Why does evolutionary usefulness not by itself make a moral practice morally right?

In the context of evolutionary ethics, evolutionary usefulness does not equate to moral rightness because scientific facts about human origins or adaptive behaviors cannot logically dictate moral obligations.12

Attempting to derive moral values from evolutionary processes is often criticized as the naturalistic fallacy—the error of inferring nonnatural properties, such as being "morally right," from natural ones. While a behavior may have provided an evolutionary advantage, such as promoting survival or cooperation, this does not establish that the behavior is rational or ethically correct.1

Furthermore, moral philosophy distinguishes between the "is" (what is natural or adaptive) and the "ought" (what is morally required). Policies concerning human rights, dignity, and justice must be determined within the moral realm rather than the scientific one. Relying solely on evolutionary utility to define morality risks justifying harmful practices, such as discrimination or genocide, by misusing scientific findings to validate immoral policies. Ultimately, demonstrating that a trait or practice is an evolutionary adaptation explains its persistence, but it provides no justification for its moral validity.12