Principia Ethica
Quick Summary
G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica (1903) is a foundational work in metaethics. Moore argued against the "naturalistic fallacy," which he defined as defining the term "good" in terms of natural properties like pleasure or utility. He contended that "good" is a simple, unanalyzable quality that cannot be defined by any other property. Moore's "open-question argument" posits that for any proposed definition of "good," it remains a meaningful question whether that definition is actually good. If the question is meaningful, the definition is incorrect because a true definition should be self-evident. This work was influential in establishing ethical intuitionism and shifting philosophical focus towards the analysis of ethical concepts.1234
- G. E. Moore
- history of ethics - Moore and the naturalistic fallacy
- naturalistic fallacy
- naturalistic fallacy
- ethics - Ethics and reasons for action
- history of ethics - Ethics and reasons for action
- axiology
- Plato - Happiness and virtue
- ethics: Top Questions
- ethics - Machiavelli
- ethics - Ancient Greece
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Western philosophyThe Western tradition…example of the second; the Principia Ethica (1903) of G.E. Moore (1873–1958), a founder of analytic philosophy, is an example of the first. Beginning with a simple question about justice, the Republic in its discursiveness slowly but progressively brings more and more areas into the discussion: first ethics, then politics,…
Read More…example of the second; the Principia Ethica (1903) of G.E. Moore (1873–1958), a founder of analytic philosophy, is an example of the first. Beginning with a simple question about justice, the Republic in its discursiveness slowly but progressively brings more and more areas into the discussion: first ethics, then politics,…
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Western philosophyAnalytic philosophyIn Principia Ethica (1903) Moore argued that the predicate good, which defines the sphere of ethics, is “simple, unanalyzable, and indefinable.” His contention was that many of the difficulties in ethics, and indeed in philosophy generally, arise from an “attempt to answer questions, without first discovering…
Read MoreIn Principia Ethica (1903) Moore argued that the predicate good, which defines the sphere of ethics, is “simple, unanalyzable, and indefinable.” His contention was that many of the difficulties in ethics, and indeed in philosophy generally, arise from an “attempt to answer questions, without first discovering…
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