Why do critics think compatibilism offers too weak a form of freedom?

Critics argue that compatibilism offers an insufficient form of freedom because it defines free will in a way that remains consistent with universal causal determinism.1

Thinkers like G.E. Moore and A.J. Ayer proposed that acting freely simply means one would have acted differently if they had chosen to do so. Detractors contend this is a weak notion of freedom because it implies an action can be considered free even when it is entirely determined by the past.2

This perspective faces significant criticism for the following reasons:
* Lack of Robust Agency: Critics believe this account fails to provide the kind of free agency humans intuitively desire.2
* Moral Responsibility: A primary concern is that this definition does not adequately imply that individuals are truly morally responsible for their actions.2
* Intuitive Demands: Many argue that compatibilism forces one to accept a definition of free will that is much weaker than what our intuition demands, leading some to seek a more robust form of freedom that is incompatible with a deterministic universe.3