Why did the Soviet Union distrust U.S. assurances about counterforce strategy?

The Soviet Union’s distrust of U.S. assurances regarding counterforce doctrine stemmed from the inherent strategic ambiguity of the policy. While the United States framed counterforce as a defensive, "city avoidance" strategy intended to limit damage in a nuclear war, the Soviet leadership viewed it as inextricably linked to an offensive first strike capability.1

Several factors fueled this skepticism:

• Disarmament Concerns: A counterforce strike aimed at military infrastructure and weapons systems could theoretically disarm an opponent, leaving them unable to retaliate effectively. The Soviets found it difficult to believe that the U.S. intended to reserve such precision strikes solely for a second-strike scenario.1
• Technical Limitations: The high level of precision required to target military installations without causing massive collateral damage was seen as unrealistic. Because many military assets were located near population centers, the Soviets recognized that any counterforce exchange would likely result in widespread civilian destruction, undermining the U.S. claim of "city avoidance".1
• Strategic Parity: The Soviets perceived U.S. planning as a continued effort to gain a decisive nuclear advantage. They viewed the development of sophisticated targeting options not as a stabilizing measure, but as a potential precursor to a preemptive attack.23

Ultimately, the Soviet Union rejected the counterforce doctrine, viewing it as a threat to their security rather than a genuine attempt to establish rules for a limited nuclear exchange.1