Why do moral and political values sometimes affect disagreements between historians?

In the philosophy of history, disagreements between historians often arise because historical inquiry involves an ineliminable evaluative component that cannot be resolved through empirical data alone.1

While some argue for a strictly objective approach, others note that historians must select from a vast mass of material, a process that requires forming judgments about relative importance and significance. These attributions of value are not inherent in the facts themselves but depend on the historian's prior acceptance of specific critical standards.1

Furthermore, the language used to assess human motives and characteristics is inherently evaluative. Consequently, disputes regarding the true causes of major events, such as wars or revolutions, often resist empirical resolution because they are rooted in a historian's adherence to a moral or political standpoint that may not be shared by their opponent. Because these perspectives are often tied to broader ideologies—systems of ideas that seek to explain and influence the world—they inevitably shape how historical evidence is conceptualized and argued.12