- Date:
- 1945 - 1952
- Location:
- Japan
- Participants:
- Allied powers
- Context:
- World War II
- Key People:
- Douglas MacArthur
occupation of Japan
How long was the Allied occupation of Japan?
What was the role of Gen. Douglas MacArthur during the occupation of Japan?
What were the main changes introduced in Japan’s new constitution of 1947?
How did the Korean War influence the occupation of Japan?
occupation of Japan, (1945–52) military occupation of Japan by the Allied Powers after its defeat in World War II. Theoretically an international occupation, in fact it was carried out almost entirely by U.S. forces under Gen. Douglas MacArthur.
During the occupation period, Japanese soldiers and civilians from abroad were repatriated to Japan, arms industries were dismantled, and political prisoners were released. Wartime leaders stood trial for war crimes, and seven were executed. A new constitution (promulgated 1947), vesting power in a democratic government, replaced the Meiji Constitution; in it Japan renounced its right to wage war, the emperor was reduced to ceremonial status, and women were given the right to vote. Though the United States wanted to end the occupation in 1947, the Soviet Union vetoed a peace treaty with Japan; a treaty was signed in 1951, and the occupation ended the following year.
The surrender of Japan
On August 14, 1945, the same day that Japan accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, Gen. MacArthur was designated the supreme commander for the Allied Powers. On the grounds that Allied relations with Japan did not rest on a contractual basis, but on unconditional surrender, the power of the emperor and the Japanese government was subordinated to the Allied occupation authorities. MacArthur became, in effect, the viceroy of Japan. As the sole executive for the Allied Powers, he exercised his authority through the Japanese governmental machinery and agencies to the extent that this arrangement satisfactorily furthered Allied objectives.
The Allied occupation began on August 29, when elements of the U.S. 11th Airborne Division secured the airstrip at Atsugi, just west of Yokohama. Later that same day, MacArthur arrived in Japan; he had received by radio a statement of U.S. government policy entitled “U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan.” This document was prepared jointly by a committee composed of representatives of the Department of State, the War Department, and Department of the Navy. It dealt with such subjects as military occupation, relationship of Allied authority to the Japanese government, disarmament and demobilization, war criminals, encouragement of desire for individual liberties and democratic processes, economic demilitarization, resumption of peaceful economic activity, and also provided for the participation in the occupation of Japan of the forces of other nations that had taken a leading part in the war against Japan. In accordance with this provision, U.S. forces in Japan were joined by British Commonwealth troops during the first three months of 1946.
On September 2, 1945, on the USS Missouri anchored in Tokyo Bay, MacArthur accepted the surrender of Japan. The instrument of surrender was also signed by representatives of the United States, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the commonwealth of Australia, the dominion of Canada, the provisional government of the French Republic, the kingdom of the Netherlands, and the dominion of New Zealand.
Creation of the occupation government
The “Big Three” Allied governments agreed, with the concurrence of China, to establish in Tokyo an Allied Council for Japan to be composed of the supreme commander as chair; members from the United States, the Soviet Union, and China; and a member representing jointly the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and India. The purpose of the council was to consult with and advise the supreme commander in regard to the implementation of the terms of surrender, the occupation, and control of Japan. Although the terms of reference of the Allied council provided that the supreme commander would consult and advise with the council in advance of the issuance of orders on matters of substance, circumstances permitting, he was the sole executive authority for the Allied Powers in Japan, and in all cases action was to be carried out under and through him. He was to issue all orders for the implementation of the terms of surrender, the occupation and control of Japan, and supplementary directives.
If any disagreement arose in the council regarding fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure, or dealing with a change in the Japanese government as a whole, the supreme commander was to withhold action pending clarification of its decision by the Far Eastern Commission (FEC), a separate advisory body composed of the representatives from the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States, China, France, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, and the Philippines that met in Washington, D.C. However, when necessary, the supreme commander, after appropriate consultation with the council, could change individual ministers or fill vacancies. The first meeting of the Allied Council was held April 4, 1946, in Tokyo.
Japan’s constitution was promulgated on November 3, 1946 and came into force on May 3 1947, superseding the Meiji Constitution of 1889. It differs from the earlier document in two fundamental ways: the principle of sovereignty and the stated aim of maintaining Japan as a peaceful and democratic country in perpetuity. The emperor, rather than being the embodiment of all sovereign authority (as he was previously), is the symbol of the state and of the unity of the people, while sovereign power rests with the people (whose fundamental human rights are explicitly guaranteed). Article 9 of the constitution states that Japan “forever renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation”—a clause that has been much debated since the constitution’s promulgation.
Through the end of the 1940s, the stated goals of the occupation government were the demilitarization and deindustrialization of Japan as preconditions to the conclusion of a final peace treaty. On June 19, 1947, the Far Eastern Commission unanimously approved a basic postsurrender policy for Japan that would remain effective until such a treaty could come in force. Designed to ensure that Japan would not again threaten the peace and security of the Pacific and to encourage a democratic and peaceful regime in Japan, this statement of principles reaffirmed in its essentials the earlier U.S. declaration of August 29, 1945. The FEC also forbade any Japanese activity in the field of atomic energy “for the time being”; laid down standards for the reduction of Japan’s capacity in war industries which were in excess of “the peaceful needs of the Japanese people”; and defined those needs as being “substantially the standard of living prevailing in Japan during the period 1930–1934.”
During this time, the rift between the Allied powers became more pronounced, especially after the victory of Mao Zedong’s Communist forces in the Chinese Civil War. The Soviets perceived, correctly, that U.S. interests in Japan had transitioned from punishing a defeated foe to helping a potential Cold War ally reform and rebuild. In this way, the Allied occupation of Japan would prove to be broadly similar to the occupation of Germany. In both cases, the Allies disagreed over reparations regimes, and the United States ultimately spent more on occupation costs and development loans than either Japan or Germany paid out in reparations. The zaibatsu, family owned enterprises that had dominated the Japanese economy before the war, were broken up by Allied authorities in 1946, but they were soon reformed as keiretsu, conglomerates that were often run by those same zaibatsu families. The rapid reindustrialization of Japan would subsequently be viewed through the same lens as the Wirtschaftswunder (“economic miracle”) in postwar Germany.
Occupied Japan and the Korean War
The Soviet Union left the FEC in January 1950, demanding the expulsion of the Chinese Nationalist member, but returned in October. Soviet participation in the Allied Council was intermittent, because of a continuing dispute over repatriation of Japanese war prisoners from the Soviet Union. In April 1950 the Soviets announced that repatriation had been completed, but the U.S. maintained that more than 300,000 prisoners were still unaccounted for. It was later estimated that as many as 200,000 Japanese POWs had died in Soviet custody.
After the Soviet-backed North Korean invasion of South Korea, the Soviet Union charged that the U.S. was secretly rearming Japan and that it was using Japanese troops in the UN campaign on the Korean peninsula. Both charges were denied by the U.S., but in fact, a flotilla of 20 minesweepers from the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency (the precursor of the modern Maritime Self-Defense Force) was operating in Korean waters under the command of the United States Navy in the last months of 1950. In October 1950 a Japanese sailor was killed in action when his ship struck a mine off Wŏnsan.
As war raged in Korea, pressure for the conclusion of a peace treaty increased in Japan and elsewhere. U.S. Pres. Harry S. Truman announced that the United States was beginning informal conversations with interested powers on the subject. An outline of proposed peace terms released by the U.S. on November 24, 1950, called for a U.S. trusteeship under the UN for the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands; the status of Taiwan, the P’eng-hu Islands, southern Sakhalin, and the Kuril Islands would be jointly determined by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China or, failing agreement, by the UN General Assembly; and Japan would be admitted to the UN. The terms would permit the maintenance of U.S. and other troops in Japan, by agreement with the Japanese government, to safeguard Japan’s security. No restrictions on Japanese rearmament were proposed. Some of Japan’s former enemies found these terms too lenient, demanding firmer guarantees against Japanese remilitarization, as well as further reparations.
The primary question, however, was whether the U.S. and other countries should conclude a separate treaty or treaties with Japan if agreement with the Soviet Union (and Communist China, which demanded a voice) proved impossible. On December 27, 1950, the U.S. intimated in a note to the Soviet Union that it was prepared to proceed without Soviet concurrence. Discussion in Japan itself was focused chiefly on the issue of a separate treaty. Throughout the occupation, the Japanese had broadly voiced approval for an overall treaty, which would give Japan full international status and diplomatic freedom of action. However, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida and his Liberal Party maintained that a separate treaty was better than none, deplored further delay, and favored alignment with the Western powers. Opposition parties, which hoped that Japan could maintain a neutral position in world affairs, argued for an overall treaty and opposed the maintenance of U.S. bases in Japan after the treaty was signed. Sentiment for an overall treaty was strong in the first half of 1950, but the war in Korea caused a swing in the other direction, convincing many that Japan, for the sake of its own security, had no choice but to throw in its lot with the Western powers.
Treaty of San Francisco and the end of occupation
In April 1951 MacArthur was relieved of command by Truman and replaced by Lieut. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway. This step caused some initial uneasiness in Japan, which was later allayed by assurances that no changes in U.S. policies toward Japan were contemplated.
The signing of the Treaty of San Francisco (also called the Treaty of Peace with Japan) on September 8, 1951, represented the climax of years of diplomatic effort by the United States. The terms of the treaty had been worked out by consultation with the United States’ allies and with the Japanese government, during which John Foster Dulles, ambassador at large, had visited Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and France. The United States sought a treaty of reconciliation, minimizing punitive and restrictive features, which would encourage Japan to make a positive and voluntary contribution to the strength of the non-Communist world. Many of Japan’s neighbors were, however, concerned over the possible revival of Japanese militarism, aggression, and economic competition. Agreement was eventually reached on a treaty which in general was considered satisfactory in Washington, D.C., Canberra, Wellington, Manila, London, and Paris. Although denounced by the Soviet delegate at San Francisco as a U.S. attempt to “enslave” Japan economically and to draw it into “aggressive military coalitions” directed against the Soviet Union and China, the treaty was signed by Japan and 48 other countries. All occupation forces were to be withdrawn from Japan within 90 days after the treaty came into force.
However, a supplementary treaty between Japan and the United States, also signed on September 8, permitted U.S. forces to be stationed in Japan after this date, as a provisional measure for Japan’s protection, with the expectation that Japan itself would increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense. The treaty contained no restrictions on Japan’s domestic political institutions, economy, or military establishment (though the maintenance of armed forces was still prohibited by the constitution of 1947). The treaty would enter into force when ratified by Japan and by a majority, including the United States, of 11 principal Pacific countries.
On April 28, 1952, the Japanese peace treaty came into effect, formally bringing to an end the Allied occupation. Japan thus resumed its place as a fully sovereign country. In proclaiming the treaty, Truman noted that six years of joint effort to restore Japan as a prosperous and progressive nation had strengthened the bonds of friendship between the Japanese and American peoples. He further expressed confidence that Japan was ready to play its full part in meeting the “menace” of Communism.
China had not been invited to sign the multilateral peace treaty, because of disagreement among the treaty’s sponsors as to whether it should be represented by the Nationalist or the Communist government. The Soviet Union denounced the treaty as illegal and as part of U.S. preparations for a new war in East Asia; these sentiments were echoed by Communist China. In June 1952 Japan formally applied for membership in the United Nations, but although its admission was generally favored, it was prevented by a Soviet veto in September (Japan was ultimately granted membership in December 1956).
Since Japan possessed no regular armed forces, U.S. troops remained in the country under the terms of the U.S.-Japanese security treaty of 1951, which became effective along with the peace treaty. Some fears that this arrangement might compromise Japan’s sovereignty were expressed in Japan, but the Diet eventually passed the necessary implementing legislation. An administrative agreement signed on February 27, 1952, defined the conditions under which U.S. troops would be stationed in Japan, including a sharing of costs between the Japanese and U.S. governments and provision for a form of extraterritoriality. More than 50,000 U.S. troops remained stationed in Japan in the 21st century.


