Why did Wittgenstein’s later work create a division among analytic philosophers?

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later work created a significant division within analytic philosophy by marking a radical departure from his own earlier doctrines and the prevailing tradition of logical atomism.1

This division emerged primarily due to a shift in methodology and the conception of language:

• Methodological Shift: While the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus utilized a semirigorous, formally organized structure, Wittgenstein’s later approach—often associated with ordinary language philosophy—relied on loosely connected remarks, suggestions, and examples.12
• Rejection of Logical Calculus: Earlier analytic philosophers viewed language as having a fixed, logical structure expressible through symbolic logic. The later Wittgenstein rejected this, arguing that language is a human institution used for an indefinite number of purposes, making it an instrument rather than a rigid calculus.3
• Meaning as Use: Wittgenstein challenged the view that meaning is simply a matter of naming or referring to entities. Instead, he famously proposed that the meaning of a word is its use in the language, emphasizing that language is bound by human practice rather than a priori rules.3

This transformation split the field between those who continued to practice philosophy in the formalist tradition and those who adopted the later Wittgenstein’s informal, conceptual investigations.12