower-level attacks by the group continued. Incidents in northern Kenya in late 2014, in which al-Shabaab killed dozens of non-Muslims, renewed concerns over security and led to Kenyatta appointing new officials to high-level positions in December 2014.

On April 2, 2015, al-Shabaab struck with its deadliest attack to date on Kenyan soil, when the group raided a university in Garissa early in the morning. The militants killed more than 140 people, injured more than 70, and held numerous hostages before the siege was ended later in the day.

2017 elections, annulment of presidential election results, and fresh election

Tensions over the 2017 general election were evident in 2016. In the spring, opposition members protested regularly against Kenya’s Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), claiming it was corrupt and biased in favor of Kenyatta’s Jubilee Coalition, and called for the IEBC commissioners to be replaced before the 2017 election. An agreement between the opposition and the government regarding the departure of the commissioners was reached in August and provided for the formal resignation of each commissioner in October. New commissioners were sworn in in January 2017.

In preparation for the election, political parties began maneuvers in hopes of being able to appeal to the widest audience possible and to secure a victory at the polls. In September 2016 the parties that constituted the Jubilee Coalition dissolved and then re-formed as one political group, the Jubilee Party. It selected Kenyatta and Ruto as its candidates for president and deputy president, respectively. In January 2017 the ODM and other parties that were part of the CORD coalition allied with other parties to form the National Super Alliance (NASA). The new alliance chose to support Odinga for president and Musyoka for deputy president. During the campaign the rhetoric of both groups grew heated, some of which was directed toward the judiciary regarding rulings or anticipated rulings in election-related matters. This led Chief Justice David Maraga to warn members of both groups, including Odinga and Kenyatta, to end their attacks on the judiciary. NASA also repeatedly alleged that the Jubilee-led government would try to rig the election.

Kenya’s general election—which included polls for the president, the members of the National Assembly and the Senate, and county governors—was held on August 8, 2017. There were eight presidential candidates, but, once again, the race was considered to be between the two front-runners, Kenyatta and Odinga. Prior to the results being announced, Odinga and NASA members denounced the election, claiming that it was a charade, although most observers said the election was free and fair. When the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) announced the results on August 11, Kenyatta was declared the winner, taking more than 54 percent of the vote. Odinga trailed him with almost 45 percent but did not concede. NASA continued to maintain that the election had been rigged, and some civil society groups also raised issues with the electoral preparations and procedures.

NASA officially contested the results, filing a petition with the Supreme Court on August 18 that alleged that the presidential election was “fatally compromised” and should be nullified. Some of the issues cited by NASA included examples of vote tally forms that were used in determining the results but lacked the security features with which the official vote tally forms had been printed and thousands of forms from polling stations—documents that were necessary in determining the final results and were supposed to be posted for public viewing—that were still unaccounted for a week after the election results had been announced. On September 1, in a decision that stunned most observers, the Supreme Court annulled the presidential election results, ruling that the election was not conducted in accordance with the terms outlined in the constitution. They ordered a new election, to be held within 60 days. Odinga praised the court’s ruling, noting that it was the first time that an African court had nullified irregular elections for president. Kenyatta said that although he disagreed with the decision, he respected it. However, he then made inflammatory statements about the judges who issued the ruling, calling them crooks and insinuating that they were a problem that he would take care of once he was reelected. The IEBC set October 17 as the date of the new election.

On September 20 the Supreme Court released a detailed ruling on why it had annulled the results of the presidential election. The ruling found fault with the actions of the IEBC and concurred with NASA regarding many of the problems with the vote tallying and transmission process. The court also denounced the IEBC because it did not obey a court order to allow access to its computer servers and logs. After the detailed ruling was issued, the IEBC changed the election date to October 26 in order to have more time for the necessary preparations.

The weeks before the election were contentious. With regard to NASA’s complaints from the previous election and the problems mentioned in the Supreme Court’s ruling, in mid-September NASA issued a list for the IEBC of “irreducible minimums”—problems with the previous election that NASA wanted the IEBC to change before Odinga would participate in the new election. In addition, NASA repeatedly held demonstrations by IEBC headquarters and in busy business districts to keep its demands in the public eye and persuade the commission to make the modifications it sought. The IEBC noted that some requests had been granted, but others were not because of reasons such as time constraints and exiting supplier contracts. Meanwhile, two election-related amendments were quickly passed in the National Assembly, in which Kenyatta’s Jubilee Party held a majority. The amendments included contentious measures such as removing the need for dual transmissions to verify the results, allowing a candidate to automatically be declared the winner of the contested post if the other candidate withdrew from an election, and limiting the court’s ability to void an election. The amendments bill, which was condemned by NASA and others, was then sent to Kenyatta to sign into law. He did not sign it, but the bill automatically became law in November.

Citing his frustration with the lack of electoral reform, on October 10 Odinga announced his withdrawal from the upcoming election. His decision led to uncertainty regarding how his withdrawal might affect the October 26 poll. Citing a 2013 Supreme Court ruling, Odinga claimed that the IEBC would now need to scrap the election and call for a fresh one in 90 days, during which time he hoped the commission would be able to address the remaining electoral reforms he and NASA felt were necessary. Kenyatta, however, insisted that the election would proceed as planned, and the IEBC appeared to agree with him, although there was some legal ambiguity. That the election would be able to proceed as planned came into further doubt when one of the IEBC members, Roselyn Akombe, fled the country on October 17 and resigned from the commission, revealing political rifts in the IEBC that she claimed were preventing any meaningful electoral change from occurring and would prevent a credible election from taking place. She also said that she had received death threats over her involvement in the IEBC. The head of the IEBC, Wafula Chebukati, then also admitted that he could not guarantee a free, fair, or credible election on October 26, given the squabbling among the political parties and their attempts to interfere with the commission.

On October 24 the Supreme Court agreed to hear a petition the following day that sought to delay the upcoming poll on the basis that the IEBC could not guarantee a free, fair, and credible election. The court, however, was unable to hear the case, for only two of the court’s seven judges came to court on October 25, leaving the court short of the necessary quorum. Some pointed to the shooting of one of a judge’s bodyguards on the evening of October 24 as a sign of intimidation of the judiciary.

Though the rerun election took place on October 26 as planned, it was marred by low turnout because of a widely heeded call by NASA for voters to boycott the poll and because security issues prevented some voting centers from opening in opposition-dominated areas. The IEBC reported that Kenyatta had won the election with about 98 percent of the vote, but the strength of his mandate was in doubt because official turnout was about 39 percent—less than half of the turnout of the August 8 poll. Chebukati, in spite of his concerns a week prior, declared that the election had been free, fair, and credible. NASA and Odinga did not recognize the validity of the rerun poll and continued to call for a fresh election in 90 days. Odinga also announced plans for the creation of a People’s Assembly, composed of representatives from various groups across society that would discuss the pressing issues faced by Kenyans, as well as a think tank that would tackle the shortcomings of government. In addition, he proposed a campaign of nonviolent demonstrations and economic boycotts—to be led by a newly created arm of NASA called the National Resistance Movement (NRM)—in support of his call for a fresh election.

Although Odinga and NASA did not file any legal challenges pertaining to the validity of the rerun election, others did. Those challenges were dismissed on November 20 by the Supreme Court, which upheld the election results. Kenyatta was sworn in for his second term on November 28, 2017. Odinga held his own controversial inauguration ceremony on January 30, 2018, where he was sworn in as the “people’s president” of Kenya. He justified his inauguration with what NASA declared were the “real” results from the August 2017 election, which showed that he had received more votes than Kenyatta and enough to avoid a runoff. The IEBC, however, disputed NASA’s results. The government was not amused with Odinga’s actions, which it deemed an “attempt to subvert or overthrow the legally constituted Government of the Republic of Kenya,” and it launched an investigation into the event. It also designated the NRM a criminal group, thereby placing the group’s members under the threat of arrest and prosecution. In the week that followed, some opposition members were indeed arrested, including Miguna Miguna—a leader in the NRM—who was charged with having committed treason-related offenses for his participation in the January 30 ceremony.

Odinga’s inauguration provoked an alarming crackdown on the media by authorities. Before the day of the event, the government warned the media not to cover it, and this warning was not heeded. On the morning of Odinga’s ceremony, the independent radio and television stations that intended to broadcast it were forced off the air by the government; some outlets, however, were able to provide coverage of the event by streaming it on the Internet. The next day, the stations were still off the air as the government announced that it was beginning investigations into why its previous directive to not cover the event had been ignored and said that the stations would remain shut down until the investigations were completed. The government’s shutdown of three of the stations was challenged in a case filed at the High Court. On February 1, 2018, the court ordered the government to restore the stations’ ability to broadcast and allow them to do so for the two weeks before a hearing was scheduled to be held. However, in the days that followed, the Kenyan government ignored the High Court’s ruling, and the stations remained off the air. Two of the stations resumed broadcasting on February 5, but the third station mentioned in the High Court case remained shut down until February 8, 2018.

Unexpected rapprochement, the Building Bridges Initiative, and shifting alliances

Despite the heightened tensions, Kenyatta and Odinga soon appeared to settle their differences, surprising many. The two came together in early March 2018, grasping hands and speaking of uniting for the best interest of the country; the event was popularly referred to as “the handshake.” Kenyatta and Odinga went on to work together on the Building Bridges Initiative (BBI) task force, which surveyed Kenyans from all over the country and compiled a list of some of the country’s most significant challenges and then recommended solutions. The reconciliation and high-profile collaboration between the two men coincided with the diminished political power of Deputy President Ruto, who until then had been the presumptive successor to Kenyatta but now was increasingly alienated from the president.

The BBI’s report, which was released in November 2019, included several recommendations that intended to provide for greater power sharing among Kenya’s many ethnic groups, including reinstating the prime minister post and creating other positions. The BBI’s recommendations were adopted into a constitutional amendment bill, which was passed by both houses of parliament in May 2021. The suggested changes and resultant amendment bill, however, had some detractors—including Ruto—who thought the bill was too costly and a political power play, and, before the amendment bill could be put to a public referendum, its constitutionality was challenged in the court system. The bill was struck down as being unconstitutional in both the High Court and the Court of Appeals, the primary reason being Kenyatta’s involvement in the process: he used a constitutional provision for initiating amendments that was designated for ordinary citizens, not a sitting president like himself. In March 2022 the Supreme Court also ruled that the amendment bill was unconstitutional for the same reason, thus halting the efforts to implement the BBI’s recommendations by changing the constitution. The court’s ruling was a blow to Kenyatta and Odinga.

2022 election

The general election was scheduled for August 9, 2022. In the presidential race there were four candidates, Odinga and Ruto being the front-runners. Odinga ran as the candidate of the Azimio la Umoja alliance, which included his ODM party as well as Kenyatta’s Jubilee Party and which had been formed to contest the 2022 election. His running mate was Martha Karua. Kenyatta, who was not eligible to serve another term as president, had officially endorsed Odinga in February; that same month Kenyatta also declared Ruto unfit to be president. Ruto, who had since exited the Jubilee Party, was the candidate of the United Democratic Alliance party, which was part of the Kenya Kwanza alliance. He selected Rigathi Gachagua as his running mate. The other two presidential candidates were David Mwaure Waihiga, representing the Agano Party, and George Wajackoyah of the Roots Party. Throughout the campaign, Ruto framed the election as a choice between “hustlers”—regular folks (which he considered himself) working hard to make ends meet and struggling to get ahead—and the dynasties, or political elite, like Kenyatta and Odinga, whose families had wealth and had long held political influence and power in Kenya (Kenyatta’s father, Jomo Kenyatta, was the first prime minister and then the first president of independent Kenya, and Odinga’s father, Oginga Odinga, had been a prominent opposition leader for decades).

Voting was generally peaceful on August 9, and early, incomplete results showed Odinga and Ruto in a close race. Vote tallying came to a conclusion, and on August 15 IEBC head Wafula Chebukati announced that Ruto had won with 50.49 percent of the vote, narrowly edging past and avoiding a runoff with Odinga, who reportedly received 48.85 percent. However, the announcement was overshadowed by uncertainty, for earlier that day four of the seven IEBC commissioners stated that they could not support the final results due to the “opaque nature” of the last phase of the vote-tabulation process; furthermore, just prior to that, one of Odinga’s election agents claimed to have reports of electoral interference, though he did not provide details. Odinga refused to recognize the results and vowed to challenge them through legal channels and filed a challenge with the Supreme Court later that month. His was one of nine petitions filed at the court: two were dismissed, and the remaining seven were consolidated due to their similarities. On September 5, the Court ruled that no credible evidence of fraud had been presented and upheld the results. Ruto was sworn in on September 13, 2022.

2024 protests and Deputy President Gachagua’s impeachment

In 2024 the government’s annual finance bill—or, more precisely, the tax increases and new taxes proposed in the bill—was a source of disgruntlement and led to the first significant crisis of Ruto’s presidency. The proposed finance bill began generating rumblings of discontent in the second fiscal quarter of 2024 among the business and financial technology (“fintech”) sectors, as well as some opposition parties. Then, in early June a comedian named Eric Omondi organized the “Mama Mboga Revolution,” a demonstration against the proposed tax changes, in which he and an estimated 200 women protested near the Parliament building in Nairobi. Though they were quickly dispersed and Omondi was arrested, the event proved to be a harbinger of what was yet to come.

The proposed tax changes included in the finance bill were widely circulated via social media, and Kenyans mobilized to show their disapproval. “Occupy Parliament,” a sit-in at Parliament, was planned for June 18, the day that MPs were scheduled to discuss the finance bill. The Occupy Parliament movement and broader opposition to the finance bill were largely dominated by protestors from the Generation Z cohort (those born in the late 1990s and early 2000s). Rather than being led by notable figures or political leaders, the movement was proudly leaderless and emphasized the people-led nature of the protests that relied on social media to organize and mobilize supporters. Hundreds of Kenyans turned out on June 18 and were met by police using water cannons and tear gas; more than 200 people were arrested. In response to the outcry, the government announced that some of the proposed taxes had been dropped from the bill, but it was not enough to appease the public. Two days later, thousands of Kenyans again demonstrated in Nairobi—meeting a similar response from the police—as well as in other major towns throughout the country, and chants of “Ruto must go” were heard.

The young protesters called for a nationwide strike to be held on June 25, and thousands gathered again outside of Parliament that day while legislators voted in favor of passing the finance bill. Demonstrations were held in other cities, towns, and rural areas as well. In Nairobi, police met demonstrators with rubber bullets, tear gas, and water cannons, and several demonstrators were shot with live fire when they entered the Parliament complex, which was later set on fire; more than 20 people were killed and hundreds were injured. The next day Ruto announced that he would not sign the finance bill with the proposed tax increases and that the government would instead look to austerity measures to help address the fiscal shortfall. Still, Kenyans continued to protest against the government, with some again calling for Ruto’s resignation. In July Ruto dismissed almost all of his cabinet ministers. His new cabinet, unveiled later that month, included opposition members as well as some ministers from his previous cabinet. Protests continued, albeit on a smaller scale, with the last major anti-tax gatherings occurring on August 8, the day Ruto’s new cabinet was sworn in. Throughout the several weeks of demonstrations, the actions of the police were criticized as excessive. There were also reports of protestors being abducted, allegedly by the police.

Tensions between Ruto and his deputy president, Gachagua, came to the fore after the protests, and Gachagua had impeachment proceedings initiated against him in Parliament in October. Gachagua was accused on 11 counts, including engaging in corrupt activity, undermining the government, and inflaming ethnic tensions; on October 17, he was impeached on 5 counts. He denied all the charges and said that the move to impeach him was politically motivated. Ruto tapped Kithure Kindiki, then serving as minister of the interior, to become his new deputy. Owing to delays stemming from Gachagua’s legal challenges regarding his impeachment, Kindiki was not sworn in as deputy president until November 1, 2024.

2025 protests

In June 2025 the death of a blogger in police custody generated unrest and renewed scrutiny over the actions of Kenya’s security forces. Albert Ojwang was a blogger who had been arrested after being critical of Eliud Lagat, a senior police official, on social media. Kenyan police initially suggested that Ojwang died of injuries he sustained from hitting his head against a wall, but that narrative was later contradicted by his autopsy results, which suggested that he had been assaulted. News of his death led to protests and calls for Lagat to resign. Soon after that, demonstrations held on June 25 in Nairobi and other Kenyan cities to commemorate the anniversary of the 2024 finance bill protests at Parliament also harnessed the current anger over police brutality and anti-government sentiments, with many calling for Ruto to step down. The June 25 demonstrations turned deadly, with more than a dozen people killed—almost all at the hands of the police responding to the gathering—and hundreds were injured. Demonstrations held in Nairobi and other towns for the anniversary of the 1990 Saba Saba protests on July 7 also resulted in additional deaths and injuries.