Why does moral disagreement not necessarily prove that no objective moral truth exists?

Moral disagreement does not necessarily prove that no objective moral truth exists because the existence of a dispute does not negate the possibility of a correct answer. Just as people may hold conflicting beliefs about scientific matters—such as the causes of disease—without implying that those phenomena lack a real, objective cause, moral disagreement may simply indicate that some individuals or societies are more enlightened than others regarding ethical truths.1

Furthermore, the existence of widespread variation in moral codes can be overstated. Anthropologists have observed that many fundamental values, such as prohibitions against murder and requirements for truthfulness, are nearly universal because they are essential for human society to function.12

Ultimately, ethical relativism often relies on the assumption that if no culture-neutral standard is immediately apparent, none can exist. However, from the standpoint of ethics, the diversity of moral beliefs does not rule out the existence of an objective answer; it is entirely conceivable that many societies have simply reached incorrect conclusions. The search for objective moral truth remains a central, ongoing theme in philosophical inquiry.3