- 1100 BC-1799
- 1800-1849
- 2000-2019
State-by-state: Number of people who cannot vote due to a felony conviction
According to The Sentencing Project, about four million Americans were disenfranchised (not allowed to vote) because of a felony conviction in 2024, down from about 5.9 million in 2016. Each state determines voting policy for people with felony convictions within its borders. The policies range from being allowed to vote from prison to permanently losing voting rights. [113]
Nationally, of those who were disenfranchised, 40 percent were post-sentence, 26 percent were in prison, 25 percent were on felony probation, 7 percent were on parole, and 3 percent were in jail. [113]
*The Sentencing Project noted that these are estimates, not head counts. [37] [20]
| State | Prison | Parole | Felony probation | Jail | Post-sentence | Total | Voting eligible population | Percent of voting eligible population disenfranchised |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alabama | 19,816 | 5,550 | 19,651 | 1,364 | 181,056 | 227,437 | 3,824,042 | 5.95 |
| Alaska | 2,223 | 750 | 2,172 | 5,145 | 534,726 | 0.96 | ||
| Arizona | 33,865 | 6,640 | 55,225 | 6,952 | 112,109 | 214,791 | 5,118,553 | 4.2 |
| Arkansas | 17,625 | 22,780 | 41,921 | 1,772 | 84,099 | 2,233,468 | 3.77 | |
| California | 97,608 | 97,608 | 26,078,138 | 0.37 | ||||
| Colorado | 17,168 | 1,560 | 18,728 | 4,267,287 | 0.44 | |||
| Connecticut | 5,449 | 5,449 | 2,646,720 | 0.21 | ||||
| Delaware | 2,587 | 340 | 2,930 | 357 | 6,214 | 746,111 | 0.83 | |
| Florida | 84,678 | 3,890 | 133,324 | 10,007 | 729,858 | 961,757 | 15,698,796 | 6.13 |
| Georgia | 48,439 | 15,460 | 174,566 | 11,234 | 249,699 | 7,686,559 | 3.25 | |
| Hawaii | 2,390 | 2,390 | 1,050,736 | 0.23 | ||||
| Idaho | 9,110 | 6,640 | 12,719 | 673 | 29,143 | 1,344,940 | 2.17 | |
| Illinois | 29,634 | 1,369 | 31,003 | 9,143,765 | 0.34 | |||
| Indiana | 25,286 | 3,330 | 28,616 | 5,009,620 | 0.57 | |||
| Iowa | 8,473 | 6,880 | 10,480 | 394 | 651 | 26,878 | 2,368,945 | 1.13 |
| Kansas | 8,709 | 5,130 | 3,765 | 1,436 | 19,040 | 2,126,123 | 0.9 | |
| Kentucky | 19,744 | 12,630 | 47,619 | 6,559 | 71,829 | 158,381 | 3,398,223 | 4.66 |
| Louisiana | 27,296 | 17,064 | 2,596 | 7,790 | 54,746 | 3,458,799 | 1.58 | |
| Maine | 0 | 1,095,863 | 0 | |||||
| Maryland | 15,637 | 633 | 16,270 | 4,411,238 | 0.37 | |||
| Massachusetts | 6,001 | 1,359 | 7,360 | 5,117,162 | 0.14 | |||
| Michigan | 32,374 | 2,183 | 34,557 | 7,633,287 | 0.45 | |||
| Minnesota | 8,636 | 936 | 9,572 | 4,206,890 | 0.23 | |||
| Mississippi | 6,139 | 2,874 | 9,418 | 2,369 | 47,932 | 68,731 | 2,232,895 | 3.08 |
| Missouri | 23,911 | 17,140 | 36,584 | 1,844 | 79,479 | 4,666,685 | 1.7 | |
| Montana | 4,691 | 639 | 5,330 | 849,900 | 0.63 | |||
| Nebraska | 5,649 | 940 | 5,067 | 543 | 12,200 | 1,405,396 | 0.87 | |
| Nevada | 10,304 | 878 | 11,182 | 2,150,275 | 0.52 | |||
| New Hampshire | 2,086 | 160 | 2,246 | 1,093,456 | 0.21 | |||
| New Jersey | 12,657 | 1,430 | 14,087 | 6,420,959 | 0.22 | |||
| New Mexico | 4,970 | 361 | 5,331 | 1,538,095 | 0.35 | |||
| New York | 31,148 | 1,898 | 33,046 | 14,187,231 | 0.23 | |||
| North Carolina | 29,627 | 9,710 | 28,989 | 1,562 | 69,888 | 7,734,317 | 0.9 | |
| North Dakota | 1,817 | 448 | 2,265 | 575,817 | 0.39 | |||
| Ohio | 45,313 | 5,303 | 50,616 | 8,948,188 | 0.57 | |||
| Oklahoma | 22,941 | 2,500 | 12,338 | 2,691 | 40,470 | 2,884,230 | 1.4 | |
| Oregon | 12,518 | 914 | 13,432 | 3,177,375 | 0.42 | |||
| Pennsylvania | 37,910 | 3,372 | 41,282 | 9,949,674 | 0.41 | |||
| Rhode Island | 1,595 | 1,595 | 824,516 | 0.19 | ||||
| South Carolina | 16,318 | 3,510 | 16,852 | 1,158 | 37,838 | 3,905,589 | 0.97 | |
| South Dakota | 3,444 | 3,360 | 5,454 | 345 | 12,603 | 656,517 | 1.92 | |
| Tennessee | 23,735 | 12,630 | 55,673 | 7,480 | 300,166 | 399,684 | 5,206,668 | 7.68 |
| Texas | 139,631 | 100,600 | 226,472 | 12,395 | 479,097 | 19,161,407 | 2.5 | |
| Utah | 6,009 | 1,402 | 7,411 | 2,204,522 | 0.34 | |||
| Vermont | 0 | 516,776 | 0 | |||||
| Virginia | 27,162 | 1,770 | 60,640 | 5,147 | 169,573 | 264,292 | 6,322,253 | 4.18 |
| Washington | 13,772 | 1,805 | 15,577 | 5,488,694 | 0.28 | |||
| West Virginia | 5,873 | 4,030 | 3,869 | 1,925 | 15,696 | 1,421,321 | 1.1 | |
| Wisconsin | 20,873 | 22,510 | 22,097 | 2,799 | 68,279 | 4,473,075 | 1.53 | |
| Wyoming | 2,154 | 840 | 3,306 | 231 | 2,907 | 9,437 | 434,427 | 2.17 |
| Total | 1,034,995 | 286,168 | 993,725 | 118,653 | 1,616,437 | 4,049,978 | 237,630,249 | 1.7 |
Incarcerated population by type of crime committed
Below find the number of people incarcerated for each type of crime as well as the percent of people imprisoned for each type of crime under both state and federal jurisdictions from 2014 through 2023, which are the most recently available numbers from the Bureau of Justice Statistics of the Department of Justice. [103] [104] [105] [106] [107] [108] [109] [114] [115]
Sentenced prisoners under state jurisdictions
| 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total sentenced prisoners | |||||||||
| 1,316,409 | 1,298,159 | 1,288,466 | 1,273,674 | 1,249,700 | 1,221,288 | 1,043,705 | 1,021,288 | 1,039,540 | |
| Violent crimes | |||||||||
| Total violent crimes | 696,900 | 707,900 | 710,900 | 709,700 | 693,300 | 710,800 | 651,800 | 642,526 | 647,585 |
| Murder | 171,700 | 177,600 | 182,400 | 182,200 | 177,700 | 162,900 | 157,000 | 155,115 | 157,619 |
| Negligent manslaughter | 17,100 | 17,500 | 17,300 | 18,800 | 18,600 | 19,200 | 18,600 | 18,776 | 19,839 |
| Rape/sexual assault | 162,800 | 161,900 | 164,800 | 167,000 | 162,700 | 167,800 | 161,500 | 160,322 | 163,088 |
| Robbery | 168,600 | 171,400 | 168,800 | 163,300 | 155,000 | 151,000 | 130,800 | 122,356 | 115,659 |
| Aggravated/simple assault | 134,400 | 135,700 | 135,400 | 137,100 | 135,900 | 165,700 | 144,600 | 146,597 | 150,682 |
| Other | 42,200 | 43,800 | 42,100 | 41,200 | 43,500 | 165,700 | 39,300 | 39,361 | 40,697 |
| Property crimes | |||||||||
| Total property crimes | 249,900 | 234,000 | 226,100 | 214,100 | 199,700 | 186,700 | 141,100 | 132,804 | 130,824 |
| Burglary | 132,600 | 126,000 | 121,300 | 115,800 | 106,500 | 100,500 | 79,800 | 75,040 | 71,773 |
| Larceny/theft | 47,000 | 47,700 | 44,000 | 37,600 | 38,700 | 37,000 | 26,400 | 24,504 | 71,773 |
| Motor vehicle theft | 11,100 | 9,400 | 9,600 | 10,800 | 10,200 | 10,300 | 7,000 | 7,097 | 7,974 |
| Fraud | 29,700 | 24,700 | 25,900 | 25,000 | 22,400 | 19,100 | 12,900 | 11,190 | 11,233 |
| Other | 29,500 | 26,200 | 25,200 | 24,900 | 21,900 | 19,800 | 15,000 | 14,973 | 15,386 |
| Drug crimes | |||||||||
| Total drug crimes | 206,300 | 197,200 | 190,100 | 183,900 | 176,300 | 171,300 | 131,600 | 127,348 | 131,352 |
| Possession | 46,000 | 44,700 | 45,300 | 46,800 | 46,500 | 46,700 | 33,700 | 34,382 | 37,790 |
| Other | 160,300 | 152,500 | 144,800 | 137,100 | 129,900 | 124,600 | 97,800 | 92,965 | 93,563 |
| Public order crimes | |||||||||
| Total public order crimes | 152,800 | 153,100 | 153,100 | 157,600 | 153,100 | 145,000 | 109,100 | 111,881 | 122,797 |
| Weapons | 51,100 | 50,500 | 54,400 | 57,800 | 58,000 | 48,900 | 38,600 | 41,046 | 47,906 |
| DUI/DWI | 27,900 | 25,300 | 24,600 | 22,800 | 21,400 | 20,800 | 15,000 | 15,082 | 16,018 |
| Other | 73,900 | 74,400 | 74,100 | 77,000 | 73,800 | 75,300 | 55,500 | 55,754 | 58,872 |
| Other/unspecified crimes | |||||||||
| Total other/unspecified crimes | 10,600 | 8,900 | 8,200 | 8,300 | 7,300 | 7,500 | 6,800 | 6,729 | 6,981 |
Notes:
- Homicide includes murder and both negligent and non-negligent manslaughter.
- Fraud includes embezzlement, fraud, forgery, and counterfeiting.
- Other property crimes include larceny, motor-vehicle theft, arson and explosives, transportation of stolen property, and other property offenses.
- Drug crimes include trafficking, possession, and other drug offenses. More than 99 percent of federal drug offenders were sentenced for trafficking.
- Immigration public order crimes include illegal entry, smuggling and importing non-U.S. citizens, and holds for immigration officials.
- Other public order crimes include regulatory offenses; tax-law violations; bribery; perjury, contempt, and intimidation in U.S. courts; national-defense offenses; escape; racketeering and extortion; gambling; sexual offenses, excluding sexual abuse; offenses involving liquor, traffic, wildlife, and environmental matters; and all other public-order offenses.
Sentenced prisoners under federal jurisdiction
| 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total sentenced prisoners | ||||||||||
| 185,917 | 172,554 | 172,554 | 162,904 | 158,107 | 144,553 | 142,298 | 142,298 | 143,644 | 143,172 | |
| Violent crimes | ||||||||||
| Total violent crimes | 13,700 | 13,400 | 13,400 | 12,800 | 12,212 | 11,303 | 10,547 | 10,547 | 10,435 | 10,880 |
| Homicide | 2,800 | 2,800 | 2,800 | 2,700 | 2,663 | 2,551 | 2,426 | 2,426 | 2,400 | 2,415 |
| Robbery | 6,900 | 6,600 | 6,600 | 6,000 | 5,521 | 4,448 | 4,448 | 4,448 | 4,044 | 3,816 |
| Sexual abuse | ā | ā | ā | 1,300 | 1,321 | 1,278 | 1,261 | 1,261 | 1,534 | 1,933 |
| Other | 4,000 | 4,000 | 4,000 | 2,700 | 2,707 | 2,516 | 2,412 | 2,412 | 2,457 | 2,716 |
| Property crimes | ||||||||||
| Total property crimes | 11,200 | 10,600 | 10,600 | 9,200 | 8,400 | 6,819 | 5,950 | 5,950 | 5,466 | 4,943 |
| Burglary | 400 | 400 | 400 | 300 | 292 | 254 | 224 | 224 | 239 | 241 |
| Fraud | 8,800 | 8,300 | 8,300 | 7,300 | 6,637 | 5,295 | 4,552 | 4,552 | 4,078 | 3,619 |
| Other | 2,000 | 1,900 | 1,900 | 1,700 | 1,471 | 1,270 | 1,174 | 1,174 | 1,149 | 1,083 |
| Drug crimes | ||||||||||
| Total drug crimes | 92,000 | 81,900 | 81,900 | 76,700 | 73,210 | 67,438 | 66,474 | 66,474 | 65,976 | 64,649 |
| Public order crimes | ||||||||||
| Total public order crimes | 67,500 | 65,900 | 65,900 | 63,600 | 63,691 | 58,503 | 58,894 | 58,894 | 61,394 | 62,350 |
| Immigration | 14,900 | 13,300 | 13,300 | 9,200 | 8,324 | 5,764 | 5,975 | 5,975 | 6,423 | 6,507 |
| Weapons | 30,200 | 28,800 | 28,800 | 28,800 | 29,327 | 28,210 | 28,537 | 28,537 | 30,062 | 30,330 |
| Other | 22,400 | 23,800 | 23,800 | 25,600 | 26,040 | 24,529 | 24,382 | 24,382 | 24,909 | 25,513 |
| Other/unspecified crimes | ||||||||||
| Total other/unspecified crimes | 1,400 | 900 | 900 | 600 | 594 | 490 | 433 | 433 | 373 | 350 |
U.S. jail, prison, parole, and probation populations
| Year | Correctional population: total | Community supervision: total | Community supervision: probation | Community supervision: parole | Incarcerated: total | Incarcerated: prison | Incarcerated: local jail |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | 5,530,300 | 3,772,000 | 3,103,400 | 680,400 | 1,852,900 | 1,254,200 | 664,200 |
| 2022 | 5,480,600 | 3,742,200 | 3,064,200 | 698,800 | 1,827,600 | 1,230,100 | 663,100 |
| 2021 | 5,442,300 | 3,741,600 | 2,963,000 | 799,900 | 1,776,000 | 1,205,100 | 636,300 |
| 2020 | 5,506,400 | 3,890,800 | 3,053,700 | 862,500 | 1,697,000 | 1,221,200 | 549,100 |
| 2019 | 6,343,200 | 4,357,500 | 3,492,900 | 878,700 | 2,086,000 | 1,430,200 | 734,500 |
| 2018 | 6,409,200 | 4,399,000 | 3,540,000 | 878,000 | 2,122,300 | 1,464,400 | 738,400 |
| 2017 | 6,549,700 | 4,508,900 | 3,647,200 | 875,000 | 2,153,600 | 1,489,200 | 745,200 |
| 2016 | 6,616,200 | 4,537,100 | 3,673,100 | 874,800 | 2,165,100 | 1,508,100 | 740,700 |
| 2015 | 6,740,300 | 4,650,900 | 3,789,800 | 870,500 | 2,172,800 | 1,526,600 | 727,400 |
| 2014 | 6,856,900 | 4,713,200 | 3,868,400 | 857,700 | 2,225,100 | 1,562,300 | 744,600 |
| 2013 | 6,899,700 | 4,749,800 | 3,912,900 | 849,500 | 2,222,500 | 1,577,000 | 731,200 |
| 2012 | 6,949,800 | 4,790,700 | 3,944,900 | 858,400 | 2,231,300 | 1,570,400 | 744,500 |
| 2011 | 6,994,500 | 4,818,300 | 3,973,800 | 855,500 | 2,252,500 | 1,599,000 | 735,600 |
| 2010 | 7,089,000 | 4,888,500 | 4,055,900 | 840,800 | 2,279,100 | 1,613,800 | 748,700 |
| 2009 | 7,239,100 | 5,019,900 | 4,199,800 | 824,600 | 2,297,700 | 1,615,500 | 767,400 |
Constitutional considerations
Is the disenfranchisement of people with felony convictions unconstitutional?
Eighth Amendment
Ratified in 1791, the amendment states: āExcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.ā
| PRO | CON |
|---|---|
| Pamela S. Karlan, the Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Professor of Public Interest Law at Stanford University, stated: | In Thiess v. State Administrative Board of Election Laws (1974), the Maryland 4th circuit Federal Court, stated: |
| āGiven contemporary voting rights doctrine, if disenfranchisement is to be justified at all, it must be justified as an appropriate punishment. Thus it is impossible to avoid the question Trop v. Dulles set to one side: is disenfranchisement consistent with the Eighth Amendmentās prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment? The Eighth Amendment āsuccinctly prohibits āexcessiveā sanctions,ā and demands that āpunishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to the offense.ā (Atkins v. Virginia, quoting Weems v. United States) ⦠The claim that a particular punishment violated the Eighth Amendment because it is disproportionately severe āis judged not by the standards that prevailed in 1685⦠or when the Bill of Rights was adopted, but rather by those that currently prevail.ā.. Thus, the states that continue to exclude all felons permanently are outliers, both within the United States and in the world.ā [42] | āUnlike the penalty of expatriation [discussed in the case Trop v. Dulles], the penalty of disenfranchisement is one specifically recognized by the Fourteenth Amendment, an amendment enacted subsequent to the Eighth. See Richardson v. Ramirez. In addition, Mr. Chief Justice Warrenās words in Trop [v. Dulles] suggest a marked difference in severity between total political expatriation and the more limited deprivation of the right to voteā¦As the Court noted in Richardson v. Ramirez, it may be that modern legislators should conclude that the concept of disenfranchisement is āoutmoded, and that the more modern view is that it is essential to the process of rehabilitating the ex-felon that he be returned to his role in society as a fully participating citizen when he has completed the serving of his term.ā Be that as it may, as a Court, we cannot conclude that such disenfranchisement as has been decreed by the State of Maryland is a punishment so grossly disproportionate to the crime as to be proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.ā |
Fourteenth Amendment
Ratified in 1896, the amendment includes two relevant sections.
Section I: āAll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.ā
The bold and italicized section above is the Equal Protection Clause.
Section II: āRepresentatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a state, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such state.ā
| PRO | CON |
|---|---|
| In Hunter v. Underwood (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court stated: | In Richardson v. Ramirez (1974), the U.S. Supreme Court stated: |
| āHeld: Section 182 [of the Alabama constitution of 1901] violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [of the U.S. Constitution] ⦠That 182 may have been adopted to discriminate against poor whites as well as against blacks would not render nugatory [worthless, futile] the purpose to discriminate against blacks⦠The drafters [of Section 182] retained the general felony provision ā āany crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiaryā ā but also added a new catchall provision covering āanyā¦crime involving moral turpitude.ā ā¦It is alleged, and the Court of Appeals found, that the crimes selected for inclusion in 182 were believed by the delegates to be more frequently committed by blacks.ā | āCalifornia, in disenfranchising convicted felons who have completed their sentences and paroles, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.(a) The understanding of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, as reflected in the express language of 2 of the Amendment, which exempts from the sanction of reduced congressional representation resulting from the denial of citizensā right to vote, the denial of such right for āparticipation in rebellion, or other crime,ā and in the historical and judicial interpretation of the Amendmentās applicability to state laws disenfranchising felons, is of controlling significance in distinguishing such laws from those other state limitations on the franchise that this Court has held invalid under the Equal Protection Clause.ā |
| PRO | CON |
|---|---|
| Jason G. Morgan-Foster, researcher at New York University School of Law, stated: | Alex Kozinski, U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge, stated: |
| āInterestingly, it appears that, like the international context, the Framers [of the U.S. Constitution] also viewed disenfranchisement along a continuum, intending the phrase āor other crimeā to apply only to crimes of rebellion or disloyalty to the state, such as treasonā¦[W]e should care about felon disenfranchisement because it inherently contradicts the rest of our constitutional jurisprudence on the right of every citizen to vote. This article has suggested that it is time to re-examine the original textual premise of the Ramirez decision that section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment affirmatively sanctions felon disenfranchisement.ā [43] | āUnlike any other voting qualification, felon disenfranchisement laws are explicitly endorsed by the text of the Fourteenth Amendmentā¦They are presumptively constitutional. Only a narrow subset of them ā those enacted with an invidious, racially discriminatory purpose ā is unconstitutional.ā [44] |
Fifteenth Amendment
Ratified in 1870, the amendment includes two relevant sections.
Section I: āThe right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.ā
Section II: āThe Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.ā
| PRO | CON |
|---|---|
| Gabriel J. Chin, professor of law, public administration, and policy at the University of Arizona, stated: | Richard L. Hasen, Distinguished Professor of Law at Loyola Law School, stated: |
| āFelon disenfranchisement has tremendous effects on the political landscape ā leading researchers report that felon disenfranchisement āmay have altered the outcome of as many as seven recent U.S. Senate elections and one presidential election.ā Because the Fifteenth Amendment repealed Section 2 [of the Fourteenth Amendment], courts must reconsider the treatment of felon disenfranchisementā¦In states that denied the vote to African-Americans, white voters had extra impact because African-Americans counted for purposes of allocating seats in Congress but did not participate in electing those who served there. Section 2 thus encouraged states to let African-Americans vote by punishing states disenfranchising African-Americans, but it left the ultimate decision to the states. Instead of merely encouraging nondiscrimination, the Fifteenth Amendment imposed it, granting the right to vote to qualified African-Americans. The Fifteenth Amendment represented a newly restrictive view of both state power and the consequences of exceeding it.ā[45] | āUnder todayās standards, Congress will have to come up with significant evidence of intentional state racial discrimination to justify a felon disenfranchisement ban under its 14th or 15th amendment enforcement powers. The evidence of intentional state discrimination must come either in relation to a cycle of poverty leading to a higher number of minority felons or intentional state discrimination in the criminal justice system that makes it more likely that minorities accused of felonies will be convicted than whites accused of felonies.ā[46] |
Twenty-fourth Amendment
Ratified in 1964, the amendment includes two relevant sections.
Section I: āThe right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay poll tax or other tax.ā
Section II: āThe Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.ā
| PRO | CON |
|---|---|
| The American Civil Liberties Union stated: | Rob McKenna, Washington State Attorney General, stated: |
| āBy denying the vote to those who have not paid their LFOs [Legal Financial Obligations], the State of Washington distributes this fundamental right [to vote] on the constitutionally impermissible basis of wealth. Washingtonās re-enfranchisement scheme creates two classes of ex-felons in Washington: those ex-felons who are able to pay their LFOs and regain the right to vote, and those ex-felons who are unable to pay their LFOs and remain permanently disenfranchised. By requiring payment of all LFOs as a condition for reenfranchisement, the State effectively imposes a poll tax upon Plaintiffs and all other ex-felons. This violates both the Federal and State Constitutions.ā[47] | āAs noted, a decision by a state not to extend the right to vote to convicted felons enjoys express constitutional sanction. The Legislatureās policy judgment that civil rights should be restored only upon completion of all terms of a felony judgment and sentence bears a rational relationship to this objective. That a different policy judgment might have been reached is no answer. The constitutional question is whether the inclusion of legal financial obligations is wholly irrelevant⦠Requiring the payment of a poll tax as a qualification for voting is unconstitutional because it bears āno relation to voting qualifications.ā By contrast, both the federal and state constitutions recognize the Stateās legitimate policy decision not to extend the right to vote to convicted felons whose civil rights have not been restored. Felony convictions, unlike the applications of the poll tax, is linked to the individual choices and conscious behavior of the particular person. Felon disenfranchisement ādoes not deny any citizen, ab initio, the equal opportunity to participate in the political process and elect candidates of their choice.ā The cause of disenfranchisement is simply that the felonās āconscious decision to commit a criminal act for which they assume the risks of detection and punishment.āā[48] |
Historical Timeline
1100 BC-1799
1100 BC ā 16th century ā āCivil deathā used as punishment for crime in ancient Athens, Ancient Rome, and medieval Europe
Jeff Manza and Christopher Uggen, authors of Locked Out: Felon Disenfranchisement and American Democracy (2006), explain:
In Athens and other Greek city-states [approximately 1100 BC - 400 BC], the status of atimia [literally without honor, a form of disenfranchisement] was imposed upon criminal offenders. This status carried the loss of many citizenship rights, including the right to participate in the polis (polity). Of course, only elites had those rights to begin with, so disenfranchisement [losing the ability to vote] was a penalty imposed on deviant elites. In ancient Rome, the related punishment of infamia [loss of public rights] could be imposed on criminal offenders. In this case, the principle penalties were loss of suffrage and the right to serve in the Roman legions (a desired opportunity)... In medieval [a historical period ending in the 16th Century] Europe, the legal doctrines of ācivil deathā and āoutlawryā carried forward similar notions. As with atimia, those punished with civil death generally suffered a complete loss of citizenship rights (in some early Germanic texts, outlaw status meant a āloss of peaceā that was comparable to becoming a wolf, since the outlaw had to ālive in the forestā). In extreme cases, civil death could be injurious or fatal, since outlaws could be killed by anyone with impunity, or have their property seized. In most medieval contexts, political rights held little substantive meaning. But the civil death model carried over into parts of modern criminal law. [118]
1607 ā 1776 ā Practice of ācivil deathā is carried over to the British colonies in America
Professor of feminist legal studies Debra Parkes, explains:
Criminal disenfranchisement has its roots in the punishment of ācivil death,ā imposed for criminal offences under Greek, Roman, Germanic and later Anglo-Saxon law. English law developed the related punishment of attainder which resulted in forfeiture of all property, inability to inherit or devise property, and loss of all civil rights. These principles were transplanted to the British colonies [the first British settlement was established at Jamestown, Virginia in 1607] which later became Canada and the United States [in 1776]. [119]
1789 - U.S. Constitution forges a link between voting in national elections and state suffrage rules
Alexander Keyssar, author of The Right to Vote (2000), says:
Under the Articles of Confederation [ratified in 1777], the states had retained complete control over the [voting] franchise. But the Constitution of the United States forged a link between state suffrage rules and the right to vote in national elections: those who participated in elections for the āmost numerous Branch of the state legislatureā... there was no formal debate about the possibility of a national standard more inclusive than the laws already prevailing in the states. Indeed, the records of the federal convention and state constitutional conventions suggest that most members of the new nationās political leadership did not favor a more democratic franchise... By making the franchise in national elections dependent on state suffrage laws, the authors of the Constitution compromised their substantive disagreements to solve a potentially explosive political problem... citizenship in the new nation - controlled by the federal government - was divorced from the right to vote. [120]
April 19, 1792 - Kentucky Constitution is first among U.S. states to establish criminal disenfranchisement
Kentuckyās state constitution is ratified. It states, "Laws shall be made to exclude from... suffrage those who thereafter be convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors."
July 9, 1793 - Vermont Constitution establishes criminal disenfranchisement
Vermontās state constitution is ratified. It gives authority to the state supreme court to disenfranchise those guilty of bribery, corruption, or other crimes.
1800-1849
January 22, 1812 - Louisiana Constitution establishes criminal disenfranchisement
Louisianaās state constitution is ratified. It states, "Laws shall be made to exclude from... suffrage those who shall thereafter be convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors." It also specifically bars from voting those convicted of being "engaged in a duel with deadly weapons against a citizen of Louisiana."
June 10, 1816 - Indiana Constitution establishes criminal disenfranchisement
Indianaās state constitution is ratified. It states, "The General Assembly shall have full power to exclude from the privilege of electing, or being elected, any person convicted of an infamous crime."
July 7, 1817 - Mississippi Constitution establishes criminal disenfranchisement
Mississippiās state constitution is ratified. It states, "Laws shall be made to exclude from... suffrage, those who shall thereafter be convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors."
October 12, 1818 - Connecticut Constitution establishes criminal disenfranchisement
Connecticutās state constitution is ratified. It bars from voting "those convicted of bribery, forgery, perjury, dueling, fraudulent bankruptcy, theft, or other offense for which an infamous punishment is inflicted."
July 5, 1819 - Alabama Constitution establishes criminal disenfranchisement
Alabamaās state constitution is ratified. It states, "Laws shall be made to exclude from... suffrage... those who shall hereafter be convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors."
June 12, 1820 - Missouri Constitution establishes criminal disenfranchisement
Missouriās state constitution is ratified. It states, "The General Assembly shall have power to exclude... from the right of suffrage, all persons convicted of bribery, perjury, or other infamous crime." The constitution also specifically bars those convicted of electoral bribery for ten years.
August 28, 1821 - New York Constitution establishes criminal disenfranchisement
New Yorkās state constitution is ratified. It states, "Laws may be passed by excluding from the right of suffrage persons... convicted of infamous crimes."
January 14, 1830 - Virginia Constitution establishes criminal disenfranchisement
Virginiaās state constitution is ratified. It specifically bars from voting those "convicted of an infamous crime."
November 8, 1831 - Delaware Constitution establishes criminal disenfranchisement
Delawareās state constitution is ratified. It states, "The legislature may impose the forfeiture of the right of suffrage as a punishment of crime." The constitution also specifically bars from voting those convicted of a felony.
May 1834 - Tennessee Constitution establishes criminal disenfranchisement
Tennesseeās state constitution is ratified. It states, "Laws may be passed excluding from the right of suffrage persons who may be convicted of infamous crimes."
December 3, 1838 - Florida Constitution establishes criminal disenfranchisement
Floridaās state constitution is ratified. It states, "Laws shall be made by the General Assembly to exclude from... suffrage those who shall have been, or may thereafter be, convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery, or other high crime or misdemeanor." It also states that "the General Assembly shall have power to exclude from... the right of suffrage, all persons convicted of bribery, perjury, or other infamous crimes." The constitution came into effect in 1845 when Florida became a U.S. state.
November 29, 1802 - Ohio Constitution establishes criminal disenfranchisement
Ohioās state constitution is ratified. It states, "The legislature shall have full power to exclude from the privilege of voting... any person convicted of bribery, perjury, or otherwise infamous crime."
November 5, 1842 - Rhode Island Constitution establishes criminal disenfranchisement
Rhode Islandās state constitution is ratified. It specifically bars from voting those "convicted of bribery or of any crime deemed infamous at common law, until expressly restored to the right of suffrage by an act of General Assembly."
June 29, 1844 - New Jersey Constitution establishes criminal disenfranchisement
New Jerseyās state constitution is ratified. It specifically bars from voting those "convicted of felonies unless pardoned or restored by law to the right of suffrage." It also states "The legislature may pass laws to deprive persons of the right of suffrage who shall be convicted of bribery."
November 5, 1845 - Louisiana Constitution ratified to bar anyone sentenced to hard labor from voting
Louisianaās state constitution specifically bars from voting those "under interdiction" or "under conviction of any crime punishable with hard labor."
August 27, 1845 - Texas Constitution establishes criminal disenfranchisement
Texasā state constitution is ratified. It states, "Laws shall be made to exclude... from the right of suffrage those who shall hereafter be convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery, or other high crimes."
August 3, 1846 - Iowa Constitution establishes criminal disenfranchisement
Iowaās state constitution is ratified. It bars from voting those "convicted of any infamous crime."
November 3, 1846 - New York Constitution ratified to bar persons convicted of āinfamousā crimes from voting
New Yorkās new state constitution is ratified. It states, "Laws may be passed excluding from the right of suffrage all persons who have been or may be convicted of bribery, larceny, or of any other infamous crime.... and for wagering on elections."
February 1, 1848 - Wisconsin Constitution establishes criminal disenfranchisement
Wisconsinās state constitution is ratified. It states, "Laws may be passed excluding from the right of suffrage all persons... convicted of bribery, or larceny, or any infamous crime... and for betting on elections."
November 1849 - California Constitution establishes criminal disenfranchisement
Californiaās state constitution is ratified. It states, "Laws shall be made to exclude from... the right of suffrage those who shall hereafter be convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery, or other high crimes." The constitution also specifically bars from voting "those convicted of any infamous crime." The constitution came into effect with statehood in 1850.
1850-1949
June 4, 1851 - Maryland Constitution establishes criminal disenfranchisement
Marylandās state constitution is ratified. It bars from voting persons "convicted of larceny or other infamous crime" unless pardoned by the executive; also persons convicted of bribery at elections are "forever disqualified from voting."
August 29, 1857 - Minnesota Constitution establishes criminal disenfranchisement
Minnesotaās state constitution is ratified. It specifically bars from voting those "convicted of treason or felony until restored to civil rights." This came into effect with statehood in 1858.
November 1857 - Oregon Constitution establishes criminal disenfranchisement
Oregonās state constitution is ratified. It specifically bars from voting those "convicted of crimes punishable by imprisonment." This constitution came into effect with statehood in 1859.
February 3, 1870 - 15th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution gives the vote to formerly enslaved people and prohibits racially based disenfranchisement
The U.S. Constitutionās 15th Amendment is ratified on February 3, 1870. It stipulates:
"Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
1882 - U.S. Congress passes the Edmunds Act, banning polygamists from voting
Rebekah Cummings and Jeff Turner, of the University of Utah J. Willard Marriott Library, explain:
The Edmunds Act of 1882 made polygamy a felony and took away the right to vote, hold office, or serve on a jury from anyone engaged in a polygamous relationship. [121]
1901 - New Alabama Constitution expands criminal disenfranchisement in effort to maintain white supremacy
Elizabeth A. Hull, author of The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons (2006), says:
Between 1890 and 1910 many states adopted new laws or reconfigured preexisting laws to handicap newly enfranchised black citizens whose rights had been expanded by both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments ā¦
The purpose of these various measures, as the President of Alabamaās all-white 1901 constitutional convention explained, was āwithin the limits imposed by the Federal Constitution to establish white supremacy. [122]
The 1901 Alabama Constitution states:,
The following persons shall be disqualified both from registering, and from voting, namely:
All idiots and insane persons; those who shall by reason of conviction of crime be disqualified from voting at the time of the ratification of this Constitution; those who shall be convicted of treason, murder, arson, embezzlement, malfeasance in office, larceny, receiving stolen property, obtaining property or money under false pretenses, perjury, subornation of perjury, robbery, assault with intent to rob, burglary, forgery, bribery, assault and battery on the wife, bigamy, living in adultery, sodomy, incest, rape, miscegenation, crime against nature, or any crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, or of any infamous crime or crime involving moral turpitude; also, any person who shall be convicted as a vagrant or tramp, or of selling or offering to sell his vote or the vote of another, or of buying or offering to buy the vote of another, or of making or offering to make a false return in any election by the people or in any primary election to procure the nomination or election of any person to any office, or of suborning any witness or registrar to secure the registration of any person as an elector.
1950-1999
September 9, 1957 - Pres. Eisenhower signs the Civil Rights Act of 1957
The Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Museum, and Boyhood Home explains:
In 1957, President Eisenhower sent Congress a proposal for civil rights legislation. The result was the Civil Rights Act of 1957, the first civil rights legislation since Reconstruction. The new act established the Civil Rights Section of the Justice Department and empowered federal prosecutors to obtain court injunctions against interference with the right to vote. It also established a federal Civil Rights Commission with authority to investigate discriminatory conditions and recommend corrective measures. The final act was weakened by Congress due to lack of support among the Democrats. [123]
August 6, 1965 - Pres. Johnson signs the Voting Rights Act
The Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice explains:
President Johnson signed... [Voting Rights Act] into law on August 6, 1965. Section 2 of the Act, which closely followed the language of the 15th amendment, applied a nationwide prohibition against the denial or abridgment of the right to vote on the literacy tests on a nationwide basis. Among its other provisions, the Act contained special enforcement provisions targeted at those areas of the country where Congress believed the potential for discrimination to be the greatest. Under Section 5, jurisdictions covered by these special provisions could not implement any change affecting voting until the Attorney General or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia determined that the change did not have a discriminatory purpose and would not have a discriminatory effect. In addition, the Attorney General could designate a county covered by these special provisions for the appointment of a federal examiner to review the qualifications of persons who wanted to register to vote. Further, in those counties where a federal examiner was serving, the Attorney General could request that federal observers monitor activities within the countyās polling place. [124]
March 24, 1966 - U.S. Supreme Court rules states cannot require payment of fees as a condition to vote
In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, Harper and co-defendants filed suit against the state of Virginia, alleging it was a violation of the U.S. Constitution for the state to require payment of state-imposed voting taxes (aka āpoll tax,ā designated to pay for āservicesā) prior to voting.
The District court dismissed the case. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed in favor of Harper et al., noting that voter qualifications have nothing to do with wealth or paying taxes or fees.
The U.S. Supreme Courtās ruling that āthe Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment restrains the States from fixing voter qualifications which invidiously discriminateā has been cited as meaning that if a felon disenfranchisement law āinvidiously discriminates,ā it should be ruled unconstitutional. The court ruled:
Held: A Stateās conditioning of the right to vote on the payment of a fee or tax violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment⦠While the right to vote in federal elections is conferred by Art. 1, 2, of the Constitution, the right to vote in state elections is nowhere expressly mentioned⦠For it is enough to say that once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ā¦
We conclude that a State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard.
Voter qualifications have no relation to wealth nor to paying or not paying this or any other tax. Our cases demonstrate that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment restrains the States from fixing voter qualifications which invidiously discriminate ⦠[W]e must remember that the interest of the State, when it comes to voting, is limited to the power to fix qualifications. [125]
May 24, 1966 - California Supreme Court in Otsuka v. Hite defines āinfamous crimesā
The California Supreme Court rules in Otsuka v. Hite that the phrase āinfamous crimesā in the state constitution should only disenfranchise those ādeemed to constitute a threat to the integrity of the elective process.ā
Katsuki James Otsuka, et al., filed a Class Action suit against the California Registrar of Voters, Benjamin S. Hite, etc., for refusing to register them to vote due to their prior convictions as conscientious objectors. The refusal to register the plaintiffs to vote was based on Californiaās constitution barring voters convicted of āinfamous crimes.ā
The California Superior Court ruled that Otsuka et al. should be permitted to register to vote, and that Californiaās list of āinfamous crimesā was too broad, and should be narrowed to āmoral corruption and dishonesty.ā As a result of this case all California counties attempted to bar from voting those convicted of āmoral corruption and dishonesty.ā The court ruled:
After reviewing the history and purpose of this ground of voter disqualifications we have concluded that to preserve its constitutionality it must be limited to conviction of crimes involving moral corruption and dishonesty, thereby branding their perpetrator a threat to the integrity of the elective process. Plaintiffsā crime was not āinfamousā as thus construed, and hence the judgment is reversed...
In ruling on the validity of state-imposed restrictions on this fundamental right the United States Supreme Court has in effect tended to apply the principle that the state must show it has a compelling interest in abridging the right, and that in any event such restrictions must be drawn with narrow specificity.
Viewed in this light, serious constitutional difficulties appear when the disfranchising provision of article II, section 1, is applied to these plaintiffs. [126]
June 13, 1967 - New York Supreme Court rules that criminal disenfranchisement is reasonable and constitutional in Green v. Board of Elections
The New York Supreme Court ruled in Green v. Board of Elections that criminal disenfranchisement statutes are constitutional, arguing that
a man who breaks the laws he has authorized his agent to make for his own governance could fairly have been thought to have abandoned the right to participate in further administering the compact... It can scarcely be deemed unreasonable for a state to decide that perpetrators of serious crimes shall not take part in electing the legislators who make the laws.
Gilbert Green, who had a felony conviction of conspiracy āto organize the Communist Party as a group to teach and advocate the overthrow and destruction of the government by force and violence,ā filed suit in New York Supreme Court challenging his disenfranchisement. The New York Supreme Court ruled in Green v. Board of Elections that there is nothing unreasonable or unconstitutional about criminal disenfranchisement statutes.
Green was challenging the New York law that stated that no person
convicted of a felony in a federal court of an offense of which such court has exclusive jurisdiction, shall have the right to register for or vote at any election unless he shall have been pardoned or restored to the rights of citizenship by the president of the United States.
The court ruled:
While this is ample to demonstrate to us the obvious lack of merit in Greenās contentions we have yet to mention the point on which New York most heavily relies ā the provision in § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment reducing the basis of representation of a state in the House of Representatives āwhen the right to vote at any election is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion or other crime.ā The framers of the Amendment, says the Attorney General, could hardly have intended the general language of § 1 to outlaw a discrimination which § 2 expressly allowed without the penalty of reduced representation. The argument is convincing. We see nothing in the language or in history to support plaintiffās suggestion that āother crimesā meant only a crime connected with the rebellion. The Courtās rejection of Mr. Justice Harlanās position that § 2 is the only portion of the Fourteenth Amendment dealing with voting rightsā¦in no way indicates it would deny that § 1 of the Amendment cannot be fairly read to prohibit a discrimination which § 2 expressly permits ā especially in the light of the Justicesā frequent and consistent statements approving voting disqualification for felony. [127]
November 16, 1972 - Federal appeals court argues that āconstitutional conceptsā should evolve along with modern concepts of justice and punishment
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Dillenburg v. Kramer that "courts have been hard pressed to define state interest served by laws disenfranchising persons convicted of crimes."
The ruling overturned a lower court decision denying the appellant, Byrle L. Dillenburg, a chance to have a three judge panel in U.S. district court decide whether or not Washingtonās criminal disenfranchisement law was unconstitutional.
This case examined a challenge to Washingtonās felon disenfranchisement laws on the grounds that they violated the U.S. Constitutionās Equal Protection Clause. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals questioned the stateās interest in disenfranchising felons, but it also noted that other courts have previously recognized the general pronouncement that a state has an interest in preventing persons who have been convicted of serious crimes from voting. The Court noted that the state interest served by disenfranchisement has never been adequately explained.
The U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that āconstitutional conceptsā can change over time, and laws disenfranchising felons should evolve along with societyās modern concepts of justice and punishment.
The search for modern reasons to sustain the old governmental disenfranchisement prerogative has usually ended with a general pronouncement that the state has an interest in preventing persons who have been convicted of serious crimes from participating in the electoral process ⦠a quasi-metaphysical invocation that the interest is preservation of the āpurity of the ballot box.ā
⦠Few decisions have penetrated the disenfranchisement classification to ascertain whether the offenses that restrict or destroy voting rights have anything to do with the integrity of the electoral process or whether there is any valid distinction between the class of offenses that disenfranchise and the class of offenses that do not ā¦
constitutional concepts of equal protection are not immutably frozen like insects trapped in Devonian amber. [128]
June 24, 1974 - U.S. Supreme Court rules that disenfranchising people with felony convictions does not violate the Equal Protection Clause
The U.S. Supreme Court rules in a 6-3 decision in Richardson v. Ramirez that "California, in disenfranchising convicted felons who have completed their sentences and paroles, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause...
Although the Court has never given plenary consideration to the precise question of whether a State may constitutionally exclude some or all convicted felons from the franchise, we have indicated approval of such exclusions on a number of occasions... recently we have strongly suggested in dicta that exclusion of convicted felons from the franchise violates no constitutional provision...
But it is not for us to choose one set of values over the other. If respondents are correct, and the view which they advocate is indeed the more enlightened one, presumably the people of the State of California will ultimately come around to the view. And if they do not do so, their failure is some evidence, at least, of the fact that there are two sides to the argument."
Ramirez, Lee, and Gill were denied the ability to register to vote in three California counties after completing their felony sentences. They filed suit against the California Secretary of State and other election officials, including Viola Richardson, County Clerk of Mendocino County. California election officials relented and registered Ramirez et al. to vote. However, the case had been certified as a class action lawsuit that would effect all felons in California and was therefore permitted to continue through the courts.
The California Supreme Court ruled that the stateās felon disenfranchisement law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that Californiaās felon disenfranchisement law was constitutionally permissible.
Even though the U.S. Supreme Court found Californiaās felon disenfranchisement clause to be constitutional, the California state legislature amended its constitution on November 5, 1974 to limit disenfranchisement to those people convicted of crimes when āimprisoned or on parole for the conviction of a felony.ā The court ruled:
Pressed upon us by the respondents, and by amici curiae, are contentions that these notions are outmoded, and that the more modern view is that it is essential to the process of rehabilitating the ex-felon that he be returned to his role in society as a fully participating citizen when he has completed the serving of his term. We would by no means discount these arguments if addressed to the legislative forum which may properly weigh and balance them against those advanced in support of Californiaās present constitutional provisions. But it is not for us to choose one set of values over the other. If respondents are correct, and the view which they advocate is indeed the more enlightened and sensible one, presumably the people of the State of California will ultimately come around to that view. And if they do not do so, their failure is some evidence, at least, of the fact that there are two sides to the argument ā¦
It is argued that disenfranchisement is necessary to prevent vote frauds. Although the State has a legitimate and, in fact, compelling interest in preventing election fraud, the challenged provision is not sustainable on that ground. First, the disenfranchisement provisions are patently both overinclusive and underinclusive. The provision is not limited to those who have demonstrated a marked propensity for abusing the ballot by violating election laws. Rather, it encompasses all former felons and there has been no showing that ex-felons generally are any more likely to abuse the ballot than the remainder of the population. [129]
November 5, 1974 - California amends constitution to allow people with felony convictions to vote after completion of incarceration and parole
According to professor of sociology and criminology Michael C. Campbell:
In November of 1974, California voters passed Proposition 10, which effectively restored voting rights to former felons. California thus joined a growing number of states that removed permanent voting restrictions for people convicted of felonies, āinfamousā crimes and a variety of lesser offenses. While this measure received little fanfare in the media, its impact was substantial due to Californiaās dramatic increase in incarceration rates beginning in the 1970s. Over the next 30 years, this change restored voting rights for hundreds of thousands of citizens who otherwise would have been disenfranchised.
The constitution restricts felons from voting āwhile ⦠imprisoned or on parole for the conviction of a felony.ā [130]
April 22, 1980 - U.S. Supreme Court rules that purposeful racial discrimination must be evident for a disenfranchisement law to be unconstitutional
The U.S. Supreme Court rules in a 6-3 decision in City of Mobile, Alabama v. Bolden that only actions undertaken with "racially discriminatory motivation" were unconstitutional or illegal under the Voting Rights Act.
The Supreme Court ruling states that there must be āpurposeful discriminationā for a voting disenfranchisement law to be found unconstitutional. Racial discrimination alone is irrelevant unless it can be shown that the intent was to racially discriminate.
This case set one of the benchmarks for future cases challenging laws that disenfranchise people with felony convictions based upon racial intent.
Bolden et al. filed a class action lawsuit in Federal District Court, alleging that āthe practice of electing the City Commissioners at large unfairly diluted the voting strength of Negroes in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendmentsā of the U.S. Constitution. The District Court and the Court of Appeals (5th District) agreed with Bolden. The case was overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court, which ruled that there must be āpurposeful discriminationā for a voting disenfranchisement law to be found unconstitutional. Racial discrimination alone is irrelevant unless it can be shown that the intent was to racially discriminate.
This case set one of the benchmarks for future cases challenging felon disenfranchisement laws based upon racial intent. The court ruled:
Only if there is purposeful discrimination can there be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. And this principle applies to claims of racial discrimination affecting voting just as it does to other claims of racial discrimination ā¦
Disproportionate effects alone are insufficient to establish a claim of unconstitutional racial vote dilution. Where the character of a law is readily explainable on grounds apart from race ⦠disproportionate impact alone cannot be decisive, and courts must look to other evidence to support a finding of discriminatory purpose. [131]
April 16, 1985 - U.S. Supreme Court rules that criminal disenfranchisement is legal if there is no racially discriminatory intent
The U.S. Supreme Court rules in an 8-0 decision in Hunter v. Underwood that states have the right to disenfranchise criminals but ānot with a racially discriminatory intent.ā
Victor Underwood, described in court documents as āa white,ā and Carmen Edwards, āa black,ā had been blocked from voting in Alabama because they each had been convicted of āpresenting a worthless check ⦠a crime involving moral turpitude.ā They filed a class action lawsuit, claiming the disenfranchisement was intended to discriminate against Black people. The District Court ruled against them. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, saying the provision āwould not have been adopted in the absence of the racially discriminatory motivation.ā The U.S. Supreme Court agreed, finding that the disenfranchisement provision āviolated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.ā
The U.S. Supreme Courtās ruling in this case struck down the provision of the Alabama Constitution that mandated voting disenfranchisement for people who committed ācrimes of moral turpitude.ā Whether a law was passed with a racially biased intent became a litmus test for whether a disenfranchisement law is constitutional. The court ruled:
Held: Section 182 [of the Alabama constitution of 1901] violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendments... That 182 may have been adopted to discriminate against poor whites as well as against blacks would not render nugatory [worthless, futile] the purpose to discriminate against blacks ā¦
The drafters [of Section 182] retained the general felony provision ā āany crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiaryā ā but also added a new catchall provision covering āany... crime involving moral turpitude.ā ...It is alleged, and the Court of Appeals found, that the crimes selected for inclusion in 182 were believed by the delegates to be more frequently committed by blacks. [132]
2000-2019
November 7, 2000 - Massachusetts Voters Ban Incarcerated People with Felony Convictions from VotingMassachusetts voters ban incarcerated people with felony convictions from voting
According to attorney and executive director of the Prison Policy Initiative Peter Wagner:
On November 7, 2000, by a 2 to 1 margin, Massachusetts disenfranchised its prisoners with a constitutional amendment called Question 2. Question 2 marked the first time that the Massachusetts constitution has been amended to take away rights from a group of people. [133]
March 15, 2001 - New Mexico repeals lifetime ban on disenfranchisement of people with felony convictions
According to attorney Steven Kalogeras
In March 2001, the New Mexico legislature adopted Senate Bill 204, repealing the stateās lifetime ban on ex-felon voting. Prior to the billās passage, anyone convicted of a felony faced permanent disenfranchisement. According to the new law, persons convicted of a felony who have completed their prison terms, as well as any offenders completing probation or parole, are automatically eligible to register. There is no application process required to restore voting rights. It is estimated that over 50,000 New Mexicans were barred from voting at the time of the lawās enactment. [134]
February 14, 2002 - U.S. Senate votes down amendment granting people with felony convictions the right to vote in federal elections
According to authors Jeff Manza and Christopher Uggen
2002 U.S. Senate vote on an amendment to the federal voting reform legislation [Equal protection of Voting Rights Act of 2001] that proposed to restore voting rights to ex-felons in federal elections. Senators from the 11 former confederate states voted 18 to 4 against enfranchisement (the measure went down by a 63-31 floor vote), and the most passionate speeches against it were made by southerners. [118]
September 25, 2003 - Alabama passes bill allowing most people with felony convictions to register to vote
According to the ACLU
In 2003, [Alabama] Gov. Riley signed into law a bill [Section 15-22-36.1] that permits most people with felony convictions [in the state of Alabama] to apply for a certificate of eligibility to register to vote after completing their sentence. [135]
July 1, 2003 - Nevada passes bill to automatically restore voting rights to people with felony convictions
According to journalist Riley Snyder:
Prior to 2003, all felony convictions in the state resulted in permanent disenfranchisement ā prohibiting them from serving on juries or voting ā unless individuals petitioned the Department of Public Safety or were granted a pardon. But that process was rarely used; the Campaign Legal Center estimated that only 281 people used the court petition process to restore their voting rights between 1990 and 2011, an average of 13 per year.
In 2003, lawmakers approved a bill allowing for the automatic restoration of voting rights for most people convicted of a felony, but carved out several exemptions including whether the person had been honorably discharged from parole or probation, whether the person had committed a category A felony or certain types of category B felonies, in case where the person had a prior felony conviction, and whether the felony conviction was in another state or federal court. [136]
March 2005 - Nebraska repeals lifetime ban of disenfranchisement of people with felony convictions
Student Angela Ching, writing for Nebraska Appleseed, explains:
In 2005, the Nebraska Legislature voted to override the veto of then-Gov. Dave Heineman and passed a bill (LB 53) that automatically restored voting rights to former felons two years after they completed their entire sentence ā including probation or parole. [137]
June 17, 2005 - Iowa restores vote to all people with felony convictions who have completed their sentences
Journalist Kate Zernike says:
Gov. Tom Vilsack of Iowa announced yesterday [June 17, 2005] that he would restore voting rights for all felons who have completed their sentences, ending what advocates for voting rights had called one of the most restrictive disenfranchisement laws in the country. [138]
July 7, 2006 - Washington District Court rules in Farrakhan v. Gregoire that stateās criminal disenfranchisement laws do not violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
The Brennan Center for Justice explains:
On July 7, 2006, the Eastern District of Washington found Washingtonās felony disenfranchisement provision did not violate the VRA. Although the court concluded that it āhas no doubt that members of racial minorities have experienced discrimination in Washingtonās criminal justice system,ā it held that āWashingtonās history, or lack thereof, of racial bias in its electoral process and in its decision to enact the felon disenfranchisement provisions, counterbalance the contemporary discriminatory effects that result from the day-to-day functioning of Washingtonās criminal justice system.ā [139]
April 5, 2007 - Florida Gov. Charlie Crist institutes automatic vote restoration to people with felony convictions who have completed their full sentences
As explained in the Florida Senate āInterim Project Report 2008-114ā:
In April 2007, the Governor and Cabinet changed the Rules of Executive Clemency to make more convicted felons who have completed their sentences eligible for restoration of civil rights. In the eight months since the change, almost twice as many felons have had their rights restored as in any previous year. Many offenses for which restoration of rights was either excluded or delayed for a period of years are now eligible for restoration after verification that all qualifying conditions have been met. [140]
April 26, 2007 - Maryland institutes automatic vote restoration for all people with felony convictions upon completion of sentence
According to the ACLU:
In 2007, the [Maryland] Legislature repealed all provisions of the stateās lifetime voting ban, including the three-year waiting period after completion of sentence for certain categories of offenses, and instituted an automatic restoration policy for all persons upon completion of sentence. [135]
July 26, 2007 - Washington Supreme Court reinstates fine payment as part of re-enfranchisement qualifications
On July 26, 2007, the Washington State Supreme Court, in Madison v. Washington, reversed an April 21 2006, King County superior Court order giving āall felons who have satisfied the terms of their sentences except for paying legal financial obligations, and who, due to their financial status, are unable to pay their legal financial obligations immediately,ā the right to vote.
The Washington State Supreme Court ruled that persons convicted of a felony in the state of Washington who were convicted after July 1, 1984 have their ability to vote restored once all probation/parole is completed and all fines are paid.
Those convicted prior to July 1, 1984 must petition the sentencing review board to have their ability to vote restored.
Daniel Madison, Beverly Dubois, and Dannielle Garner, who all have felony convictions, filed suit against the state of Washington, challenging the constitutionality of Washingtonās disenfranchisement law, claiming it denies the right to vote to convicted felons who have not completed all the terms of their sentences, including full payment of their legal financial obligations (LFOs).
All convicted felons in this case had completed all of their sentences except for the payment of LFOs. They had payment plans established, which were current and still owed (approximately, with interest) as follows:
Maddison: Monthly Payment: $15; Total Due: $242.25
DuBois: Monthly Payment: $10; Total Due: $1,805.69
Garner: Monthly Payment: $10; Total Due: $360.00
Madison et al. felt that Washingtonās requirement that all LFOs must be paid in full prior to their sentence being considered ācompleteā was biased against the poor. Washingtonās Supreme Court disagreed, opining that as long as all felons were treated in the same way the law could not be considered biased.
The court ruled:
We hold that Washingtonās disenfranchisement scheme does not violate the privileges and immunities clause of the Washington Constitution or the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.
The privileges and immunities clause does reflect, in part, our framersā concerns with āundue political influence exercised by those with large concentrations of wealthā and āavoiding favoritism toward the wealthy.ā However, such concerns are not triggered by Washingtonās felon disenfranchisement scheme because it grants the āprivilegeā of restoration of voting rights āupon the same terms... equally... to all citizens.ā
The Washington Constitution grants the right to vote to all Washington citizens on equal terms. Additionally, the Washington Constitution disqualifies voters on equal terms ā that is, when individuals have been convicted of committing a felony. ⦠The system of only restoring voting rights to felons who have satisfied all of the terms of their sentences, including fully paying their LFOs, does not constitute a grant of favoritism or a granting of a privilege on unequal terms ⦠because the same standard is applied evenly to all felons seeking restoration of their voting rights. [141]
December 2007 - Barack Obama supports re-enfranchisement of people who have completed felony sentences
Presidential candidate Barack Obama made a statement supporting the re-enfranchisement of people who have completed felony sentences in a December 7, 2007 questionnaire for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP): āI support restoration of voting rights for ex-offenders. I am a cosponsor of the Count Every Vote Act, and would sign that legislation into law as president.ā [142]
October 27, 2008 - U.S. Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK) convicted of felony and loses ability to vote
On October 27, 2008 Senator Stevens was convicted on 7 of 7 felony charges. Journalist Shayana Kadidal explains,
The New York Times reports, correctly, that Sen. Stevens can run for reelection despite his convicted felon statusā¦
Ironically, though, it looks like Stevens may not be able to vote for himself. Felons whose crimes involve āmoral turpitudeā (defined by state law to include bribery, Alaska Stat. 15.60.010(9)) cannot vote in Alaska, at least until their civil rights are restored, which only happens when āa person is released from all disability arising under a conviction and sentence, including probation and parole.ā (The statute is at this citation: Alaska Stat. 15.60.010(39).) Deregistration from the voting rolls is automatic upon conviction.
Stevens was convicted of violating ethics disclosure rules. Technically the indictment charged violation of the federal criminal statute 18 U.S.C. 1001, which makes it a crime to knowingly fill out a federal form falsely. I guess the question now is whether that offense fits within the definition of a āfelony involving moral turpitudeā under Alaska law. [143]
January 5, 2010 - 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals rules that Washingtonās disenfranchisement law violates the Voting Rights Act
A three judge panel of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled 2-1 in Farrakhan v. Gregoire that Washingtonās law disenfranchising people with felony convictions violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and that plaintiffs ādemonstrated that the discriminatory impact of Washingtonās felon disenfranchisement is attributable to racial discrimination.ā According to a press release from Washington Secretary of State Sam Reed, the ruling will allow āinmates currently behind bars to vote in Washington.ā
Editorsā Note: In an interview with ProCon.org on January 6, 2010, Sam Reedās office stated that they were expecting the Attorney General to appeal this decision (the office announced later that day that the case will be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court). The office also stated that until guidance is received from the Washington Attorney Generalās Office as to how this ruling should be implemented, the status quo remains in place; incarcerated felons will not be allowed to vote. [144] [145]
October 7, 2010 - Washingtonās law disenfranchising people with felony convictions upheld in en banc Reversal of 9th U.S. 9th Circuit Court Decision
On October 7, 2010, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, in a full 11 judge bench hearing of Farrakhan v. Gregoire, reversed the courtās 2-1 panel decision from January 5, 2010, and ruled 11-0 that Washingtonās law disenfranchising of people with felony convictions did not violate the Voting Rights Act.
The courtās majority opinion states:
Because plaintiffs presented no evidence of intentional discrimination in the operation of Washingtonās criminal justice system and argue no other theory under which a section 2 challenge might be sustained, we conclude that they didnāt meet their burden of showing a violation of the VRA. Accordingly, the district court didnāt err when it granted summary judgment against them. [144] [146]
October 18, 2010 - U.S. Supreme Court declines taking up Massachusetts voting case Simmons v. Galvin
On October 18, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court published its denial of a writ of certiorari filed February 1, 2010 in the case of Simmons v. Galvin thus refusing to hear the case. The petitioners claimed that a Massachusetts law banning people with felony convictions from voting while incarcerated was racially discriminatory and in violation of the Voting Rights Act. [147] [148]
January 14, 2011 - Iowa rescinds automatic voting restoration for people with felony convictions who have completed their sentences
On January 14, 2011, the Republican Gov. of Iowa, Terry Branstad, issued executive order 70, rescinding a law allowing people convicted of a felony to automatically have their ability to vote restored after completing their sentences. The automatic voting restoration law had been instituted by former Democratic Gov. Tom Vilsackās signing of executive order 42 in 2005. People with felony convictions in Iowa must now pay all outstanding monetary obligations to the court in addition to completing their sentence and period of parole or probation. People convicted of a felony may then apply for restoration of the ability to vote. [149]
March 9, 2011 - Florida rescinds automatic voting restoration for people with felony convictions who have completed their sentences
On March 9, 2011 the Florida rules of Executive Clemency were toughened. Automatic restoration of civil rights and the ability to vote will no longer be granted for any offenses. All individuals convicted of any felony will now have to apply for executive clemency after a five year waiting period. Individuals who are convicted, or who have previously been convicted, of certain felonies such as murder, assault, child abuse, drug trafficking, arson, etc. are subject to a seven year waiting period and a clemency board hearing to determine whether or not the ability to vote will be restored.
Prior to the March 9, 2011 rule change some individuals convicted of nonviolent felonies were re-enfranchised automatically by the Clemency Board upon completion of their full sentence, including payment of fines and fees. [150]
March 19, 2012 - South Dakota enacts HB 1247, removing the right to vote from people with felony convictions until completion of probation
On March 19, 2012, HB 1247 was enacted. The bill took the ability to vote away from people with felony convictions serving terms of probation. Previously, only persons on parole or incarcerated were ineligible to register to vote. Now people with felony convictions must serve their full term of incarceration, parole, and probation before they may register to vote. [151]
April 16, 2013 - Delaware Senate passes the Hazel D. Plant Voter Restoration Act
On April 16, 2013 the Delaware Senate passed the Hazel D. Plant Voter Restoration Act in a 15-6 vote. The act amended the Delaware Constitution by removing the five year waiting period for most people with felony convictions to regain the ability to vote. Persons convicted of a felony (with some exceptions) are now automatically eligible to vote after serving their full sentence including incarceration, parole, and probation. [55]
May 29, 2013 - Virginia implements automatic vote restoration to all people with nonviolent felony convictions who have completed their full sentences
On May 29, 2013, Gov. Bob McDonnell announced that he will automatically restore the ability to vote to all people with nonviolent felony convictions who meet the following conditions: 1) have completed their term of incarceration and all probation or parole; 2) have paid all court costs, fines, and any restitution; and 3) have no pending felony charges. Previously, individuals convicted of most nonviolent felonies had to wait two years to apply for a gubernatorial restoration of voting ability after completion of their sentence and the payment of any fines and restitution. Persons convicted of violent felonies, drug sales or manufacturing, crimes against minors, and election law offenses must wait five years to apply for a gubernatorial restoration of rights. [153]
February 11, 2014 - Attorney General Eric Holder calls for restoration of the vote to people convicted of a felony
In a speech on criminal justice reform at Georgetown University Law Center on February 11, 2014, Attorney General Eric Holder called for the restoration of the vote to people convicted of a felony. According to journalist Matt Apuzzo:
The call was mostly symbolic ā Mr. Holder has no authority to enact these changes himself ā but it marked the attorney generalās latest effort to eliminate laws that he says disproportionately keep minorities from the polls
Attorney General Holder says,
Across this country today, an estimated 5.8 million Americans ā 5.8 million of our fellow citizens ā are prohibited from voting because of current or previous felony convictions. Thatās more than the individual populations of 31 U.S. states. And although well over a century has passed since post-Reconstruction states used these measures to strip African Americans of their most fundamental rights, the impact of felony disenfranchisement on modern communities of color remains both disproportionate and unacceptable... It is unwise, it is unjust, and it is not in keeping with our democratic values. These laws deserve to be not only reconsidered, but repealed. And so today, I call upon state leaders and other elected officials across the country to pass clear and consistent reforms to restore the voting rights of all who have served their terms in prison or jail, completed their parole or probation, and paid their fines. [154] [155]
November 24, 2015 - Voting rights restored to people with nonviolent felony convictions in Kentucky
Journalist Erik Eckholm explains,
Weeks before he leaves office, the governor of Kentucky [Steven L. Beshear] on Tuesday [November 24, 2015] issued an executive order that immediately granted the right to vote to about 140,000 nonviolent felons who have completed their sentences ā¦
Kentucky had been one of just three states imposing a lifetime voting ban on felons unless they received a special exemption from the governor. Florida and Iowa still carry the lifetime ban ā¦
As an executive order, the new policy can be altered or scrapped by a future governor. But the initial response from the governor-elect, Matt Bevin, a conservative Republican, was positive ā¦
Mr. Beshearās order excludes those with new pending charges and those convicted of violent crimes, sex crimes, bribery or treason. [156]
December 22, 2015 - Kentucky governor reverses predecessorās executive order that allowed people with nonviolent felony convictions to vote
Journalist David Weigel explains:
Kentuckyās new Republican governor has rescinded an executive order that restored voting rights to as many as 140,000 non-violent felons ā¦
āWhile I have been a vocal supporter of the restoration of rights,ā Gov. Matt Bevin (R-Ky.) said in announcing the order, āit is an issue that must be addressed through the legislature and by the will of the people.ā [157]
February 9, 2016 - Maryland Senate restores the vote to people with felony convictions immediately upon release from prison
The Brennan Center for Justice explains:
The Maryland General Assembly voted to override a veto today on a bill that will restore voting rights for approximately 40,000 citizens who live in their communities but cannot vote because of a criminal conviction in their past ā¦
Previous Maryland law withheld the right to vote from individuals until they fully completed every requirement of their sentence, including those beyond incarceration, like probation and parole supervision. SB 340/HB980, introduced by Sen. Joan Carter Conway (D-Baltimore) and Del. Cory McCray (D-Baltimore), simplifies the process by allowing an individual to become eligible to vote upon release from prison or if they were never incarcerated. [158]
April 22, 2016 - Virginia governor restores voting rights to all people with felony convictions
Journalists Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Erik Eckholm explain:
Gov. Terry McAuliffe of Virginia used his executive power on Friday to restore voting rights to more than 200,000 convicted felons, circumventing the Republican-run legislature. The action overturns a Civil War-era provision in the stateās Constitution aimed, he said, at disenfranchising African-Americans.
The sweeping order, in a swing state that could play a role in deciding the November presidential election, will enable all felons who have served their prison time and finished parole or probation to register to vote. Most are African-Americans, a core constituency of Democrats, Mr. McAuliffeās political party. [159]
July 22, 2016 - Virginia Supreme Court rules executive order restoring voting rights to 200,000 people who have completed felony sentences unconstitutional
The Associated Press explains:
Virginia Gov. Terry McAuliffeās sweeping executive order restoring the voting rights of more than 200,000 felons is unconstitutional, the stateās highest court ruled Friday, siding with Republican lawmakers who said the Democratic governor had overstepped his authority.
In a 4-3 decision, the Supreme Court of Virginia ordered the state to cancel the registrations of the more than 11,000 felons who had signed up to vote so far under the governorās April executive order and subsequent orders, which also allowed felons to run for public office, serve on a jury and become a notary public ā¦
Republicans argued that governors cannot restore rights en masse but must consider each former offenderās case individually. Their attorney, Charles Cooper, told the justices during oral arguments Tuesday that the fact that no other Virginia governor had taken such a sweeping action proves the power doesnāt exist.
McAuliffe responded to the ruling by saying:
I will expeditiously sign nearly 13,000 individual orders to restore the fundamental rights of the citizens who have had their rights restored and registered to vote," he said. "And I will continue to sign orders until I have completed restoration for all 200,000 Virginians. [160] [161]
September 28, 2016 - California governor restores voting to people with felony convictions serving time in county jails
Gov. Jerry Brown signed AB2466, which allows those serving low-level felony conviction sentences in county jails to vote. The bill also restores voting rights to people who have completed felony sentences on probation or under community supervision. The bill does not change the voting status of those serving felony convictions in state or federal prisons. [162]
July 1, 2017 - Wyoming makes voting rights restoration automatic
As of July 1, 2017, people convicted of nonviolent felonies who have completed all aspects of their sentences will have their right to vote automatically restored. Previously, people who have completed felony sentences had to submit an application to be re-enfranchised. [163]
April 18, 2018 - New York Governor gives conditional pardons to people with felony convictions who are on parole to restore vote
Gov. Andrew Cuomo signed an executive order that will give conditional pardons to people with felony convictions who are on parole. The pardons will restore voting rights to about 35,000 people with felony convictions. [164]
May 31, 2018 - People who have completed felony sentences in Louisiana to regain voting rights after five years
Gov. John Bel Edwards signed a law that will re-enfranchise people who have completed felony sentences who have been out of prison for five years but are on probation or parole. The law immediately impacts about 2,200 people, about 3 percent of over 70,000 people on probation or parole in Louisiana. [165]
November 7, 2018 - Florida restores the vote to up to 1.4 million people with prior felony convictions
The Brennan Center for Justice explains:
In November 2018, nearly 65 percent of FlorĀida voters approved AmendĀment 4, a constitutional amendment that autoĀmatĀicĀally restored voting rights to most Floridians with past convictions who had completed the terms of their sentence. [166]
May 30, 2019 - Nevada restores the vote to about 77,000 people who have completed felony sentences
The Associated Press says:
Nevadaās governor has signed criminal justice reform bills that restore voting rights to convicted felons and streamlines the process for sealing low-level marijuana convictions.
Democratic Gov. Steve Sisolak signed both the measures Wednesday [May 29, 2019] as the legislative session continues on in its final days.
The voting rights legislation gives felony offenders the right to vote after being released from prison, instead of granting certain felons the right to vote two years after being released.
Sisolak says some 77,000 state residents will have their voting rights restored due to the legislation. [167]
July 1, 2019 - Colorado parolees now eligible to vote
A new Colorado law went into effect on July 1, 2019 that restores the vote to people with felony convictions who are on parole. 11,467 parolees were eligible to register to vote when the law went into effect. [168]
December 12, 2019 - Kentucky governor restores vote to people with nonviolent felony convictions
Gov. Andy Beshear signed an executive order restoring voting rights to people with nonviolent felony convictions in the state. The order could allow up to 140,000 people with felony convictions to vote and reverses former Gov. Matt Bevinās December 15, 2015 reversal of former Gov. Steven L. Beshearās November 24, 2015 voting restoration. [169]
December 18, 2019 - New Jersey re-enfranchises people with felony convictions on parole or probation
New Jersey Gov. Phil Murphy signed a voting rights restoration law for people with felony convictions who are on parole or probation. The law is expected to affect more than 80,000 people. [170]
2020-present
January 16, 2020 - Florida Supreme Court rules people who have completed felony sentences will have to pay fines and fees before voting
"Floridaās Supreme Court ruled Thursday [January 16, 2020] that convicted felons must pay fines and other fees related to their sentences before voting, concluding a legal controversy that pitted the state government against civil voting rights advocacy groups.
The court decided in its ruling that āall terms of sentenceā includes not only terms of a personās imprisonment and supervision, but also fines and other obligations imposed as part of a punishment..
The amendment to the Florida constitution that allows 1.4 million convicted felons to vote following their release from incarceration was lauded by civil rights advocates after its passage in November, with the advocates noting that people of color had been disproportionately impacted by the ban.
However, Gov. Ron DeSantis (R) signed a bill in June [2019] mandating that the former convicts pay off restitution, court fees and fines before regaining the right to vote, sparking criticism from opponents who said the law amounted to a poll tax.
Several groups, including the Florida State Conference of the NAACP, the Orange County Branch of the NAACP, and the League of Women Voters of Florida, sued the state government following the billās signing."
Editorsā Note: A federal appeals court ruled on February 19, 2020 that a Florida law requiring former felons to pay off restitution, court fees, and fines before voting again violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. Gov. DeSantis has appealed the decision. [171] [172]
May 24, 2020 - People who have completed felony sentences in Florida cannot be barred from voting for owing court fees, rules federal judge
U.S. District Judge Robert Hinkle ruled on Sunday, May 24, 2020 that parts of the Florida law requiring people who have completed felony sentences to pay court fees, fines, and restitution to victims before they can vote is unconstitutional.
Hinkle ruled that the following people who have completed felony sentences should have their right to vote restored: those who were appointed a public defender, those whose fines, fees, and restitution were converted to civil liens (in which property such as a house is put up as collateral for payment), and those who only owe court fees.
The ruling stated, "This order holds that the State can condition voting on payment of fines and restitution that a person is able to pay but cannot condition voting on payment of amounts a person is unable to pay.ā
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on July 16, 2020, that the law requiring payment of fines prior to restoration of voting rights can be enforced by the state of Florida. The case remains in federal appeals court, but, until the resolution of that case, people who have completed felony sentences in Florida may be required to pay any and all outstanding court fines and fees before being allowed to register to vote. [173] [174] [175]
August 5, 2020 - Iowa Gov. Kim Reynolds signs executive order restoring vote to some people who have completed felony sentences
Iowa Gov. Kim Reynolds signed an executive order automatically restoring the vote to some people who have completed felony sentences. People convicted of felony homicide will still have to apply for re-enfranchisement.
Iowa was the last remaining state to have a complete ban on voting for people who have completed felony sentences. The state constitution still disenfranchises all people who have completed felony sentences so the next governor could easily overturn Reynoldsā executive order. [176]
September 11, 2020 - Appeals court upholds Florida law requiring fine and fee payment
The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled 6-4 that Florida can require repayment of fines and fees before people who have completed felony sentences are eligible to vote. The court stated, "Florida withholds the franchise from any felon, regardless of wealth, who has failed to complete any term of his criminal sentenceāfinancial or otherwise." This ruling overturns the May 24, 2020 ruling that struck down the repayment requirement. [177]
September 22, 2020 - Snoop Dogg and Mike Tyson to vote for first time in November 2020 election
Rapper and TV star Snoop Dogg and former heavyweight boxing champion Mike Tyson both said they would vote for the first time in the November 2020 election. Both stars were convicted of felonies, Snoop Dogg in 1990 and 2007 and Tyson in 1992.
Snoop Dogg explained that he was lead to believe he couldnāt vote even after his record was expunged. He stated about voting, āWe got to make a difference, I canāt talk about it and not be about it. I canāt tell you to do it and then not go do it ⦠If I tell you to do something, I done it already.ā
Mike Tyson was ineligible to vote until this year due to Nevada law. Nevada restored voting rights to former felons in 2019. Tyson tweeted on September 22, 2020, āThis election will be my 1st time voting. I never thought I could because of my felony record. Iām proud to finally vote.ā [178] [179] [180]
November 3, 2020 - California voters approve Proposition 17
On November 3, 2020, California voters approved Proposition 17, which allows people on parole to vote. [181]
March 16, 2021 - Virginia governor allows vote after prison
On March 16, 2021, Gov. Ralph Northam issued rules that allows those with felony convictions to vote as soon as they have completed their prison sentences. [182]
April 7, 2021 - Washington governor restores vote to those who have finished prison sentences
Legislation signed on April 7, 2021 by Gov. Jay Inslee restores the right to vote upon release from prison and goes into effect in January 2022. Until then, the right to vote is not restored until prison, parole, and probation are completed. [183]
May 4, 2021 - New York Governor restores vote after prison
On May 4, 2021, Gov. Cuomo signed a bill into law that automatically restores voting rights upon release from prison, even if the person is on parole. Previously, under Cuomoās executive order, the person would have to apply for a review of records. [184]
August 23, 2021 - April 6, 2022 - North Carolina voting rights in question
On August 23, 2021, a three-judge panel in North Carolina issued a preliminary injunction declaring that people with felony convictions who have completed their prison time must be allowed to register to vote immediately. The injunction restored the right to vote to about 56,000 people who are on probation, parole or post-release supervision.
On September 14, 2021, the NC Supreme Court put that ruling on hold while it was appealed. According to Democracy Docket, āIndividuals in the state who are on probation, parole or a suspended sentence may no longer register to vote while the case moves through the appeals process, though those who registered to vote before the lower courtās ruling was paused are still considered registered voters.ā
On March 28, 2022, a NC state court ruled that people with felony convictions could vote once released from prison. However, that ruling was temporarily stayed, pending appeals to the NC State Supreme Court, by the Wake County Superior Court. The ruling states that the NC Board of Election should hold and not act upon voter registrations by people with felony convictions who are out of prison.
North Carolina is marked as a state where people out of prison may vote because some people can if they registered in 2021 before that ruling was stayed. But, as of April 6, 2022, no new registrations are being processed for people on parole or probation, though registrations may be submitted. [185] [186] [187] [188] [189]
June 23, 2021 - Connecticut Governor restores vote to everyone not in prison
On June 23, 2021, Connecticut Gov. Ned Lamont signed legislation restoring the right to vote to all state residents who are not in prison. Previously, people with felony convictions had to have completed parole to vote. [190]
May 20, 2022 - Virginia governor restores vote to those with completed sentences
On May 20, 2022, Gov. Glenn Youngkin announced he would restore voting (and other civil) rights to 3,496 people with felony convictions who have completed their sentences. The Youngkin administration stated rights would be restored āon an ongoing basis.ā [191]
October 25, 2022 - 4.6 million people disenfranchised due to felony convictions
According to The Sentencing Project, about 4.6 million Americans, or 2 percent of the U.S. population, with felony convictions are unable to vote because of state restrictions on voting. 48 states have some sort of restriction on voting for those with felony convictions, with state-level disenfranchisement ranging from 0.15 percent in Massachusetts to more than 8 percent in Alabama, Mississippi, and Tennessee. [152]
March 3, 2023 - Minnesota governor restores vote to those who have completed prison sentences
On March 3, 2023, Gov. Tim Walz signed SF26, which restored the right to vote to people with felony convictions once they complete their prison sentence(s). Minnesota previously required that parole was completed. [38]
January 27, 2025 - U.S. Supreme Court declines review of Mississippiās permanent voting with felony convictions ban
Mississippiās law bars everyone convicted of a felony from voting. Criminal justice advocates brought the case on behalf of disenfranchised residents, but were rebuffed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit. The majority of the 5th Circuit judges indicated disenfranchisement is allowed by the U.S. Constitution and is not a punishment, much less cruel and unusual. Advocates argued the country is trending toward re-enfranchisement and Mississippiās law is especially harsh. The U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the case, leaving the law in place. [11]