diplomatic compellence

Diplomatic compellence is a strategy in international relations where one state attempts to coerce another into taking or refraining from specific actions, primarily through threats of punishment. Coined by Thomas C. Schelling, compellence is distinct from deterrence; while deterrence aims to prevent an opponent from acting, compellence seeks to make an opponent change its behavior.1

Compellence can be achieved through diplomatic means, involving verbal threats and promises, often backed by the implicit threat of military action. It can also involve a limited use of force, coupled with the threat of escalation if demands are not met, a tactic Schelling termed the "diplomacy of violence". While compellence can be effective, it is often considered more difficult to achieve than deterrence because it requires costly actions and can make the target state appear to lose face if it complies. Economic sanctions are also a non-military tool used in coercion.12