quasi-market

quasi-market, organizationally designed and supervised markets intended to create more efficiency and choice than bureaucratic delivery systems while maintaining more equity, accessibility, and stability than conventional markets. Quasi-markets are also sometimes described as planned markets or internal markets.

From the viewpoint of economics, a market is an exchange mechanism of commodities that is able to match supply and demand, mostly through price adjustments. In this way, a market can also be conceptualized as a self-adjusting monetary incentive system that influences the behaviour of consumers and providers so they agree on terms of exchange. Quasi-markets are also an exchange system that aims to emulate competitive markets’ characteristics of being self-adjusting incentive systems that influence consumers’ and providers’ behaviours. However, such systems are quasi-markets because they have characteristics at both supply and demand levels that differentiate them from conventional markets.

On the supply side, quasi-markets are a form of market system, because there is competition between many providers to attract consumers. However, most of the time those providers do not merely seek a maximization of their profits. In the public sector, those providers are often more or less nonowned organizations or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Providers can also be components or sectors of a single organization that internally trade their services inside a specific form of quasi-market called an internal market. Moreover, internal markets are not open markets, because providers and their products or services often need a third party or purchaser approbation to enter the market.

On the demand side, quasi-markets are designed to create or enhance consumer choice, obliging providers to be responsive to those choices. However, welfare-state quasi-markets differ from conventional ones because, generally, consumers are not directly paying for the service they choose and because price plays only a marginal role, if any, in the consumers’ choice. In private-sector internal markets, pricing does have a direct influence on internal resource allocation, though it does not directly influence a company’s bottom line.

The implementation of any form of quasi-market implies that purchaser and provider are distinct entities and that there is more than one provider. The process by which some entities are granted a purchaser status and the allocative prerogatives that come with it while other entities are given a provider status and broader latitude in their own governance and strategic planning is called a purchaser-provider split.

In most welfare-state quasi-markets, while consumers have a level of choice in the services they consume, it is a third party, often a state-based purchaser, who will pay or reimburse the provider for those services. Quasi-market purchasing can be implemented through fee-for-service reimbursements, vouchers, retrospective budgeting, and the like. Hence, while consumers’ choices will be made according to such factors as perceived quality of service, waiting time, or availability, price will generally play no role in their choice. However, price will matter for the third-party payer, who is expected to limit consumers’ choices to services that have a comparable high value for money. Successful providers are expected to simultaneously respond to purchasers’ demands for low price or good value as well as to consumers’ demands for quality, availability, waiting time, and the like. However, this implies that the necessary information to make a rational choice of providers and services will be accessible in a timely and usable form to both consumers and purchasers. This involves important transaction costs that are supposed to be compensated for by added efficiency.

At the beginning of the 1980s, a shift in the theoretical foundations of state welfare schemes took place in many countries, while neoclassical economics started to replace some of the Keynesian postulates that once predominated. The main purpose of welfare systems shifted from an enhancement of equity and social justice to a maximization of value for money and consumer choice. Quasi-markets were one of the principal means used to reform the delivery of welfare in order to achieve those results. Many sectors were targeted, from education to health care or social housing in countries ranging from New Zealand to Sweden to the United Kingdom. However, the interest in quasi-markets was far from limited to welfare-state interventions, and corporations such as the British Broadcasting Company (BBC), Intel, and British Petroleum (BP) implemented forms of internal markets in some sectors.

Where they have been implemented, the actual functioning of quasi-markets has often been less conclusive than theory would have predicted. The existing delivery infrastructure often considerably limits the extent of potential competition in the market. For example, if there is only one hospital in a given rural region, for many interventions, the extent of consumers’ choice of providers is very low unless they are willing to travel to other regions. Moreover, creating new providers to enhance competition would run opposite to the quasi-market goal of maximizing efficiency.

Even where there are a sufficient number of providers to allow for competition, interprovider competition in many sectors where quasi-markets have been implemented has often been below the expected level. Many factors can account for this. First, in the case of welfare interventions, those who consume the most services (the very young, the very old, the very poor, and disabled people) are the least likely to be able to access, treat, or use the information needed to make a rational choice. Second, from the purchasers’ viewpoint, many services have intrinsic characteristics that make them difficult to assess in terms of value for money. And whereas the quasi-market provides at least theoretical incentives to maximize providers’ performance, it is not clear what the incentives are that would persuade purchasers to make the extra effort needed to compare available services. Finally, the underlying incentive behind the notion of competition is that low-performing providers would either improve or disappear, something that governments have often proved reluctant to see happen.

Julian Le Grand and Will Bartlett (eds.), Quasi-Markets and Social Policy (1993); Bas Denters et al. (eds.), The Rise of Interactive Governance and Quasi-Markets (2003).