Why can it be difficult to prove genocidal intent in court?

Under international law, genocide is defined by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide as specific acts committed with the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such".1

Proving this "specific intent" (often referred to as dolus specialis) is frequently the most challenging aspect of a genocide prosecution. While the actus reus—the physical commission of crimes like killing or inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about destruction—may be evident, the prosecution must also prove the perpetrator’s subjective state of mind: that these acts were committed specifically to destroy the group as such.12

This is difficult because perpetrators rarely leave explicit documentation of their genocidal intent. Courts must often rely on circumstantial evidence to infer intent, such as the systematic nature of the violence, the targeting of specific groups, or the broader context of the conflict. Tribunals like the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia have clarified that intent can be inferred from the destruction of even a limited number of people if their disappearance is intended to impact the survival of the group as a whole.2