The Concept of Mind

work by Ryle

Written by

The Information Architects of Encyclopaedia Britannica

Last updated

June 24, 2026

Quick Summary

Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind (1949) challenges the traditional Cartesian dualism that separates the mind from the body. Ryle argues that viewing the mind as a separate, mysterious entity—a "ghost in the machine"—is a fundamental error in language and logic. Instead, he proposes that mental terms are essentially abbreviations for observable behaviors and dispositions. For example, intelligence isn't an internal, unseen quality but rather a set of behaviors that indicate intelligent action. Ryle's work is a key text in the ordinary language philosophy movement, aiming to resolve philosophical confusion by clarifying how language is used.123

Summary created from Britannica articles using AI. AI can make mistakes, so verify using Britannica articles.

3 Britannica Sources

Ask Britannica AI about this topic

Britannica doesn't have a full article on this topic, so we've curated a list of our relevant coverage.

Gilbert Ryle
Ryle’s first book, The Concept of Mind (1949), is considered a modern classic. In it he challenges the traditional distinction between body and mind as delineated by René Descartes. Traditional Cartesian dualism, Ryle says, perpetrates a serious confusion when, looking beyond the human body (which exists in space…
Read More
Ryle’s first book, The Concept of Mind (1949), is considered a modern classic. In it he challenges the traditional distinction between body and mind as delineated by René Descartes. Traditional Cartesian dualism, Ryle says, perpetrates a serious confusion when, looking beyond the human body (which exists in space…
Read More

Cartesianism
Contemporary influences
In The Concept of Mind (1949), Ryle dismisses the Cartesian view as the fallacy of “the ghost in the machine,” arguing that the mind—the ghost—is really just the intelligent behaviour of the body. A different criticism has been advanced by the American pragmatist Richard Rorty (1931–2007),…
Read More
In The Concept of Mind (1949), Ryle dismisses the Cartesian view as the fallacy of “the ghost in the machine,” arguing that the mind—the ghost—is really just the intelligent behaviour of the body. A different criticism has been advanced by the American pragmatist Richard Rorty (1931–2007),…
Read More

Western philosophy
Ordinary-language philosophy
In The Concept of Mind (1949), Ryle argued that the traditional conception of the human mind—that it is an invisible ghostlike entity occupying a physical body—is based on what he called a “category mistake.” The mistake is to interpret the term mind as though it were…
Read More
In The Concept of Mind (1949), Ryle argued that the traditional conception of the human mind—that it is an invisible ghostlike entity occupying a physical body—is based on what he called a “category mistake.” The mistake is to interpret the term mind as though it were…
Read More

concept
…use of concept is in The Concept of Mind (1949) by Gilbert Ryle, an Oxford Analyst, which implies that the purpose of the author is not to investigate matters of fact empirically (i.e., by the methods of psychology) about the mind itself but to investigate its “logical geography.” Similarly, investigation…
Read More
…use of concept is in The Concept of Mind (1949) by Gilbert Ryle, an Oxford Analyst, which implies that the purpose of the author is not to investigate matters of fact empirically (i.e., by the methods of psychology) about the mind itself but to investigate its “logical geography.” Similarly, investigation…
Read More