Why can historians not completely avoid making judgments about importance?

In the philosophy of history, historians cannot completely avoid making judgments about importance because they are tasked with selecting relevant information from a vast, overwhelming mass of historical material.1

These attributions of significance cannot be derived directly from the facts themselves. Instead, the process of determining what is important depends on the historian's prior acceptance of specific critical standards. Because historians must conceptualize their data and construct arguments, they inevitably rely on an evaluative component that is inseparable from their work.1

Even in areas such as causal analysis—where one might expect purely empirical results—disputes often arise because historians may hold differing moral or political standpoints that influence how they weigh the importance of various events, such as the causes of wars or revolutions. Consequently, while the ideal of a completely value-free history is theoretically conceivable, it is not considered a practical or realizable goal in historical inquiry.1