Zambia under Kaunda (1964–91)

During the early years of independence, Zambia was comparatively prosperous. Copper prices rose steadily from 1964 to 1970, boosted by the Vietnam War, and Zambia became the world’s third largest producer of copper. Meanwhile, the leakage of copper profits abroad was greatly reduced. In 1964 the government acquired the mineral rights of the BSAC, and thereafter it also increased mining taxation. The country embarked on long-overdue investment in communications and social services. In 1960 there had been only 2,500 Africans in secondary schools; by 1971 there were 54,000. At independence there were fewer than 100 Zambian university graduates; in 1965 the University of Zambia was founded, and by 1971 it had 2,000 students. Zambians finally began to predominate in the upper ranks of the civil service, the army, business, and the professions. The copper industry still relied heavily on white expertise, but the color bar had vanished, and in 1966 Black mine workers secured a large increase in pay, which soon affected wage levels generally.

On the other hand, Zambia incurred massive costs from the survival of white supremacy across the Zambezi. Following (Southern) Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965, the United Nations imposed sanctions intended to isolate that country, but these bore much more heavily on Zambia. Copper exports were expensively rerouted northward, and a tarmac road and oil pipeline were built to Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Trade with Rhodesia was steadily reduced, and the border was finally closed in 1973. A new coal mine and new hydroelectric schemes made Zambia largely independent of the Rhodesian-controlled power station at the Kariba Dam (built in 1959). In 1970–75 China built a railway from the Copperbelt to Dar es Salaam, which committed Zambia and Tanzania to extensive trade with China.

National integration had been a major task for Zambia’s leaders at independence. White settlers presented no great difficulty, and those farmers who stayed on were valued for their major contribution to food production. African “tribalism” was a more serious problem. This had less to do with the survival of precolonial political loyalties than with regional differences aggravated under colonial rule and the absence of any African lingua franca. The Lozi and other peoples in the west and south had long depended on labor migration across the Zambezi; the Copperbelt was dominated by Bemba speakers from the northeast. Kaunda did not himself belong to any major ethnic group, but his continuation in power required constant reshuffling of colleagues in the party and the government to preclude the emergence of a rival. In the name of national unity, UNIP sometimes made exaggerated claims to allegiance; such claims had brought it into armed conflict in 1964 with the Lumpa church founded by Alice Lenshina and in the late 1960s with Jehovah’s Witnesses. UNIP also challenged the independence of the judiciary, though from 1969 the authority of the bench was strengthened by the appointment of Black Zambian judges.

In the early 1970s Zambia’s economic fortunes took a turn for the worse. Copper continued to provide the great bulk of export earnings, but prices fluctuated erratically and suffered a prolonged fall in 1975. The price of oil shot up in 1973, and inflation, already serious, rapidly increased. The government, committed to high spending, both public and private, reacted by borrowing heavily abroad and drawing on reserves. Investment declined, as did the efficiency of the transport network. State control of the mining industry, achieved in 1969–75, artificially prolonged its life but also increased the scope of corruption, as did parastatal corporations set up to promote industrial diversification.

The government became increasingly authoritarian. Kaunda felt threatened by critics at home and by the illegal Rhodesian regime, which harassed African guerrillas based in Zambia. UDI had already prompted Kaunda to impose emergency regulations, which thereafter were regularly renewed by the National Assembly and enabled the president to detain political opponents without trial. In 1973 the National Assembly approved a one-party constitution, and in 1975 UNIP took over Zambia’s main newspaper. To some extent, fear of foreign attack diminished with the advent of independence in Portuguese Africa in 1975 and in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) in 1980. But warfare in Angola and South African interference continued to provide pretexts to curb internal opposition.

Still more worrying, however, was the deepening economic crisis. Kaunda urged Zambians to look to agriculture rather than mining for a solution, but rural development policies, though consuming foreign aid, were mostly ill-conceived and failed to stem the historic drift to the towns. By 1980, out of a population of 5.7 million, more than 2 million lived in towns—many without jobs or housing—and, inevitably, disease and crime flourished. Urban dwellers refused to pay the high prices that might have encouraged more farmers to produce for the market. Government subsidies sometimes bridged the gap, but their partial removal in 1986 and 1990 provoked major food riots in the towns. The restoration of subsidies in 1987 cost Zambia the support of the International Monetary Fund, though such support had been critical in coping with enormous foreign debts. Mounting discontent was reflected in recurrent closings of the University of Zambia, and in August 1991, in response to widespread pressure, the National Assembly abolished the one-party state. Multiparty elections were held in October, and Kaunda was decisively defeated by a trade union leader, Frederick Chiluba of the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD). UNIP was left with fewer than one-sixth of the seats in the National Assembly.

Chiluba presidency (1991–2001)

Although the 1991 election positioned Zambia to become one of Africa’s leaders in the area of political stability, its fulfillment of that promise was hampered by a variety of domestic issues. Chiluba’s administration worked to bring about economic reform, but ironically economic progress was limited because of the widespread corruption that became a problem under his rule. In addition, Chiluba’s presidency was marked by unsuccessful attempts by opposing forces to topple the ruling party, termed “coup attempts,” although they involved neither bloodshed nor widespread popular support.

On May 16, 1996, the National Assembly approved amendments to the constitution that declared that presidential candidates must be Zambian citizens born of parents who are Zambian by birth and that a candidate must not be a tribal chief. These amendments were widely viewed in both domestic and international circles as a deliberate attempt to prevent Kaunda—whose parents were from Malawi—and his running mate, Senior Chief Inyambo Yeta, from running for office. Despite broad opposition, however, the National Assembly passed the amendments, thereby preventing Kaunda’s candidacy. Later that year Chiluba was reelected to a second term. Some viewed his reelection as an empty victory, however, since Kaunda had been prevented from contesting and UNIP had boycotted the elections.

Chiluba faced another weak coup attempt on October 28, 1997, when a group of Zambian army commandos seized control of the national radio station in Lusaka and proclaimed that they had toppled Chiluba’s government; within hours, however, the group was overpowered by Zambian troops loyal to the president. Several people were later charged in connection with the event, including Kaunda, who was arrested on December 25. He was released six days later, but he was placed under house arrest until June 1998, when all charges were withdrawn.

Discontent with the state of the economy was evident in May 2001 when the country’s public sector workers went on strike, demanding an increase in salaries and improved working conditions. The strike lasted several weeks and had a detrimental effect on the daily functioning of the country, closing schools and hospital wards and bringing the judicial system to a halt. The government resolved the strike in July, just days before Zambia was to host an international summit. Chiluba was also concerned with the growing refugee population in the country: Beginning in 1999 and continuing for several years, Zambia received more than 200,000 refugees fleeing conflicts in the neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo and Angola.

Limited to two terms in office, Chiluba stepped down in 2001. His handpicked successor, Levy Mwanawasa of the MMD, was declared the winner of the hotly contested election and was sworn into office in January 2002.

Mwanawasa’s administration (2002–08)

Despite being mired in election controversy, Mwanawasa moved quickly to assert his authority and launched a campaign against corruption. The initial targets of the campaign—the individuals alleged to be responsible for the corruption that damaged Zambia’s economy in the 1990s—included former president Chiluba and many of his associates. Mwanawasa also initiated a review of the country’s constitution in 2003 in an effort to bring about political reform, but some organizations invited to participate in the review declined, claiming that the review process itself was flawed.

Concerns over Mwanawasa’s health emerged late in his first term, after he suffered a stroke in April 2006. He reassured the country that he was fit for office, and he stood for reelection later that year, garnering more than two-fifths of the vote. His nearest competitor, Michael Sata of the Patriotic Front (PF), made claims of voting irregularities and contested the election. Sporadic violence ensued in areas loyal to Sata, but the result of the election stood, and Mwanawasa was sworn in for his second term in October 2006. Mwanawasa again suffered a stroke in late June 2008. Rumors of his death circulated a few days later but were quickly refuted by Zambian government officials. He never fully recovered, however, and he died several weeks later.

Under the terms of the constitution, a special election to choose a new president was eventually scheduled for later that year; in the interim, Vice Pres. Rupiah Banda (also of the MMD) served as acting president. The election, held on October 30, was contested by four candidates, including Banda and Sata. Banda won, although by only a narrow margin, and Sata, who finished a close second, alleged that the vote had been flawed.

Presidencies of Sata and Scott (2008–15)

Banda and Sata faced each other again in 2011, when they were the front-runners in the presidential election held on September 20. Campaigning by the candidates had been contentious, with poverty and the role of foreign investment in Zambia—particularly by China—being some of the major issues. Tempers flared as the country anxiously awaited the election results, which trickled in more slowly than expected. Some areas saw incidents of violence and rioting, and the media was banned from reporting on any early results before they were officially released. On September 23, officials announced that Sata had won the election with more than 40 percent of the vote. Banda immediately conceded, and Sata was sworn in that day.

Although the economy experienced growth during Sata’s presidency, there was increasing discontent among the population over his failure to deliver on some of his election promises, such as reducing unemployment, improving socioeconomic policy, and championing democratic governance. Sata did not tolerate opposition well, and political opponents were subject to harassment and repeated arrests. Throughout his term, Sata’s health was the subject of much speculation, and he did little to dispel the rumors. On October 28, 2014, while abroad for medical treatment, Sata died at a London hospital.

Vice Pres. Guy Scott was named interim president, and elections for a new president to complete the rest of Sata’s term were set to be held within 90 days. Scott’s parents were not born in Zambia, and a 1996 constitutional amendment stipulating that a candidate had to be a Zambian citizen and have parents who are Zambian by birth precluded Scott from being eligible to run for president. Scott’s interim ascendancy to the presidency was notable in that Scott was the first white head of state in Zambia and the first in Africa since the end of the apartheid era in South Africa.

The special election was held on January 20, 2015. Edgar Lungu, the PF candidate, won with 48.3 percent of the vote, just slightly more than the 46.7 percent garnered by his nearest competitor, Hakainde Hichilema of the United Party for National Development (UPND). Lungu was sworn in as president on January 25.

Lungu’s administration (2015–21)

Regularly scheduled elections were held the next year, on August 11, 2016. Lungu faced eight other candidates, including Hichilema. New electoral rules dictated that more than 50 percent of the vote needed to be won in the first round in order to avoid a runoff election, and, after days of counting the votes, the electoral commission declared that Lungu had won with 50.35 percent of the vote. His nearest challenger was Hichilema, who was credited with 47.63 percent. Hichilema and the UPND raised allegations of irregularities, however, and took their complaints to the country’s Constitutional Court. Their case, however, was dismissed, as were their related cases before the country’s High Court and Supreme Court, and Lungu was sworn in on September 13.

Lungu’s administration was lauded for the number of infrastructure projects it had completed, which included improving existing roads as well as building new ones, constructing many new schools, increasing the country’s power-generating capacity, refurbishing international airports, and constructing new health care facilities as well as upgrading existing structures. In contrast to this progress, however, the country experienced a worsening economy, the fallout of which was compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic beginning in 2020, and Zambia defaulted on its foreign debt in November 2020. Also concerning was the erosion of freedoms, as evidenced by the suppression and harassment of the media and opposition parties. One notable incident was the April 2017 arrest and monthslong imprisonment of Hichilema for treason after an incident in which the vehicle he was traveling in did not yield to Lungu’s presidential motorcade; the charges were eventually dropped in August, and Hichilema was released. In 2020 an attempt by Lungu’s PF to amend the constitution generated controversy and ultimately failed; had it succeeded, presidential powers would have been expanded.

Lungu and Hichilema faced each other again—as well as 14 other candidates—in the 2021 presidential election, held on August 12. This time Hichilema was declared the victor, with more than 57 percent of the vote; Lungu, who had garnered almost 38 percent, conceded, and Hichilema was inaugurated on August 24. Elections for the National Assembly, also held on August 12, saw Hichilema’s UPND winning slightly more than half the body’s seats and the PF taking a little more than one-third.

Hichilema’s presidency (2021– )

Over time, Hichilema’s administration was able to restructure almost all of the country’s debt, successfully completing a 38-month IMF program by early 2026. International investors were attracted to the economic potential of the country, including its lucrative copper production, and inflation dropped considerably. Hichilema was lauded for launching free secondary education and for providing funding for community projects. However, in spite of the economic progress made, the high cost of living troubled many Zambians. Furthermore, as with his predecessor, human rights organizations noted a crackdown on dissent and worsening freedom of the press during Hichilema’s term.

In early 2025 the UPND-led government began the process of constitutional reform, and in May a constitutional amendment bill was made public. The draft amendment, which focused on the electoral process and expanding the National Assembly, generated public outcry for multiple reasons, among them being the timing of proposed changes ahead of the 2026 presidential and legislative elections and the lack of public input into the drafting process. The lack of public consultation was challenged at the Constitutional Court, and in June the court declared the amendment process to have been unconstitutional. Later that year, the government began the reform process anew, allowing for some degree of public participation, and in December a very similar version of the bill was passed in the National Assembly and signed into law.