Why Has Peru Had So Many Presidents?

Peru has earned a reputation for a so-called “presidential curse”: Eight presidents have taken office since 2016, an extraordinary turnover in a decade, and a ninth is set to be elected following a June 7, 2026, runoff. Many of the country’s recent leaders were removed through impeachment or forced to resign, and some are now held in Lima’s Barbadillo prison, often dubbed the country’s “presidential prison.” The stories behind such turnover are striking, involving corruption allegations, prolonged power struggles, and a slew of impeachment attempts. What appears to be a series of dramatic personal downfalls is in fact part of a broader pattern shaped by the country’s political system. But what explains this cycle of rapid presidential turnover?

How Peru built a system that topples presidents

Few democracies have experienced such sustained presidential turnover in so short a period. The rapid turnover is not simply the result of individual failings or political misfortune, although those have no doubt played a part. It is also rooted in Peru’s constitutional design. The 1993 constitution, drafted during Alberto Fujimori’s presidency, grants the Peruvian Congress broad authority to remove presidents for “permanent physical or moral incapacity”—a loosely defined provision that requires a two-thirds vote. In practice, that ambiguity has made impeachment a powerful political tool. Congress has repeatedly initiated impeachment proceedings, making removal of a president a recurring feature rather than a last resort.

In Peru’s fractured legislature, where no single political party holds a stable majority and alliances shift frequently, lawmakers have invoked the “moral incapacity” clause against presidents they oppose or dislike. What should be used as a safeguard against an unfit or abusive president has instead become a routine mechanism for resolving political conflict. The result is a presidential system with a parliamentary trapdoor, where executive authority depends on maintaining congressional support. Presidents often take office with weak mandates, face immediate opposition, and govern under the constant threat of removal. In such a system, crises that might otherwise be managed politically are more likely to end in resignation or impeachment.

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From one leader to the next: A decade of turnover

Peru’s recent political history has been defined by rapid succession and recurring crises. Since 2016, presidents have cycled through office with unusual speed, their tenures often cut short by confrontation with Congress, corruption allegations, or mass protests. Pedro Pablo Kuczynski’s resignation in 2018 amid corruption scandals set the tone, followed by Martín Vizcarra’s impeachment in 2020—one of several cases in which Congress invoked the constitutional clause of “moral incapacity.” Next was Manuel Merino, who served as president for only five days. Francisco Sagasti came after and was followed by Pedro Castillo, who survived two impeachment trials and attempted to dissolve Congress ahead of a third only to be removed, arrested, and imprisoned. Dina Boluarte assumed the presidency in late 2022, and her approval rating fell to just 2 percent, among the lowest recorded for any president globally. More recently, José Jerí lasted months before being removed, and his successor, José María Balcázar, assumed power as yet another interim figure.

Taken together, these episodes reveal a consistent trajectory: Political crises escalate quickly and, rather than being resolved through negotiation or electoral cycles, frequently end in presidents being removed.

What comes next—and what’s at stake

The consequences of this political instability extend beyond individual presidencies. Frequent leadership changes have disrupted policy continuity, weakened executive authority, and eroded public trust in democratic institutions. Approval ratings for both the executive branch and Congress have remained persistently low in Peru, reflecting widespread frustration with a political system marked by conflict and short-lived governments. For example, public opinion data has found that approximately 90 percent of Peruvians disapprove of their Congress, and the majority of respondents are also not satisfied with how democracy functions in their country.

The June 7, 2026, runoff will bring a new president to office but not necessarily a new political reality. The first round of voting that took place on April 12, 2026, featured a crowded field of 35 hopeful presidential candidates—an unusually large number that reflects the depth of Peru’s political fragmentation and the weakness of its party system. Among the contenders was Keiko Fujimori, daughter of former president Alberto Fujimori, whose continued prominence underscores how Peruvian politics remains shaped by familiar figures, even as governments prove fleeting.

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In short, the election is unfolding against a backdrop of long-standing instability. Even in the months leading up to the runoff vote, Peru continued to experience rapid leadership turnover, political infighting, and lingering public distrust. These dynamics are not incidental to the election but are instead part of the environment that the next president will inherit. A decisive electoral victory is unlikely to translate into stable governance. The structural constraints that have defined the past decade remain firmly in place. Presidents are elected without strong legislative backing, confront a fragmented Congress, and operate under a constitutional framework that allows for their relatively swift removal. In this context, governing becomes less about implementing policy than about surviving politically.

Whether Peru can break this cycle remains uncertain. Although constitutional scholars, political analysts, and international organizations have called for reforms or clearer limits on the use of the “moral incapacity” clause, substantive changes to the constitutional framework have remained limited, leaving the underlying incentives for conflict largely intact. The country’s so-called “presidential curse” is therefore unlikely to disappear—not as a matter of bad luck but as a consequence of how its political system operates.