Battles of Panipat

Background

The Delhi sultanate under Ibrahim Lodi (1517–26) was marked by growing internal strife and suspicion among the Afghans and the Rajputs of India alike because of his tyrannical regime. Lodi’s insistence on building a large centralized empire under his absolute authority undermined the position of nobles in his court, and the interventions of antagonized powerful Afghan chiefs such as Daulat Khan Lodi (the governor of Punjab) made conditions favorable for Babur’s invasion.

Babur was a member of the Chagatai clan that ruled over Fergana in what is now Uzbekistan. He succeeded his father to the throne of Fergana but eventually lost it. He also made several unsuccessful attempts to capture Samarkand (now in Uzbekistan). For a brief period Babur occupied Kabul (now in Afghanistan). However, with no prospects of reclaiming his former territories, Babur turned his attention toward India, where new opportunities for expansion presented themselves.

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According to the Baburnama (“History of Babur”), Babur set out on his expedition to Hindustan, a region of the northern Indian subcontinent, in November 1525.

The battle

Before the First Battle of Panipat, Babur made four unsuccessful raids (1519–24) into India without being able to gain a secure foothold. However, he sensed the cracks in the Lodi polity. During one such conflict, the Afghan nobles Alam Khan (Ibrahim Lodi’s uncle) and Daulat Khan Lodi urged Babur to launch a fifth invasion, arguing that Ibrahim had become a tyrant and had lost the support of his nobles.

Marching toward Delhi, Babur reached Milawat (now Malot, Punjab, India) and captured it. He pushed on, capturing key regions in Punjab and defeating many forces, including an army that was in support of Ibrahim Lodi and led by the Afghan noble Hamid Khan Lodi.

In early April 1526 Babur arrived near Panipat to confront Ibrahim Lodi. Although Babur’s army was much smaller, he made up for it in innovative tactics. For one week, Babur sent small contingents of his forces to the enemy camp and launched night attacks. Finally, on April 20, Lodi advanced toward the Mughal camp, and both sides engaged. The well-planned formation of Babur’s forces and their effective use of artillery disrupted Lodi’s army, whose soldiers and elephants were unable to maneuver effectively. After several hours of fighting, the Lodi forces collapsed, and the battle turned in Babur’s favor. Ibrahim Lodi was killed and thus began the three-century-long Mughal rule (1526–1857) in India.

The estimates of casualties in this battle vary from 15,000 to 50,000.

For a full treatment see First Battle of Panipat.

Forces and military strategy

According to the Baburnama, Ibrahim Lodi’s “standing-army was called a lak (100,000), whose elephants and whose begs’ elephants were about 1,000.” Recognizing the disadvantage of his smaller army, Babur adopted innovative tactics influenced by Central Asian and Ottoman practices.

Babur used the tulughma military tactic, which involved dividing the army into coordinated left, right, and center units supplemented by flanking forces. This enabled Babur’s small army to surround the much larger army of Lodi. The defense line of Babur’s army consisted of hundreds of carts (arabas) tied together with rawhide. Behind these carts were mantelets, protecting cannons and providing cover to matchlock operators. Lodi’s army—which consisted of elephants, cavalry, and mercenary units—lacked the artillery and cohesiveness of Babur’s army. By surrounding Lodi’s army, Babur was able to control the outcome of the battle. He then went on to take Delhi and Agra.

(Read Britannica’s article on gunpowder empires.)

Background

After the brief rule of Babur (1526–30), his son Humayun came to power. On June 26, 1539, only nine years into his rule, Humayun was defeated by Sher Shah of Sur (Afghan soldier of fortune) in the Battle of Chausa. Shortly after, in Kannauj in May 1540, Humayun faced another defeat against Sher Shah of Sur. Humayun fled and Sher Shah of Sur, who had previously captured Bengal, Bihar, and northern India, established the Sur dynasty. His regime lasted only five years, as he died on May 22, 1545. Instability, chaos, and issues of succession followed his death.

The last Sur ruler, Adil Shah, lost Bengal and Malwa during internal conflicts with Sher Shah’s nephews. The continuous infighting escalated into civil war, which allowed Humayun to take advantage and recover lost territory. In February 1555 he took over Lahore and captured Agra and Delhi on July 23, 1555. However, he died in January 1556, leaving the Mughal throne to Akbar, who was 13 years old at the time. The Sur dynasty still held power over much of India, and Hemu, a Hindu chief who was appointed head of the Sur army by Adil Shah, seized the opportunity to retake Sur territory from Akbar.

The battle

Hemu had fought and won 22 battles for Adil Shah. Soon after Humayun captured Delhi and Agra, Hemu marched with a large army from the eastern provinces to recover them. As Hemu advanced toward northern India, the Mughal governor of Agra fled to Delhi. Hemu then moved toward Delhi, where the Mughal commander Tardi Beg engaged him near Tughlaqabad on October 7, 1556. After a fierce fight, Hemu captured Delhi and claimed the throne for himself. The news of this crushing defeat reached Akbar, who was in Jalandhar at the time, and he began marching toward Delhi.

Akbar was supported by his guardian, the seasoned general Bairam Khan. Akbar did not participate in the battle and was marching several miles behind the army with Bairam Khan. The Mughal army of 10,000 cavalry faced Hemu’s army of 30,000 cavalry and 500 war elephants. On November 5, 1556, Hemu’s army advanced with elephants attacking the right and left wings of the Mughal army. To avoid the elephants, the Mughal cavalry moved around the flanks and rear, shooting arrows at the elephants, targeting their drivers, and creating confusion among the animals. The Mughals, though heavily outnumbered, were able to penetrate the opposing army from the side and rear. During the continuous fighting Hemu was struck by an arrow in his eye, which demoralized his troops, who promptly fled or surrendered. A Mughal captain led Hemu and his elephant to Akbar’s camp, where Hemu was beheaded by Bairam Khan. Akbar went on to retake both Agra and Delhi and ruled for the next 49 years, overseeing significant Mughal expansion.

The estimates of deaths in this battle were more than 5,000.

Forces and military strategy

The Second Battle of Panipat demonstrated the contrast between Hemu’s reliance on war elephants and massed offensive action and the Mughal preference for mobile cavalry tactics and coordinated battlefield maneuvers. Hemu’s army included approximately 500 war elephants and 30,000 cavalry. The Mughal army included 10,000 cavalry. The military strategy of both forces was different: Hemu, mounted on his war elephant, personally led his army from the front, with 30,000 horsemen in formation. By contrast, Akbar was stationed with 5,000 soldiers away from the actual battle while the main Mughal troops fought under able generals.

During the battle Mughal troops allowed portions of Hemu’s force to advance into the battlefield, while some cavalrymen moved around the opposition’s flanks. Instead of a direct confrontation with Hemu’s war elephants, the Mughal right wing attacked Hemu’s troops on the sides. The Mughal cavalry targeted the elephants or their drivers. Once the elephants began to lose momentum, Mughal cavalry emerged from protected positions and launched counterattacks against the advancing Afghan and Rajput troops.

Background

The first and second battles of Panipat established Mughal dominance, but by the mid-18th century, the Mughal Empire possessed only symbolic authority. The Mughal government in the 1750s controlled little beyond the area around Delhi, which was characterized by territorial disputes between Jats, Rohillas, and other regional powers. In this landscape, the Marathas expanded for two decades and had already established their influence in Malwa and Gujarat. Under Nana Saheb’s leadership, Maratha armies pushed even farther into the Delhi region, Rajasthan, Bundelkhand, Punjab, Orissa (now Odisha), Bengal, Bihar, and the Karnatak (present-day Karnataka).

In 1752 the Marathas entered into the Mughal-Maratha treaty of April 1752, which made them protectors of the Mughal throne and gave them rights to collect revenue in the Punjab region. From farther north Ahmad Shah Durrani led as many as eight conquests into India. After one such invasion by Durrani, Maratha forces advanced into the Punjab in 1757–58, which coincided with the Sikh rebellion in the region. In late 1759, while Durrani was advancing toward India, Sadashiv Rao Bhau, who was leading the Marathas, retreated from the Punjab. On the side of the Marathas, ineffective artillery prevented their victory against Durrani’s allies, and Durrani’s forces later defeated part of the Maratha army. Meanwhile, both sides sought support from influential northern Indian powers. Negotiations occurred, yet neither side would accept the other’s terms. The Maratha force took Delhi in August 1760, and a series of small battles took place along the Yamuna River.

The Battle

By the end of 1760 the Maratha army established a fortified camp at Panipat, but their position was weakened by diseases and shortage of money. The Durrani camp was not doing any better. Owing to the Sikh rebellion, Durrani could not communicate with his kingdom in Afghanistan. Still, both sides were committed to a confrontation. On January 14, 1761, the Maratha forces marched toward the Afghan camp, attempting to break the siege. Both sides, weakened by adverse conditions, had armies of nearly equal strength. In the beginning, the battle favored the Marathas. This early success, however, exposed weaknesses within the Maratha army rather than resolving them. The Marathas had several units of troops, but they could not use them as one coordinated force. The Maratha cavalry was supported by an artillery bombardment, but poor tactics and the need to protect civilians undermined the Maratha strength.

The Marathas’ weakness proved fatal late in the afternoon. At a crucial point, the Afghans added about 5,000 fresh cavalry, which enabled them to gain considerable advantage over the Marathas. Once the center was pierced and the leadership structure failed, the Maratha army could not make an organized retreat. Many fleeing Marathas were pursued by the Afghan troops and thus, the Afghans won the battle.

Durrani returned to Afghanistan after the battle. The Maratha army was decimated, and they ceased to be a powerful force in India. The Maratha Empire was to see no further expansions, and eventually splintered into smaller kingdoms. The absence of a strong political power in India was to be exploited by the British in the next few decades, eventually giving rise to the British Raj.

The estimates of deaths in this battle vary from 60,000 to 70,000. After the battle the Durrani forces slaughtered about 40,000 Marathas.

Forces and military strategy

The Maratha and Durrani forces followed two very different strategic approaches. While both forces were roughly the same in size, their composition, arms, and tactics differed greatly. These differences proved to be pivotal in the outcome of the battle.

The Afghan army under Ahmad Shah Durrani relied primarily on cavalry. The troops wore body armor and were heavily armed, with some carrying muskets, which allowed them to combine arms with firepower. They further benefited from lighter artillery such as swivel guns. The Maratha army, which was much more diverse in composition, drew its strength from traditional light cavalry. These troops generally fought with swords and shields.

The Maratha forces included various military formations that were not completely understood by all Maratha generals. A part of the Maratha forces led by Ibrahim Gardi was organized and trained in more modern methods. His force included disciplined infantry supported by artillery. The coexistence of different military traditions created both opportunities and problems as they were never fully integrated into a single military system.