What is medieval logic?

Medieval logic refers to the concepts, principles, and systems of logical argumentation that were mainly studied and developed by Arabic philosophers from the 9th century CE and by Latin philosophers from the 12th century CE through the end of the European Middle Ages. Logic, as a formal study, began in ancient Greece, especially in the philosophy of Aristotle (384–322 BCE). His logic was documented and commented on by Greek philosophers until the 6th century CE, and by Latin philosophers who translated Aristotle’s works. Boethius , a Roman scholar, was the most important of the latter, and his translations became the basis for Europe’s understanding of logic in the early Middle Ages.

When and where was medieval logic studied?

Medieval logic, a system of logical argumentation, was primarily studied and developed by Arabic philosophers from the 9th century CE and by Latin philosophers from the 12th century CE through the end of the European Middle Ages. Key locations for the study of medieval logic: * The Continent Disciples of Jean Buridan, such as Albert of Saxony and Marsilius of Inghen, furthered the work of their predecessors. * England The second half of the 14th century saw logicians at Oxford and Cambridge consolidate earlier developments. In 1390, the Italian Paul of Venice studied at Oxford for three years before teaching in Italy, advancing the study of English logic there. * University of Paris Jean Buridan, a significant logician, wrote his Summulae de dialectica for instructional use at the University of Paris.

Why was logic important to scholars in the Middle Ages?

During the Middle Ages, logic was of great importance to scholars because it was a tool for critical thinking, argumentation, and theological reasoning. The rediscovery of Aristotle's works, especially Sophistic Refutations , introduced new ways to identify and avoid fallacies, which was essential in theological and philosophical discussions. Figures like Peter Abelard used logical techniques in theology, setting a precedent for those who followed. The development of Logica moderna , or "Terminist" logic, further emphasized the properties of terms and semantic paradoxes, enriching logical study until the end of the Middle Ages.

How did medieval thinkers build on or change ideas from ancient Greek logicians like Aristotle?

Medieval thinkers in both the Arabic and Latin worlds extensively studied and developed logical argumentation, building upon the concepts and principles of ancient Greek logicians like Aristotle . Key aspects of their work: * Translation and Commentary Philosophers like Boethius translated Aristotle’s works, which became the basis for understanding logic in Europe during the early Middle Ages. * Dialectic From the 9th century onward, scholars applied Aristotelian logic, particularly from Porphyry’s Isagoge and Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione , to theological and philosophical problems. Peter Abelard used dialectic for analysis and discovering truth, especially regarding universals. * Fallacies and Sophismata The rediscovery of Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations led to investigations into fallacies in theology, physics, and logic. This spurred the creation of sophismata treatises and new studies on the properties of terms and syncategoremata (expressions like "only," "except"). * Later Developments Thinkers such as Jean Buridan 's disciples and Paul of Venice continued to develop logical ideas, with the latter popularizing the study of English logic in Italy.

What are some key concepts or methods used in medieval logic?

Medieval logic, a field of study developed by Arabic and Latin philosophers, covers concepts, principles, and systems of logical argumentation. Key methods include the theory of supposition, which addresses reference within propositions, and divides personal supposition into determinate, confused and distributive, and merely confused types. Theologians and scientists also applied supposition theory in their work. Other key concepts include the study of sophismata, which deepened in the 13th century, and the development of summulae (little summaries) by authors called summulists . In the 14th century, logicians also developed theories of connotation and mental language.

How did the study of logic in the Middle Ages influence modern logical thinking and philosophy?

Medieval logic, which was developed by Arabic and Latin philosophers, significantly shaped modern logical thinking. Thinkers like Jean Buridan and Paul of Venice advanced logical study through their writings, which were used as textbooks. Figures like Petrus Ramus criticized medieval logic and proposed reforms, emphasizing logic's use in arguments. Later, the drive to symbolize logic, linking it with mathematics, became a characteristic theme in the modern era. This evolution led to a focus on developing ideal logical languages and methods, enhancing human thought and its mechanical application.

Medieval logic

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Medieval logic

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What is medieval logic?
Medieval logic refers to the concepts, principles, and systems of logical argumentation that were mainly studied and developed by Arabic philosophers from the 9th century CE and by Latin philosophers from the 12th century CE through the end of the European Middle Ages.

Logic, as a formal study, began in ancient Greece, especially in the philosophy of Aristotle (384–322 BCE). His logic was documented and commented on by Greek philosophers until the 6th century CE, and by Latin philosophers who translated Aristotle’s works. Boethius, a Roman scholar, was the most important of the latter, and his translations became the basis for Europe’s understanding of logic in the early Middle Ages.
3 Britannica Sources
Created from Britannica articles using AI. AI can make mistakes, so verify using Britannica articles.
When and where was medieval logic studied?
Medieval logic, a system of logical argumentation, was primarily studied and developed by Arabic philosophers from the 9th century CE and by Latin philosophers from the 12th century CE through the end of the European Middle Ages.

Key locations for the study of medieval logic:
* The Continent Disciples of Jean Buridan, such as Albert of Saxony and Marsilius of Inghen, furthered the work of their predecessors.
* England The second half of the 14th century saw logicians at Oxford and Cambridge consolidate earlier developments. In 1390, the Italian Paul of Venice studied at Oxford for three years before teaching in Italy, advancing the study of English logic there.
* University of Paris Jean Buridan, a significant logician, wrote his Summulae de dialectica for instructional use at the University of Paris.
2 Britannica Sources
1. history of logic: Late medieval logic
2. medieval logic
Created from Britannica articles using AI. AI can make mistakes, so verify using Britannica articles.
Why was logic important to scholars in the Middle Ages?
During the Middle Ages, logic was of great importance to scholars because it was a tool for critical thinking, argumentation, and theological reasoning. The rediscovery of Aristotle's works, especially Sophistic Refutations, introduced new ways to identify and avoid fallacies, which was essential in theological and philosophical discussions.

Figures like Peter Abelard used logical techniques in theology, setting a precedent for those who followed. The development of Logica moderna, or "Terminist" logic, further emphasized the properties of terms and semantic paradoxes, enriching logical study until the end of the Middle Ages.
2 Britannica Sources
1. history of logic: The “properties of terms” and discussions of fallacies
2. medieval logic
Created from Britannica articles using AI. AI can make mistakes, so verify using Britannica articles.
How did medieval thinkers build on or change ideas from ancient Greek logicians like Aristotle?
Medieval thinkers in both the Arabic and Latin worlds extensively studied and developed logical argumentation, building upon the concepts and principles of ancient Greek logicians like Aristotle.

Key aspects of their work:
* Translation and Commentary Philosophers like Boethius translated Aristotle’s works, which became the basis for understanding logic in Europe during the early Middle Ages.
* Dialectic From the 9th century onward, scholars applied Aristotelian logic, particularly from Porphyry’s Isagoge and Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione, to theological and philosophical problems. Peter Abelard used dialectic for analysis and discovering truth, especially regarding universals.
* Fallacies and Sophismata The rediscovery of Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations led to investigations into fallacies in theology, physics, and logic. This spurred the creation of sophismata treatises and new studies on the properties of terms and syncategoremata (expressions like "only," "except").
* Later Developments Thinkers such as Jean Buridan's disciples and Paul of Venice continued to develop logical ideas, with the latter popularizing the study of English logic in Italy.
5 Britannica Sources
Created from Britannica articles using AI. AI can make mistakes, so verify using Britannica articles.
What are some key concepts or methods used in medieval logic?
Medieval logic, a field of study developed by Arabic and Latin philosophers, covers concepts, principles, and systems of logical argumentation. Key methods include the theory of supposition, which addresses reference within propositions, and divides personal supposition into determinate, confused and distributive, and merely confused types. Theologians and scientists also applied supposition theory in their work. Other key concepts include the study of sophismata, which deepened in the 13th century, and the development of summulae (little summaries) by authors called summulists. In the 14th century, logicians also developed theories of connotation and mental language.
2 Britannica Sources
1. modern logic: The 16th century
2. medieval logic
Created from Britannica articles using AI. AI can make mistakes, so verify using Britannica articles.
How did the study of logic in the Middle Ages influence modern logical thinking and philosophy?
Medieval logic, which was developed by Arabic and Latin philosophers, significantly shaped modern logical thinking. Thinkers like Jean Buridan and Paul of Venice advanced logical study through their writings, which were used as textbooks.

Figures like Petrus Ramus criticized medieval logic and proposed reforms, emphasizing logic's use in arguments. Later, the drive to symbolize logic, linking it with mathematics, became a characteristic theme in the modern era. This evolution led to a focus on developing ideal logical languages and methods, enhancing human thought and its mechanical application.
3 Britannica Sources
Created from Britannica articles using AI. AI can make mistakes, so verify using Britannica articles.

Medieval logic, in the history of Western philosophy, the concepts, principles, and systems of logical argumentation that were studied and developed primarily by Arabic philosophers from about the 9th century ce and by Latin philosophers from approximately the 12th century ce through the end of the European Middle Ages.

Logic as a formal study of correct reasoning originated in ancient Greece, primarily in the philosophy of Aristotle (384–322 bce). Until the 6th century ce Aristotle’s logic was documented and commented upon by several Greek philosophers, including Porphyry (c. 234–c. 305 ce), and by Latin philosophers who also translated Aristotle’s works. Arguably the most important member of the latter group was the Roman scholar Boethius (470–475?—524), whose translations became the basis of Europe’s understanding of logic during the early Middle Ages.

Arabic logic

Syrian Christian authors in the late 8th century were among the first to introduce Hellenistic scholarship to the Arab world. By about 850 at least three major works of Aristotle—the Categories, De interpretatione, and Prior Analytics—had been translated via Syriac into Arabic. Between 830 and 870 the philosopher and scientist al-Kindī produced in Baghdad what seem to have been the first Arabic writings on logic that were not translations. But these writings, now lost, were probably mere summaries of others’ work.

By the late 9th century the school of Baghdad was the focus of logic studies in the Arab world. Most of the members of this school were Nestorian or Jacobite Christians, but the Muslim al-Fārābī (c. 873–950) wrote important commentaries and other logical works there that influenced all later Arabic logicians (many of these writings, however, are now lost). Al-Fārābī, was among the best logicians the Arab world produced.

By 1050 the school of Baghdad had declined. The 11th century saw very few Arabic logicians, with one distinguished exception: the Persian Ibn Sīnā, or Avicenna (980–1037), perhaps the most original and important of all Arabic logicians. Avicenna abandoned the practice of writing on logic in commentaries on the works of Aristotle and instead produced independent treatises. He sharply criticized the school of Baghdad for what he regarded as their slavish devotion to Aristotle. Among the topics Avicenna investigated were quantification of the predicates of categorical propositions—that is, propositions of the form “Every S is P,” “No S is P,” “Some S is P,” and “Some S is not P”—the theory of definition and classification, and an original theory of “temporally modalized” syllogisms, in which premises include such modifiers as “at all times,” “at most times,” and “at some time.”

The Persian mystic and theologian al-Ghazālī, or Algazel (1058–1111), followed Avicenna’s logic, although he differed sharply from Avicenna in other areas. Al-Ghazālī was not a significant logician but is important nonetheless because of his influential defense of the use of logic in theology.

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In the 12th century the most important Arab logician was Ibn Rushd, or Averroës (1126–98). Unlike the Persian followers of Avicenna, Averröes worked in Moorish Spain, where he revived the tradition of al-Fārābī and the school of Baghdad by writing penetrating commentaries on Aristotle’s works, including the logical ones. Such was the stature of these excellent commentaries that, when they were translated into Latin in the 1220s or ’30s, Averroës was often referred to simply as “the Commentator.”

After Averroës, logic declined in western Islam because of the antagonism felt to exist between logic and philosophy on the one hand and Muslim orthodoxy on the other. But in eastern Islam, in part because of the work of al-Ghazālī, logic was not regarded as being so closely linked with philosophy. Instead, it was viewed as a tool that could be profitably used in any field of study, even (as al-Ghazālī had done) on behalf of theology against philosophers. Thus, the logical tradition continued in Persia long after it died out in Spain. The 13th century produced a large number of logical writings, but these were mostly unoriginal textbooks and handbooks. After about 1300 logical study was reduced to producing commentaries on these earlier, already derivative handbooks.

The revival of logic in Europe

St. Anselm and Peter Abelard

Except in the Arabic world, there was little activity in logic between the 5th and the 12th century. Certainly Byzantium produced nothing of note. In Latin Europe there were a few authors, including Alcuin of York (c. 732–804) and Garland the Computist (flourished c. 1040). But it was not until late in the 11th century that serious interest in logic revived. St. Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109) discussed semantical questions in his De grammatico and investigated the notions of possibility and necessity in surviving fragments, but these texts did not have much influence. More important was Anselm’s general method of using logical techniques in theology. His example set the tone for much that was to follow.

The first important Latin logician after Boethius was Peter Abelard (1079–1142), who wrote three sets of commentaries and glosses on Porphyry’s Isagoge and on Aristotle’s Categories and De interpretatione; these were the Introductiones parvulorum (also containing glosses on some writings of Boethius), Logica “Ingredientibus,” and Logica “Nostrorum petitioni sociorum” (on the Isagoge only), together with the independent treatise Dialectica (extant in part). These works show a familiarity with Boethius but go far beyond him. Among the topics discussed insightfully by Abelard are the role of the copula in categorical propositions, the effects of different positions of the negation sign in categorical propositions, modal notions such as “possibility,” future contingents (as treated, for example, in chapter nine of Aristotle’s De interpretatione), and conditional (“if…then”) propositions or “consequences.”

Abelard’s fertile investigations raised logical study in medieval Europe to a new level. His achievement is all the more remarkable, since the sources at his disposal were the same ones that had been available in Europe for the preceding 600 years.

“Properties of terms” and discussions of fallacies

Even in Abelard’s lifetime, however, things were changing. After about 1120 Boethius’s translations of Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, Topics, and Sophistic Refutations began to circulate. Sometime in the second quarter of the 12th century, James of Venice translated the Posterior Analytics from Greek, which thus made the whole of Aristotle’s Organon available in Latin. These newly available Aristotelian works were known collectively as the Logica nova (“New Logic”). In a flurry of activity, others in the 12th and 13th centuries produced additional translations of these works and of Greek and Arabic commentaries on them, along with many other philosophical writings and other works from Greek and Arabic sources.

The Sophistic Refutations proved an important catalyst in the development of medieval logic. It provides a catalog of logical fallacies and instructions on how to avoid them and how to trap others into committing them. The work is not comprehensive, however. Many kinds of fallacies are not discussed, and those that are could have been treated differently. Unlike the Posterior Analytics, the Sophistic Refutations was relatively easy to understand. And unlike the Prior Analytics—where, except for modal syllogistic, Aristotle had left little to be done—there was obviously still much to be investigated about fallacies. Moreover, the discovery of fallacies was especially important in theology, particularly in the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. In short, the Sophistic Refutations was tailor-made to exercise the logical ingenuity of the 12th century. And that is exactly what happened.

The Sophistic Refutations and the study of fallacy it generated produced an entirely new logical literature. A genre of sophismata (“sophistical”) treatises developed that investigated fallacies in theology and physics as well as logic. The theory of “supposition” (see below The theory of supposition) also developed out of the study of fallacies. Whole new kinds of treatises were written on what were called “the properties of terms,” semantic properties important in the study of fallacy. The study of valid inference generated a literature on “consequences” that went into far more detail than any previous studies. By the late 12th or early 13th century, special treatises were devoted to insolubilia (semantic paradoxes such as the liar paradox, illustrated in sentences such as “This sentence is false”) and to a kind of disputation called “obligationes,” the exact purpose of which is still in question.

All these treatises, and the logic contained in them, constitute the peculiarly medieval contribution to logic. It is primarily on these topics that medieval logicians exercised their best ingenuity. Such treatises, and their logic, were called the Logica moderna (“Modern Logic”), or “terminist” logic, because they laid so much emphasis on the “properties of terms.” These developments began in the mid-12th century and continued to the end of the Middle Ages.

Developments in the 13th and early 14th centuries

In the 13th century the sophismata literature continued and deepened. In addition, several authors produced summary works that surveyed the whole field of logic, as well as the new developments in the Logica moderna. These compendia are often called “summulae” (“little summaries”), and their authors “summulists.” Among the most important of the summulists are: (1) Peter of Spain (also known as Petrus Hispanus; later Pope John XXI), who wrote a Tractatus more commonly known as Summulae logicales (“Little Summaries of Logic”) probably in the early 1230s; it was used as a textbook in some late medieval universities; (2) Lambert of Auxerre, who wrote a Logica sometime between 1253 and 1257; and (3) William of Sherwood, who produced Introductiones in logicam (Introduction to Logic) and other logical works sometime about the mid-century.

Despite his significance in other fields, St. Thomas Aquinas is of little importance in the history of logic. He did write a treatise on modal propositions and another one on fallacies. But there is nothing especially original in these works; they are early writings and are confined to passing on received doctrine. He also wrote an incomplete commentary on the De interpretatione, but it is of no great logical significance.

About the end of the 13th century John Duns Scotus (c. 1266–1308) composed several works on logic. There also are some very interesting logical texts from the same period that have been falsely attributed to Scotus and were published in the 17th century among his authentic works. These are now referred to as the works of “the Pseudo-Scotus,” although they may not all be by the same author.

The first half of the 14th century saw the high point of medieval logic. Much of the best work was done by people associated with the University of Oxford. Among them were William of Ockham (c. 1285–1347), the author of an important Summa logicae (“Summary of Logic”) and other logical writings. Perhaps because of his importance in other areas of medieval thought, Ockham’s originality in logic has sometimes been exaggerated. But there is no doubt that he was one of the most important logicians of the century. Another Oxford logician was Walter Burley (or Burleigh), an older contemporary of Ockham. Burley was a bitter opponent of Ockham in metaphysics. His work De puritate artis logicae (“On the Purity of the Art of Logic”; in two versions) was apparently written in response and opposition to Ockham’s views, although on some points Ockham had simply copied Burley almost verbatim.

Slightly later, on the Continent, Jean Buridan (1300–58) was a very important logician at the University of Paris. In many areas of logic and philosophy, his views were close to Ockham’s, although the extent of Ockham’s influence on Buridan is not clear. Buridan’s Summulae de dialectica (“Little Summaries of Dialectic”), intended for instructional use at Paris, was largely an adaptation of Peter of Spain’s Summulae logicales. He appears to have been the first to use Peter of Spain’s text in this way. Originally meant as the last treatise of his Summulae de dialectica, Buridan’s extremely interesting Sophismata (published separately in early editions) discusses many issues in semantics and philosophy of logic. Among Buridan’s pupils was Albert of Saxony (died 1390), the author of a Perutilis logica (“A Very Useful Logic”) and later first rector of the University of Vienna. Albert was not an especially original logician, although his influence was by no means negligible.

The theory of supposition

Many of the characteristically medieval logical doctrines in the Logica moderna centred on the notion of “supposition” (suppositio). Already by the late 12th century the theory of supposition had begun to form. In the 13th century special treatises on the topic multiplied. The summulists all discussed it at length. Then, after about 1270, relatively little was heard about it. In France supposition theory was replaced by a theory of “speculative grammar” or “modism” (so called because it appealed to “modes of signifying”). Modism was not so popular in England, but there too the theory of supposition was largely neglected in the late 13th century. In the early 14th century the theory reemerged both in England and on the Continent. Burley wrote a treatise on the topic about 1302, and Buridan revived the theory in France in the 1320s. Thereafter the theory remained the main vehicle for semantic analysis until the end of the Middle Ages.

Supposition theory, at least in its 14th-century form, is best viewed as two theories under one name. The first, sometimes called the theory of “supposition proper,” is a theory of reference and answers the question “To what does a given occurrence of a term refer in a given proposition?” In general (the details depend on the author), three main types of supposition were distinguished: (1) personal supposition (which, despite the name, need not have anything to do with persons), (2) simple supposition, and (3) material supposition. These types are illustrated, respectively, by the occurrences of the term horse in the statements “Every horse is an animal” (in which the term horse refers to individual horses), “Horse is a species” (in which the term refers to a universal), and “Horse is a monosyllable” (in which it refers to the spoken or written word). The theory was elaborated and refined by considering how reference may be broadened by tense and modal factors (for example, the term horse in “Every horse will die,” which may refer to future as well as present horses) or narrowed by adjectives or other factors (for example, horse in “Every horse in the race is less than two years old”).

The second part of supposition theory applies only to terms in personal supposition. It divides personal supposition into several types, including (again the details vary according to the author): (1) determinate (e.g., horse in “Some horse is running”), (2) confused and distributive (e.g., horse in “Every horse is an animal”), and (3) merely confused (e.g., animal in “Every horse is an animal”). These types were described in terms of a notion of “descent to (or ascent from) singulars.” For example, in the statement “Every horse is an animal,” one can “descend” under the term horse to: “This horse is an animal, and that horse is an animal, and so on,” but one cannot validly “ascend” from “This horse is an animal” to the original proposition. There are many refinements and complications.

The purpose of this second part of the theory of supposition has been disputed. Since the question of what it is to which a given occurrence of a term refers is already answered in the first part of supposition theory, the purpose of this second part must have been different. The main suggestions are (1) that it was devised to help detect and diagnose fallacies, (2) that it was intended as a theory of truth conditions for propositions or as a theory of analyzing the senses of propositions, and (3) that, like the first half of supposition theory, it originated as part of an account of reference, but, once its theoretical insufficiency for that task was recognized, it was gradually divorced from that first part of supposition theory and by the early 14th century was left as a conservative vestige that continued to be disputed but no longer had any question of its own to answer. There are difficulties with all these suggestions. The theory of supposition survived beyond the Middle Ages and was frequently applied not only in logical discussions but also in theology and in the natural sciences.

In addition to supposition and its satellite theories, several logicians during the 14th century developed a sophisticated theory of “connotation” (connotatio or appellatio; in which the term black, for instance, not only refers to black things but also “connotes” the quality, blackness, that they possess) and a subtle theory of “mental language,” in which tools of semantic analysis were applied to epistemology and the philosophy of mind. Important treatises on insolubilia and obligationes, as well as on the theory of consequence or inference, continued to be produced in the 14th century, although the main developments there were completed by mid-century.

Developments in modal logic

Medieval logicians continued the tradition of modal syllogistic inherited from Aristotle. In addition, modal factors were incorporated into the theory of supposition. But the most important developments in modal logic occurred in three other contexts: (1) whether propositions about future contingent events are now true or false (Aristotle had raised this question in De interpretatione, chapter nine), (2) whether a future contingent event can be known in advance, and (3) whether God (who, the tradition says, cannot be acted upon causally) can know future contingent events. All these issues link logical modality with time. Thus, Peter Aureoli (c. 1280–1322) held that if something is in fact ϕ (“ϕ” is some predicate) but can be not-ϕ, then it is capable of changing from being ϕ to being not-ϕ.

Duns Scotus in the late 13th century was the first to sever the link between time and modality. He proposed a notion of possibility that was not linked with time but based purely on the notion of semantic consistency. This radically new conception had a tremendous influence on later generations down to contemporary times. Shortly afterward, Ockham developed an influential theory of modality and time that reconciles the claim that every proposition is either true or false with the claim that certain propositions about the future are genuinely contingent.

Late medieval logic

Most of the main developments in medieval logic were in place by the mid-14th century. On the Continent, the disciples of Jean Buridan—Albert of Saxony, Marsilius of Inghen (died 1399), and others—continued and developed the work of their predecessors. In 1372 Pierre d’Ailly (1350–1420) wrote an important work, Conceptus et insolubilia (Concepts and Insolubles), which appealed to a sophisticated theory of mental language in order to solve semantic paradoxes such as the liar paradox.

In England the second half of the 14th century produced several logicians who consolidated and elaborated earlier developments. Their work was not very original, although it was often extremely subtle. Many authors during this period compiled brief summaries of logical topics intended as textbooks. The doctrine in these little summaries is remarkably uniform, which makes it difficult to determine who their authors were. By the early 15th century informal collections of these treatises had been gathered under the title Libelli sophistarum (“Little Books for Arguers”)—one collection for Oxford and a second for Cambridge; both were printed in early editions. Among the notable logicians of this period are Henry Hopton (flourished 1357), John Wycliffe (c. 1330–84), Richard Lavenham (died after 1399), Ralph Strode (flourished c. 1360), Richard Ferrybridge (or Feribrigge; flourished c. 1360s), and John Venator (also known as John Huntman or Hunter; flourished 1373).

Beginning in 1390 the Italian Paul of Venice (1372–1429) studied for at least three years at Oxford and then returned to teach at Padua and elsewhere in Italy. Although English logic was studied in Italy even before Paul’s return, his own writings advanced this study greatly. Among Paul’s logical works were the very popular Logica parva (“Little Logic”), printed in several early editions, and possibly the huge Logica magna (“Big Logic”) that has sometimes been regarded as a kind of encyclopaedia of the whole of medieval logic.

After about 1400 serious logical study was dead in England. However, it continued to be pursued on the Continent until the end of the Middle Ages and afterward.

Paul Vincent Spade