Why did Cicero argue that wicked statutes should not count as true laws?

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Painting by Rembrandt showing Aristotle in rich dark clothing with a gold chain, resting his hand thoughtfully on a marble bust of Homer, illuminated against a dark background. — natural law *Aristotle Contemplating the Bust of Homer*, oil on canvas by Rembrandt van Rijn, 1653; in the collection of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York.

Cicero argued that wicked statutes do not qualify as true laws because he believed that valid law must be rooted in "right reason in agreement with nature".1

In his view, true law is an eternal and unchangeable standard that transcends human-enacted statutes. Because he defined law as being fundamentally tied to objective moral truths, any statute that is wicked or unjust—and which breaks the promises and agreements inherent in a just society—fails to meet the essential moral criteria required to be considered law at all. Consequently, for Cicero, such enactments are merely "anything but 'laws'" because they lack the necessary alignment with the natural, rational order that gives law its authority and legitimacy.1