Why did Gilbert Ryle argue that knowing how cannot always be reduced to knowing that?
Gilbert Ryle argued that "knowing how" cannot be reduced to "knowing that" because the two expressions denote fundamentally different types of knowledge.1
"Knowing that," or propositional knowledge, involves the possession of specific information that can typically be articulated and conveyed to others, such as knowing that a historical event occurred on a specific date. In contrast, "knowing how" refers to the possession of a skill or ability, such as knowing how to swim.1
Ryle observed that an individual can possess a skill without being able to explain the underlying information or principles to others. Because one can demonstrate a "know-how" ability without the capacity to translate that skill into a set of propositional facts, Ryle concluded that these two forms of knowledge are independent of each other. This distinction was central to his broader philosophical work, which sought to clarify conceptual confusion arising from the misapplication of language.12