Why did Robert Nozick reject patterned theories of distributive justice?

Robert Nozick rejected patterned theories of distributive justice because he believed they rely on a flawed conception of what makes a distribution just. He argued that justice should not be defined by the specific pattern a distribution exhibits at a given time—such as an equal distribution or one based on historical circumstances like effort—but rather by the nature of the transactions through which the holdings were acquired.1

For Nozick, any distribution of holdings is just if it arises from a previous just distribution through legitimate means, such as voluntary transfer or original appropriation. He famously illustrated the flaw in patterned theories using the "Wilt Chamberlain" argument: if individuals voluntarily pay to watch a talented athlete perform, the resulting unequal distribution of wealth is not unjust, as it stems from legitimate, unobjectionable transactions.1

Nozick concluded that enforcing any patterned theory would require constant, gross interference in the liberty of citizens, as the state would have to forbid "capitalist acts between consenting adults" to maintain the desired pattern. Consequently, he advocated for an entitlement theory of justice, where a society is just if everyone is entitled to what they possess.1