Why do other philosophers doubt that biology has laws like those in physics?

In the philosophy of biology, many thinkers doubt that biology possesses laws comparable to those in physics. This skepticism stems from several key arguments regarding the nature of biological generalizations and the structure of scientific theories:

• Need for Excessive Qualification: Critics argue that biological generalizations often require so many qualifications to account for exceptions—such as the platypus in the generalization that all mammals give birth to live young—that they lack the necessary force and universality characteristic of genuine natural laws.1
• Lack of "Force": While some, like Charles Darwin, viewed natural selection as a force analogous to gravity, critics contend that there is no single, identifiable "force" of selection. Instead, they argue that selection is merely a shorthand for a complex host of individual processes, such as organisms living, reproducing, and dying, which may not be governed by a single law.1
• Complexity and Reductionism: Unlike physics, which often relates simple entities like fundamental particles, biological phenomena involve highly complex systems. Attempts to reduce biology to physics or chemistry have faced significant obstacles, such as the lack of "bridge principles" to link biological vocabulary to physical or chemical terms.23
• Context-Dependency: Some philosophers, such as Nancy Cartwright, argue that science is "dappled," consisting of limited pockets of order where models work well, rather than universal laws that apply everywhere and always.2

Consequently, many contemporary philosophers have begun to shift their focus away from the search for universal laws, concentrating instead on the use of models, symmetries, and approximate generalizations within the life sciences.42