- Date:
- July 1, 2021
- Location:
- United States
Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee
-
What is Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee?
Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee is a legal case where the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that state voting restrictions that disproportionately burden racial minority groups do not necessarily violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965.
In March 2021, the Court heard oral arguments regarding Arizona's out-of-precinct policy and law against third-party ballot collection, ultimately deciding that neither violated Section 2, and H.B. 2303 was not adopted with discriminatory intent.
The Court's conservative majority held that the law only requires a state's voting system to be "equally open" to all groups, even if some provisions disproportionately burden racial and ethnic minorities. The ruling has been sharply criticized for potentially legalizing voter discrimination that the VRA was designed to prevent. This decision, along with Shelby County v. Holder (2013), has weakened the VRA. However, the Court upheld Section 2 of the VRA in Allen v. Milligan (2023).
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Which parties were involved in this case?
In Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee, the parties involved were the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and associated organizations, who filed suit against Arizonaâs attorney general and secretary of state in 2016. The DNC alleged that Arizona's out-of-precinct (OOP) policy and law against third-party ballot collection disproportionately burdened racial minorities, violating Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) and the Fifteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court ruled 6â3 in favor of Arizona, stating that the voting restrictions did not necessarily violate Section 2 of the VRA.
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What was the main legal issue in Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee?
The central legal issue in Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee was whether Arizona's out-of-precinct policy and ban on third-party ballot collection violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA). The Supreme Court, in a 6â3 decision, held that these voting restrictions, despite disproportionately affecting minority groups, did not violate the VRA because the burdens were not significant and other voting opportunities existed. The Court clarified that Section 2 does not prohibit all disproportionate burdens but requires an equally open electoral system for all citizens.
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Why was the Voting Rights Act important to this case?
The Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965 aimed to eliminate state and local barriers preventing African Americans from exercising their right to vote guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment.
In Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee, the Supreme Court ruled that Arizona's voting restrictions, including out-of-precinct ballot disqualification and limits on third-party ballot collection, did not violate Section 2 of the VRA, even if they disproportionately burdened minority voters. The Court asserted that the state's voting system, as a whole, needed only to be "equally open" to all citizens.
Critics argued that the decision weakened the VRA, enabling voter discrimination that the VRA was designed to prevent. This ruling, along with Shelby County v. Holder (2013), limited the federal government's ability to block discriminatory voting laws.
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What did the Supreme Court decide in this case?
In Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee, the Supreme Court ruled (6â3) that Arizona's voting restrictions, such as discarding ballots cast in the wrong precinct and limiting third-party ballot collection, do not violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), even if they disproportionately burden minority groups. The court held that the law requires a stateâs voting system to be equally open to all races, but it does not ban all disproportionate burdens on minorities. The minority justices dissented, stating that the ruling weakened the VRA and legalized voter discrimination.
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How did the ruling in Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee affect voting laws in the United States?
In Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee (2021), the Supreme Court upheld two Arizona voting laws, stating that they did not violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), even though they disproportionately burdened minority voters. The laws included one discarding ballots cast in the wrong precinct and another limiting third-party ballot collection.
The courtâs conservative majority stated that the law requires a stateâs voting system to be equally open to all races, but it does not ban all disproportionate burdens on minorities. The ruling introduced a set of guideposts for assessing if voting rules violate Section 2, considering factors like the burden size, its departure from past practices, and the state's interests.
Dissenting justices argued that the decision weakened the VRA and legalized voter discrimination. Critics felt the ruling, along with Shelby County v. Holder (2013), hindered the elimination of discriminatory voting practices.
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Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee, legal case in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled (6â3) on July 1, 2021, that state voting restrictions that disproportionately burden racial minority groups do not necessarily violate Section 2 of the federal Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965, despite that lawâs prohibition, in its subsection (a), of any electoral âstandard, practice, or procedureâŠwhich results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.â The Courtâs decision, representing the consensus of its six-member conservative majority, upheld two voting provisions in the state of Arizona, one a policy requiring that ballots cast in the wrong precinct be discarded in their entirety (the âout-of-precinct [OOP] policyâ) and the other a law prohibiting the collection and delivery of ballots by third parties other than certain election officials, mail carriers, caregivers, and family members. Although both provisions disproportionately burdened racial and ethnic minorities in the stateâparticularly Native Americans, Hispanic Americans, and African Americansâthe Court asserted that such disparate effects were acceptable because the burdens imposed were insignificant in themselves and were sufficiently compensated for by the existence of other voting opportunities for the affected groups. In the Courtâs view, Section 2 of the VRA, notwithstanding the unqualified language of subsection (a), did not ban disproportionate burdens on racial minorities outright but merely required that a stateâs voting system as a whole be âequally openâ to members of those groups, as provided in the lawâs subsection (b). The Courtâs three-member liberal minority, joined by voting rights advocates across the country, sharply criticized the ruling for essentially legalizing forms of voter discrimination that the VRA had been designed to prevent. In their view, the Courtâs decision in Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee, together with its earlier ruling in Shelby County v. Holder (2013)âwhich voided a provision of the VRA that had enabled the federal government to prevent certain states from adopting racially discriminatory voting lawsâhad greatly weakened the VRA, rendering it incapable of eliminating many real-life instances of voter discrimination, such as the Arizona provisions in question.
The case arose in 2016, when the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and certain associated organizations filed suit against Arizonaâs attorney general and secretary of state in federal district court, alleging, among other complaints, that: (1) the stateâsOOP policy and its law against third-party ballot collection and delivery (H.B. 2023) violated Section 2 of the VRA, as amended in 1982, because of the provisionsâ disproportionate burdens upon racial minorities; and (2) H.B. 2303 also violated Section 2 and the Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, because it was enacted with discriminatory intent. (In the wake of a Supreme Court decision in 1980 that interpreted Section 2 as prohibiting only those voting provisions adopted with discriminatory intent, Congress significantly amended the section in 1982 to ban provisions with discriminatory results, irrespective of whatever purpose the provisions were designed to serve.) After the district court upheld both the OOP and H.B. 2303, the case was heard by a three-member panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Although the panel affirmed the district courtâs ruling, a subsequent en banc sitting of the appeals court reversed the panelâs judgment and enjoined both provisions as violations of Section 2, also finding that the district court had âclearly erredâ in its determination that H.B. 2303 had not been adopted with discriminatory intent. In April 2020 the defendants filed a writ of certiorari (a petition for review) with the Supreme Court, which was eventually granted in October. Oral arguments were heard on March 2, 2021.
In its majority opinion, written by Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., the Court noted that Brnovich was the first case in which it had been asked to consider how Section 2 applies to âgenerally applicable time, place, or manner voting rulesââwhich are set by the states, within limits established by the Constitution and Congressârather than to alleged instances of racially discriminatory vote dilution, which diminishes the power of racial minorities to elect candidates of their choice and is usually accomplished through racial gerrymandering of electoral districts (see also voter suppression). (Legal challenges to discriminatory time, place, and manner rules under Section 2 increased after Shelby County v. Holder because, absent a new amendment to the VRA, the federal government could no longer block discriminatory voting rules before they were enacted and used in at least one election.) For that reason, the Court argued, a âfresh look at the statutory text is appropriate.â Recalling Congressâs 1982 amendment of the VRA, the Court regarded the âresultsâ test in subsection (a) as insufficient on its own to establish a violation of Section 2 because, in the Courtâs view, subsection (b) explicitly sets out âwhat must be shown to prove a §2 violationâânamely, that the rules in question prevent racial minorities from participating fully in the electoral process. The relevant text of subsection (b) states:
A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.
In the Courtâs reading, then, no âdenial or abridgment of the rightâŠto vote on account of race or colorâ amounts to a violation of Section 2 unless, considering the âtotality of circumstances,â it so limits the voting opportunities of racial minorities as to make participation in elections less open to them than to other citizens.
The Court then identified and elaborated on the kinds of âcircumstancesâ that would be appropriate to consider in assessing whether rules such as the OOP and H.B. 2023 violate Section 2, presenting them as a set âguidepostsâ for future assessments rather than as an âexhaustive listâ of relevant factors. The guideposts were: (1) the âsize of the burden imposed,â which bears consideration only if it is greater than the usual effort or inconvenience involved in voting; (2) the extent to which the burden âdeparts fromâ voting practices that were legal and standard in 1982, when Congress amended Section 2; (3) the size of any disparity in the burden imposed on different racial groups; (4) the range of different voting opportunities provided by a stateâs electoral system considered as a whole; and (5) the strength and validity of the state interest served by the voting rule in question, the presumption being that rules that serve strong state interestsâsuch as preventing voter fraudâare less likely than other rules to violate Section 2.
Having taken these circumstances into account in its assessment of the legality of the OOP and H.B. 2023, the Court concluded that neither provision violated Section 2 and that H.B. 2023 had not been adopted with discriminatory intent.
In her lengthy dissent, which was joined by the Courtâs two other liberal justices, Justice Elena Kagan accused the Courtâs majority of adopting a cramped (needlessly narrow) and twisted reading of the text of Section 2, in disregard of Congressâs obvious intent in drafting the sectionâs original and amended versions; in defiance of the purposefully broad language of subsection (a); and in opposition to decades of judicial precedent in the federal courts, including the Supreme Court itself. Kagan faulted the majority for misrepresenting subsection (b) and its reference to the âtotality of circumstancesâ as a limiting condition on alleged violations of Section 2âone that, in Alitoâs words, âexplains what must be shown to establish a §2 violationâârather than as a requirement, in keeping with the intended breadth of subsection (a), that courts give due consideration to the fact that an âordinary-seemingâ and facially (on its face) neutral voting rule âcan interact with local conditionsâeconomic, social, historicalâto produce race-based voting inequalities.â Having thus misread subsection (b), Kagan argued, the majority proceeded to impose its own âmade-upâ and âextra-textualâ limits on the application of Section 2, effectively rewriting the law by introducing restrictions âit would have liked Congress to enact.â For example, the Courtâs conclusion that Section 2 does not apply to voting rules that impose burdens no greater than the usual effort or inconvenience involved in votingâeven if those burdens fall (in Kaganâs words) âhighly unequally on members of different racesââis unsupported by the text of Section 2, which nowhere states that minor or insignificant burdens fall outside its scope. Kagan also disputed the majorityâs contention that voting rules that were common in 1982, the year in which Section 2 was amended, are relevant to determining whether a current voting rule is discriminatory, noting that the entire purpose of the amended section was (and continues to be) to eliminate existing rules with discriminatory effects. âSection 2 was meant to disrupt the status quo, not to preserve itâto eradicate then-current discriminatory practices, not to set them in amber,â she insisted. Kagan likewise rejected the Courtâs conclusion that deficits in voting opportunities for racial minorities may be legal under Section 2 as long as other opportunities are made available.
Finally, Kagan dismissed the majorityâs rationale for holding that discriminatory voting rules serving a strong state interest can be consistent with Section 2 even in cases where other, nondiscriminatory means would accomplish the same goal. A conclusion to the contrary, the majority stated, would âinvalidat[e] a great many neutral voting regulationsâ and would inappropriately transfer regulatory authority over elections from the states to the federal courts. Kagan noted that Section 2 would apply only to voting rules that were shown to be discriminatory in practice; that the VRA was a legitimate exercise of Congressâs constitutional power âto replace state and local election rules that needlessly make voting harder for members of one race than for othersâ; and that, in ruling as it did, the majority had effectively endorsed the long-standing practice of rationalizing racially discriminatory voting laws by emphasizing the nonracial interests they supposedly serve.

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