Much contemporary growth theory can be viewed as an attempt to develop a theoretical model that would bring the rate of growth of demand and the rate of growth of supply into line, since a model implying that capitalist systems are inherently unstable would not correspond to the historical facts. Models of growth may be classified according to whether they emphasize adjustments in demand (supply-determined models) or adjustments in supply (demand-determined models). One of the better-known examples of the supply-determined model was developed by the British economist J.R. Hicks. Hicks assumed that the spending propensities of consumers and investors were such as to cause demand to grow at a rate in excess of the rate of growth of maximum output. This assumption meant that during any “boom” the economy would eventually run into a “ceiling” that, while also moving upward, was moving less rapidly than demand. The long-run rate of growth of the economy would be determined by the rate of ascent of the ceiling, which in turn would depend upon supply factors such as the rate of growth of the labour force and the rate of growth of technical progress or productivity. If for some reason these were to grow more rapidly, then output would also grow more rapidly as demand adjusted upward to the more rapid growth of supply.
An example of a demand-determined model of growth is one developed by the American economist J.S. Duesenberry. In the Duesenberry model, spending propensities of consumers and investors are such as to generate steady growth in demand. Assume that instead of spending nine-tenths of any change in income on consumer goods, as in the multiplier example above, they choose to spend 0.95. This increase will cause the rate of growth of demand to increase. The question is whether it will also cause the rate of growth of production to increase or whether it will merely result in price increases. If productivity or technical progress responds to a higher rate of growth of demand, as Duesenberry assumes, then production can grow more rapidly. Although in both the Hicks and Duesenberry models demand and supply grow at the same rate, the adjustment mechanisms are entirely different. In the Duesenberry model supply adjusts to demand; in the Hicks model demand adjusts to supply.
Other models of growth also illustrate this distinction between demand-determined and supply-determined growth. The British economist N. Kaldor assumed that there is a mechanism at work generating full employment. Simply stated, in his model an inadequate rate of investment will be offset by shifts in the distribution of income between profits and wages, which will cause consumption to change in a compensating manner so that overall demand is unchanged. While there are important differences between the Hicks and Kaldor models, both can be described as models of supply-determined growth.
Another model of supply-determined growth is that implicit in the traditional neoclassical analysis. The mechanism that adjusts demand to growing supply is the price mechanism, or “invisible hand” of the market, as explained in Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776). This type of model assumes a world devoid of monopoly and uncertainty, in which the markets for capital goods and labour are free to adjust quickly so that “markets are always cleared” in the very short run.
A final example of a model of growth that illustrates the problem of adjustment between supply and demand is to be found in the work of the Dutch economist Jan Tinbergen and his followers. In contrast to neoclassical growth models where the market brings about an adjustment of demand to supply, the “target-instrument” models of Tinbergen assume that the government (as in the Netherlands and other European countries) undertakes to regulate demand and supply in an effort to achieve certain targets such as full employment or a predetermined rate of growth. For example, economists are expected to provide the fiscal authorities with a model that approximates the working of the economy and that indicates what will happen if the government, say, does not change its tax and spending programs in the coming period. These forecasts are appraised in terms of what the authorities consider desirable as a matter of social and economic policy. If it appears that unemployment will be too high and the rate of growth too low, the authorities take countermeasures. The government may, for example, cut taxes on corporate profits in order to stimulate investment. If investment is excessive and there is danger of inflation, the government may take other measures to reduce aggregate demand such as cutting its expenditures. This type of planning procedure has been tried with varying degrees of success. Sweden and the Netherlands are prominent examples of attempts to offset fluctuations in private spending so as to realize full employment and growth. It should be noted that these models do not fit neatly into the demand-determined or supply-determined classification. In the example just given, both the rate of growth of demand and the rate of growth of supply are effectively determined by the fiscal authorities.
The rise in unemployment rates and the slowdown in growth rates of GNP and per capita incomes throughout the capitalist world beginning in the early 1970s is clearly a case where demand and supply did not grow at similar rates. Many economists turned their attention to developing theories to explain this prolonged period of stagnation. A common theme in much of their work was the adverse effects of high unemployment and low utilization of the capital stock on investment and, therefore, on productivity growth.
The high unemployment rates for labour and capital are initially traced to policies restricting aggregate demand that were pursued by monetary and fiscal authorities from the first half of the 1970s. This policy response was widely interpreted by economists as an effort by the authorities to reduce inflation rates that had begun to accelerate in the latter 1960s. The continued use of restrictive policies is then related to fear on the part of the authorities that any attempt to restimulate their economies would merely bring back inflation.
Tighter labour markets resulting from any such stimulative policies are seen to increase the bargaining power of labour, thereby leading to larger wage demands and settlements that in turn feed into prices, causing price inflation to accelerate. This leads to yet higher wage demands in order to protect real wages and thus an explosive wage–price spiral. In addition, more stimulative aggregate demand policies are perceived to result in balance of payments difficulties at existing exchange rates. But any attempt to avoid larger payments deficits by reducing the exchange rate leads to the “importation” of inflation through higher prices of imported goods. The result of such considerations is reluctance of the authorities to attempt to create full employment through stimulative policies.
What emerges from these theories is a chain of causation that describes the way in which, in the period since World War II, inflation and growth have become causally connected through the responses of governments to actual and anticipated inflationary pressures. Inflation and the fear of inflation lead to slow growth and high unemployment because the inability of governments to bring inflation under control at full employment by other means—e.g., an income policy—constrains governments to implement restrictive policies to combat or forestall inflationary pressures. Such responses lead, as they did in the early 1970s, not only to high rates of unemployment of capital and labour but also to low rates of investment and productivity growth. Stagnation is the result, and such a scenario is a likely prospect for capitalism in the future.
Little has been said about foreign trade. Yet growth in most economies is very much dependent upon imports and the ability to export in order to pay for imports. The fact that some economies recovered relatively quickly from World War II and grew much more rapidly in the postwar period than others has stimulated a great deal of comparative analysis in growth theory. The exceptionally high growth rates in Japan and Germany compared to the general sluggishness of the British economy are related to foreign trade. Economists have pointed to the periodic balance of payments crises experienced by Britain and the lack of such crises in Germany. During a boom, as incomes rise the demand for imports will rise also as a natural feature of prosperity. But if exports do not also rise at the same time, the authorities may be forced to take fiscal or monetary countermeasures and slow down the economy in an effort to bring imports and exports back into balance. Or exports may fail to grow sufficiently because labour costs are rising very rapidly and pushing up prices of exports faster than in competing countries.
A policy of encouraging growth has the effect of keeping the demand for imports high and making labour markets tight, thereby tending to push up money wage rates. At the same time, such a policy also tends to encourage innovations and investment projects that are very productive, particularly if the demand pressures are sustained. A “stop” policy naturally has just the opposite effects, both good and bad from the point of view of a country’s balance of payments. The question is which policy will in the long run result in less rapidly rising costs and prices. Many writers have argued that if demand pressures are maintained the response or adjustment of productivity and therefore of supply to these pressures will be such that the country will soon find itself in a more competitive position. Running an economy “flat out,” however, is likely to cause a short-run balance of payments crisis and lead to devaluation of currency.
