Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person

Harry Frankfurt's paper, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," explores autonomy and free will. He argues that acting autonomously involves not just having desires, but also reflectively endorsing those desires. This means having a second-order desire to have a particular first-order desire that then moves you to act.1

Frankfurt uses the example of a drug addict to illustrate this. An addict may have a desire to take the drug (first-order desire) but also wish they didn't have that desire (second-order desire). For the addict to act autonomously in taking the drug, they would need to endorse their desire to take it, meaning they would want to have the desire to take the drug and want that desire to lead to action.1

This hierarchical view of desires is a key aspect of Frankfurt's contribution to understanding what it means to be a person with free will, distinguishing between simply acting on desires and acting on desires that one authentically endorses. The concept of autonomy is central to Western ethics and political philosophy, referring to self-governance and living according to one's own values.12