Why was monitoring compliance difficult under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention?

Monitoring compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is difficult primarily because the treaty lacks formal provisions for intrusive inspections and a robust reporting system.1

Unlike other arms control agreements, the BWC does not provide member states with strong assurances to verify that other parties are adhering to the terms. This challenge is compounded by the nature of biological weapons themselves:1

• Ease of Concealment: Biological weapons programs do not require large-scale infrastructure or extensive personnel, making them significantly easier to hide than nuclear or conventional arms.1
• Dual-Use Facilities: Clandestine programs can be effectively disguised within legitimate pharmaceutical plants or vaccine-production facilities.1
• Lack of Signatures: Because these facilities serve dual purposes, they often lack unique "signatures" or telltale indicators that would alert international observers to illicit activity.1

Consequently, relying solely on national technical means, such as spy satellites, or traditional human intelligence is often insufficient to detect a clandestine program, leaving the international community without a reliable method to ensure compliance.1