How does the hawk-dove model apply game theory to animal behavior?

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A colorful payoff matrix for a normal form game in game theory, showing strategy options-support, oppose, evade-for both party A and party B. Each cell contains cartoon figures representing each party's action and lists percentage payoffs for A and B. The bottom-right cell is labeled saddlepoint, highlighting the equilibrium. — game theory Table 1
The normal-form table illustrates the concept of a saddlepoint, or entry, in a payoff matrix at which the expected gain of each participant (row or column) has the highest guaranteed payoff.

The Hawk-Dove model, formulated by John Maynard Smith and George Price, applies game theory to explain why animal conflicts are often resolved through displays rather than lethal combat.1

The model defines two primary strategies:
* Hawks: Always launch escalated attacks.
* Doves: Always use non-aggressive displays and flee before injury.

The model assumes that the fitness consequences of a strategy depend on the behavior of others. When the costs of injury are high, the hawk strategy is not evolutionarily stable because doves, while losing, avoid injury. Consequently, the model predicts an "evolutionary stable strategy" (ESS)—a mixture of hawks and doves—where the population's behavior cannot be bettered by alternative strategies.1

This framework demonstrates that conventional fighting is driven by individual costs rather than group benefits. It explains behavioral diversity in species like the ruff, fig wasp, dung beetle, and mite, where individuals use different tactics to secure resources. Later iterations of the model incorporate asymmetries in fighting ability and resource value, further illustrating why animals often assess opponents before engaging in dangerous fights.1