Why did the majority conclude that the term person in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act includes for-profit corporations?

In the case of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Supreme Court majority concluded that for-profit corporations qualify as "persons" under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) based on several key arguments:1

• The Dictionary Act: The Court pointed to the Dictionary Act of 1871, which provides standard definitions for statutory interpretation. This act states that the word "person" may apply to corporations as well as individuals, and the Court found no language in the RFRA to suggest that Congress intended a narrower definition.1
• Consistency with Precedent: The Court noted that it had previously taken for granted that religious nonprofit corporations and other institutions could be considered "persons" under the RFRA. Furthermore, the government had already conceded in this case that the RFRA could apply to nonprofit corporations.1
• Legal Logic: The majority reasoned that if the term "person" in the RFRA encompasses both individuals and nonprofit corporations, it must logically include for-profit corporations as well, noting that there is no recognized understanding of the term that includes some corporations but excludes others.1