The emphasis on stakeholding has not gone unchallenged. Elaine Sternberg, a philosopher specializing in business ethics and corporate governance, alleged that stakeholding is unworkable and destroys accountability within a firm. Sternberg argued that stakeholders are usually seen as all those who affect or are affected by a corporation. She argued that a key problem is that the understanding can be stretched so that virtually everyone can be presented as a stakeholder. Because of the sheer numbers involved, managers will find it impossible to reach decisions that satisfy all stakeholders. Stakeholding is a recipe for managerial paralysis. Furthermore, according to Sternberg, accountability can only function well when those to whom the managers are accountable agree on what ought to be the purpose of corporate policy. Under shareholder governance, this is usually assumed to be profit. Sternberg suggests that the stakeholder model fractures this single, clear purpose. Different stakeholders value different ends. Rather than being subject to some overriding organizational goal, managers have to balance stakeholder benefits. As managers cannot be judged against a single purpose, they are effectively accountable to no one. Stakeholding destroys accountability.

Sternberg’s criticisms did not close the debate and instead opened up a new set of questions. If stakeholding means that managers have to take everyone into account, then there are grounds to believe that stakeholding will be unworkable. However, stakeholding does not necessarily have to take everyone into account. While some understandings of stakeholding may be elastic, not all are. Thus, managers are unlikely to be overwhelmed by the numbers of stakeholders they have to consider. It is true that the cutoff point for those to be considered stakeholders is not easy to fix. However, these difficulties apply to all systems of corporate governance, including those that restrict their attention to shareholders. It is likely that those denied stakeholder status would lobby managers to be viewed as stakeholders. This feature is not unique to stakeholding and also applies to those excluded from shareholder models of the firm.

Stakeholder firms might also be charged with meeting a clear purpose, delivering a specified level of service. For example, foundation hospitals are responsible for delivering health care services to a specified population. Of course, the best way in which this may be achieved may be a subject of considerable debate. But this applies equally to what policies firms have to follow in order to maximize profits. Empirical evidence is needed to see whether or not stakeholding is unworkable and destroys accountability. What can be said is that corporate governance reform is high on the agenda, and there is likely to be a more complex and varied system of corporate governance in the future, as the impact of public service reform and dissatisfaction with corporate failings gathers momentum.

Adolph A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1933); Johnston Birchall, A Mutual Trend: How to Run Rail and Water in the Public Interest (2002); Margaret M. Blair, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-first Century (1995); Will Hutton, The State We’re In (1996); John Kay, Foundations of Corporate Success (1993); J.E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law (1993); Elaine Sternberg, Corporate Governance: Accountability in the Marketplace (1998).