Why did some philosophers argue that history is neither a strict science nor an art?

In the philosophy of history, many thinkers have argued that history is neither a strict science nor an art, rejecting the traditional binary classification.1

Why History is Not a Strict Science

Critics argue that history fails to meet the rigorous criteria of the natural sciences as defined in the Anglo-Saxon tradition. Specifically:1
* Lack of Universal Laws: Unlike physics, history possesses no established "covering laws" that can predict outcomes or explain events with logical necessity. Attempts to formulate such laws often result in circular reasoning or are invalidated by counterexamples.1
* Complexity and Chaos: The unpredictability of historical events, often compared to the sensitivity of systems in chaos theory, makes it impossible to specify boundary conditions with the precision required for scientific prediction.1
* Subjectivity: Because historical explanations often rely on interpreting human intentions or social structures, they frequently shift toward rhetoric and plausibility rather than logically compelling, value-free proof.1

Why History is Not Merely an Art

While history shares narrative elements with literature—such as characterization, plotting, and the use of metaphor—it is distinguished from pure art by its commitment to evidence. Historians are bound by the requirement that their narratives consist of true statements consonant with available sources. Unlike fiction, historical work is subject to protocols for validating claims to truth, even if those claims remain interpretative rather than absolute.1

Ultimately, philosophers like Wilhelm Dilthey sought to establish history as an interpretative science (Geisteswissenschaften) in its own right, distinct from the natural sciences yet grounded in a systematic study of the human mind and its historical manifestations.2