Why have some scholars questioned whether judicial independence can develop in China?

Scholars have questioned the development of judicial independence in China due to the country's unique political structure and the pervasive role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in society.1

Some observers, such as legal scholar Jerome A. Cohen, argue that issues like corruption, local protectionism, and a lack of professional competence are inherent to a one-party state where most judges are party members. From this perspective, significant progress toward the rule of law is viewed as unlikely without thoroughgoing political reform. Evidence cited for this position includes the treatment of lawyers who represent political dissidents or ethnic minorities, which some see as a sign that legal development has plateaued.1

Conversely, other scholars, including Zhu Suli, argue that because Chinese institutions and the role of the party differ so fundamentally from Western models, it is neither realistic nor appropriate to envision judicial independence in China according to the standards typically understood in the United States. These scholars suggest that the Chinese system operates under a different logic, making the Western concept of an independent judiciary less applicable to the Chinese context.1