transaction cost

transaction cost, economic losses that can result from arranging market relationships on a contractual basis.

In the field of economics, the study of transaction costs originated from the use of aggregative social modeling and its underlying assumption of individuals operating under competitive self-interest. At the highest level of abstraction, there are only markets, and everyone is free to enter into contractual relations with everyone else. Under this view, the firm is seen famously as a nexus of contracts. This approach led economists to expect that contracts will be violated not occasionally but whenever the parties to them find it possible. Emerging from these studies, transaction cost economics focuses on the limitations of contractual relationships.

Transaction cost economics seeks to explain why there are some markets with many organizations in them and why there are some industries dominated by just a few large organizations—called hierarchies. Oliver E. Williamson, the field’s leading innovator and a winner of the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences, sketched a historical argument that explains the transformation of an economy based on many small transactions into one based on large hierarchies that transact among themselves and into which individuals are absorbed. The organizational developments that characterize today’s economy, dominated as it is by such hierarchies, are seen as a more efficient way to organize economic relationships.

Transaction cost economics consists of four main elements:

Together, these four factors make it difficult to contract at low costs and create frictions (i.e., transaction costs) in the marketplace. The capitalist solution is to integrate up and down the production chain by buying out suppliers and the people one sells to. Variations in the way the four factors affect different economic relationships determine the degree to which an industry is concentrated or not.

Transaction cost economics argues that the modern large firm represents a substitution of contractual relationships with an authority relationship. Entrepreneurs who create large hierarchies no longer have to write complicated contracts but can instead use organizational tools such as incentives, coercion, and monitoring to maintain behavioral control.

Coase, R. The nature of the firm. Economica 4 386–405 (1937).

Moe, T. M. Integrating politics and organizations: Positive theory and public administration. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 4 (1) 17–25 (1994).

Williamson, O. (1985). Economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Free Press.