Why can probability help historians discuss likely outcomes without proving certainty?

In the philosophy of history, the use of probability allows historians to discuss likely outcomes without requiring the absolute certainty of scientific laws. This approach emerged largely as a response to the limitations of applying the rigid, deterministic models of the natural sciences to human events.1

Because historians have not discovered universal "covering laws" for history—and because even minute variations in initial conditions can lead to unpredictable consequences, as suggested by chaos theory—they often rely on probability to explain why an outcome was what "usually or almost always happened" under specific conditions.1

While this method sacrifices the ideal of a logically compelling, invariable explanation, it provides a practical framework for analysis. It allows historians to:1
* Identify generalizations that have a high degree of probability, even if they are not certain.1
* Distinguish between outcomes that were highly likely to occur and those that were complete surprises.1
* Maintain a scholarly focus on plausible interpretations when absolute, objective proof is unattainable due to the complex, subjective nature of historical evidence and human action.12

Ultimately, probability serves as a tool for navigating uncertainty, enabling historians to construct persuasive narratives that reflect the complexities of the past.1