- Also called:
- Bingfa or Sunzi Bingfa
The Art of War
What is The Art of War?
Who wrote The Art of War?
When was The Art of War written?
How has The Art of War influenced modern military leaders?
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The Art of War is the common English title of the Chinese classic Bingfa (“Military Methods”). It is widely regarded as one of the most influential treatises on warfare ever written. It is traditionally attributed to Sun Tzu, a military strategist said to have lived during the late Spring and Autumn period (770–476 bce), although some scholars date the work to the subsequent Warring States period (475–221 bce). Both were eras of political fragmentation, and the centuries between 770 and 221 bce produced many of the foundational texts of Chinese philosophy and some of the most prominent figures in Chinese intellectual history.
The Art of War is a relatively short work consisting of 13 chapters. Its style is terse, cool, and detached, presenting warfare as primarily a problem of calculation rather than brute force or individual courage. Broadly, the earlier chapters establish fundamental concepts—including planning, logistics, strategic advantage, deception, and the qualities of an effective commander—whereas the later chapters examine how those principles should be applied amid the complexities of actual warfare, including difficult terrain, incomplete information, unpredictable circumstances, and competing human motivations.
Content and selected passages
| chapter | summary | selected passage |
|---|---|---|
| 1: Laying Plans | Planning and calculation are presented as the foundation of successful warfare. Before fighting, a commander should systematically compare his circumstances with those of the enemy, assessing such factors as leadership, discipline, terrain, and military strength. Victory is thus determined largely by calculations made before battle begins. | “The general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought.” (26) |
| 2: Waging War | The financial and logistical demands of warfare are emphasized, particularly the enormous costs and complexities of maintaining an army in the field. Because prolonged campaigns exhaust soldiers, supplies, and the resources of the state, military objectives should be achieved as quickly and efficiently as circumstances permit. | “There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.” (6) |
| 3: Attack by Stratagem | A hierarchy of military success is established in which achieving objectives without destruction is preferable to victory through direct combat. The highest form of military prowess is to compel submission without having to fight. | “The best thing of all is to take the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good.” (1) |
| 4: Tactical Dispositions | A distinction is drawn between protecting oneself from defeat and creating opportunities to defeat the enemy. A commander should first make his position as secure as possible, avoid unnecessary mistakes, and then attack when circumstances expose the enemy to defeat. | “The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy.” (1) |
| 5: Energy | The organization and application of an army’s collective force are considered. Central to the chapter is the concept of shi—variously translated as “energy,” “force,” or “strategic advantage”—by which troops and circumstances are arranged so that their combined potential becomes more important than the abilities of individual soldiers. | “The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and does not require too much from individuals.” (21) |
| 6: Weak Points and Strong | The enemy’s strengths and weaknesses should be carefully analyzed but can also be manipulated. Through deception, provocation, threats, and unexpected movements, a commander can compel the enemy to respond, shifting his forces and exposing vulnerabilities. The aim is to avoid the enemy where he is strong, attack where he is weak, and shape his behavior so that one’s own forces can be concentrated against vulnerable positions. | “Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may know where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient.” (23–24) |
| 7: Maneuvering | The difficulties of moving and coordinating an army while preserving its strength and cohesion are examined. Commanders should seek positional advantages without exhausting their soldiers, manipulate the enemy’s movements when possible, and recognize when circumstances make pursuit or attack unwise. | “To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait at ease while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy is famished:—this is the art of husbanding one’s strength.” (31) |
| 8: Variation of Tactics | Adaptability is emphasized over the mechanical application of strategic rules. A commander must recognize when circumstances favor fighting, waiting, movement, or cooperation with allies while guarding against personal weaknesses—including anger, recklessness, cowardice, and excessive concern for one’s soldiers—that can compromise military judgment. | “There are roads which must not be followed, armies which must not be attacked, towns which must not be besieged, positions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed.” (3) |
| 9: The Army on the March | The focus shifts increasingly toward the practical circumstances of campaigning, including the movement and encampment of armies in mountains, near rivers, in marshes, and on other types of terrain. Physical and behavioral signs are also presented as clues to the position, condition, and intentions of an enemy army. | “When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he is relying on the natural strength of his position. When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he is anxious for the other side to advance. If his place of encampment is easy of access, he is tendering a bait. Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the enemy is advancing.” (18–21) |
| 10: Terrain | Terrain is classified into six types, each presenting different strategic advantages and dangers. The chapter also examines military disasters caused not by geography but by failures of leadership, organization, discipline, and judgment. | “The natural formation of the country is the soldier’s best ally; but a power of estimating the adversary, of controlling the forces of victory, and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and distances, constitutes the test of a great general.” (21) |
| 11: The Nine Situations | Nine strategic situations in which an army may find itself are described, together with the appropriate responses to each. Particular attention is given to the psychology of soldiers: Different circumstances can produce hesitation, cohesion, desperation, or extraordinary determination, and an effective commander must understand and manage these responses. | “The different measures suited to the nine varieties of ground; the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics; and the fundamental laws of human nature: these are things that must most certainly be studied.” (41) |
| 12: The Attack by Fire | Five forms of attack using fire are described, together with the circumstances in which they can be employed. More broadly, the chapter stresses timing, environmental conditions, coordination, and restraint, warning against destructive action that serves no clear strategic purpose. | “There are five ways of attacking with fire. The first is to burn soldiers in their camp; the second is to burn stores; the third is to burn baggage-trains; the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines; the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy.” (1) |
| 13: The Use of Spies | Reliable intelligence is presented as indispensable to successful warfare. Five categories of spies are described, and espionage is treated as essential to providing rulers and commanders with the foreknowledge needed to make informed strategic decisions. | “What enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively from experience, nor by any deductive calculation. Knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions can only be obtained from other men. Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes.” (4–7) |
Chapter titles and quotations follow Lionel Giles’s 1910 translation of The Art of War. Numbers in parentheses indicate passage numbers within each chapter.
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Historical context
According to the Shiji (Records of the Grand Historian of China) of Sima Qian, written about 85 bce, Sun Tzu was a native of the state of Qi and became a general in the service of King Helü of Wu, a southeastern state that rose dramatically in power during the late 6th century bce. The Shiji associates Sun Tzu with Wu’s campaigns against its powerful rival Chu, including the campaign that culminated in the capture of the Chu capital, Ying, in 506 bce.
The historical Sun Tzu remains difficult to identify with certainty, however: He does not appear in some early accounts of the period in which later tradition places him. The precise circumstances in which The Art of War was composed therefore remain uncertain. Sima Qian’s account may be largely accurate, the text may preserve the teachings of a historical military thinker that were subsequently transmitted and edited by his followers, or it may have evolved over a long period of time.
Whether The Art of War originated in the Spring and Autumn period or during the Warring States period, it emerged against a backdrop of rapid change in the nature of Chinese warfare. During the period known as the Xi (Western) Zhou dynasty (1046–771 bce), warfare had been dominated by aristocratic elites and chariot forces and was generally conducted by armies smaller than those of subsequent centuries. During the Dong (Eastern) Zhou dynasty (770–256 bce), which encompassed the Spring and Autumn period and most of the Warring States period, warfare grew in scale and intensity. Armies became much larger, infantry became increasingly important, campaigns grew longer and more geographically complex, and states developed increasingly complex administrative systems capable of mobilizing soldiers, collecting taxes, storing grain, and supplying armies in the field. These transformations provide important context for The Art of War’s emphasis on logistics, strategy, and the efficient use of resources.
Textual history
Important evidence concerning the early history of The Art of War was discovered in 1972, when archaeologists excavating a Western Han tomb at Yinqueshan in present-day Shandong province found thousands of inscribed bamboo slips. Among them were substantial portions of The Art of War, as well as a separate military treatise attributed to Sun Bin, a strategist traditionally placed in the Warring States period. The tomb dates to the late 2nd century bce, demonstrating that a version of The Art of War closely resembling the text known today was in circulation by that time.
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A particularly important figure in the later transmission of the text was the warlord and statesman Cao Cao (155–220 ce), who edited the text and produced an influential commentary on it. His commentary became an important part of the textual tradition, and his annotations are included in many modern editions of the work.
Legacy
The Art of War remains one of China’s preeminent works of military theory and has developed an extensive tradition of textual study and commentary. During the Song dynasty (960–1279), it was included among the Seven Military Classics, a collection of military texts that became part of the curriculum for candidates seeking military office. The work also circulated throughout East Asia as part of the broader tradition of Chinese classical learning.
The Art of War reached a wider global audience following its translation into European languages. A translation by the French Jesuit missionary Jean-Joseph-Marie Amiot was published in 1772. English translations followed in the early 20th century, including an influential 1910 translation by the British scholar Lionel Giles.
The work found renewed relevance amid the wars and political upheavals of the 20th century. Mao Zedong, leader of the Chinese Communist Party, studied the text and drew upon its ideas in his writings on warfare. The Vietnamese general Vo Nguyen Giap, who led Viet Minh forces to victory over the French at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and later played a leading role in the Vietnam War, has also been described as a student and practitioner of Sun Tzu’s ideas.