After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy

After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy is a significant work by Robert O. Keohane that challenges the idea that international cooperation requires a dominant power, or hegemon. Keohane, a key figure in neoliberal institutionalism, argues that even after the decline of a hegemon, states can continue to cooperate through international regimes.1

These regimes, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), are defined by norms, institutions, and decision-making procedures that help states manage their expectations and maintain cooperation. Keohane posits that these regimes reduce the risks and costs associated with international interactions by facilitating negotiation, improving information flow, and providing mechanisms for monitoring compliance. This perspective contrasts with neorealism, which emphasizes distrust and competition between states.1